Also known as: nolo contendere
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A criminal defendant's plea that does not admit guilt but does not dispute the charge. The plea permits resolution of the case without forcing an admission that could later support civil liability. Courts may accept the plea only after considering the parties' views and the public interest.
Noah Nakamura entered a non vult contendere plea to securities fraud charges after indictment. When a victim later sued in civil court, the defendant moved to bar introduction of the plea itself. The court excluded the plea because the rule treats a non vult contendere plea the same as a withdrawn guilty plea for admissibility purposes.
Nolan Nunez and three co-defendants faced related misdemeanor charges. The prosecutor offered a package deal requiring all to plead guilty or non vult contendere or the offer would be withdrawn. Their shared lawyer could not present the package without first obtaining each client's informed written consent after full disclosure of the aggregate terms.
Neil Nair was indicted in one district but arrested in another. He filed a written statement in the transferee district stating his wish to enter a non vult contendere plea and waiving trial in the original district. The court could not accept the transfer until the United States attorneys in both districts gave written approval.
Naomi Norton received a non vult contendere plea to a felony fraud count. In a later civil suit the plaintiff sought to introduce the resulting judgment to prove essential facts. The court refused admission because the hearsay exception for prior convictions expressly excludes judgments entered on non vult contendere pleas.
Nalini Narula faced federal charges and considered entering a non vult contendere plea. The court addressed her personally to confirm the plea was voluntary and not the product of force or improper promises before accepting it. After acceptance the plea could be withdrawn only on direct appeal or collateral attack.
In 1959, petitioner Brady was charged with kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). The indictment charged that the victim of the kidnapping was not liberated unharmed, so Brady faced a maximum penalty of death if the jury recommended it. Represented by competent counsel throughout, Brady first elected to plead not guilty. He made no serious attempt to reduce the possibility of a death penalty by waiving a jury trial because the trial judge was unwilling to try the case without a jury. Upon learning that his codefendant, who had confessed to the authorities, would plead guilty and be available to testify against him, Brady changed his plea to guilty. The trial judge twice questioned Brady as to the voluntariness of his plea before accepting it. Brady was sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment, later reduced to thirty years. In 1967, Brady sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his plea of guilty was not voluntarily given because the statute operated to coerce his plea, because his counsel exerted impermissible pressure upon him, and because his plea was induced by representations with respect to reduction of sentence and clemency. He also alleged that the trial judge had not fully complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. After a hearing, the District Court for the District of New Mexico denied relief. The District Court found that Brady's counsel did not put impermissible pressure on him to plead guilty and that no representations were made with respect to a reduced sentence or clemency. The court determined that Brady decided to plead guilty when he learned that his codefendant was going to plead guilty. The court concluded that the plea was voluntarily and knowingly made. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, determining that the District Court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and specifically approving the finding that Brady's plea of guilty was voluntary. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the claim that the Court of Appeals was in error in not reaching a contrary result on the authority of United States v. Jackson.
Neville Norton entered plea discussions and later sought to bar use of his statements at trial. The government argued he had waived the usual protections that attach to non vult contendere discussions. The court enforced the waiver because the rule's default exclusion does not prevent parties from agreeing otherwise.
On August 1, 1991, San Diego Narcotics Task Force agents arrested Gordon Shuster after discovering a methamphetamine laboratory at his residence in Rainbow, California. Shuster agreed to cooperate with the agents. He placed a call to respondent Gordon Mezzanatto's pager a few hours later. When Mezzanatto returned the call, Shuster told him that a friend wanted to purchase a pound of methamphetamine for $13,000. Shuster arranged to meet Mezzanatto later that day. At the meeting, Shuster introduced an undercover officer as his friend. Mezzanatto produced a brown paper package containing approximately one pound of methamphetamine from his car. He also presented a glass pipe containing methamphetamine residue and asked the officer if he wanted to take a hit. The officer gave a prearranged arrest signal after leaving the car to retrieve the money. Mezzanatto was arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On October 17, 1991, Mezzanatto and his attorney asked to meet with the prosecutor to discuss cooperating with the Government. At the beginning of the meeting, the prosecutor stated that Mezzanatto would have to agree that any statements made could be used to impeach contradictory testimony at trial if the case proceeded that far. Mezzanatto conferred with counsel and agreed to proceed under those terms. He then admitted knowing the package contained methamphetamine while claiming he had dealt only in ounce quantities and had not visited Shuster's residence for at least a week. The Government confronted Mezzanatto with surveillance evidence showing his car on Shuster's property the day before the arrest. It terminated the meeting for failure to provide completely truthful information. Mezzanatto was later tried on the charge. He took the stand in his own defense. He testified that he thought Shuster used the laboratory to manufacture plastic explosives for the CIA and that he did not know the package contained methamphetamine. Over defense objection, the prosecutor cross-examined Mezzanatto about inconsistent statements from the October 17 meeting. The prosecutor called an attending agent to recount those statements. The jury found Mezzanatto guilty. The District Court sentenced him to 170 months in prison. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed over Chief Judge Wallace's dissent in 998 F. 2d 1452 (1993). The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the decision conflicted with the Seventh Circuit's ruling in United States v. Dortch, 5 F. 3d 1056 (1993).
No. The plea allows the defendant to resolve the case without admitting guilt while still accepting the conviction and sentence. Courts treat it differently from a guilty plea for purposes such as later civil litigation.
A court may accept the plea only with the court's consent after considering the parties' views and the public interest in the effective administration of justice. The defendant must also waive trial rights and the plea must be voluntary.
…the Texas Constitution. Tex. Const., Art. 1, § 3a. Those contentions were rejected. The petitioners, having entered a plea of nolo contendere , were each fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25. App. to Pet. for Cert. 107a-110a. The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the petitioners' federal…
…and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any prior conviction and pleas: Provided, however, that only such evidence in aggravation as the State has made known to the defendant prior to his trial…
…pleaded guilty, Rule 11 read as follows: “A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere . The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge.…
…by death"); S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-655(C)(1) (Supp.2007) ("If the [defendant] has previously been convicted of, pled guilty or nolo contendere to, or adjudicated delinquent for first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor who is less than eleven years of age . . . he must be punished by death or by imprisonment for life");…
…see Pet. for Cert. 10-11), approximately 92.2% of the convictions in the Ninth Circuit were secured through pleas of guilty or nolo contendere . Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts 278 (1992) (Table D-7). During that same period, about…
No. Federal evidence rules bar admission of a nolo contendere plea against the defendant who entered it in subsequent civil or criminal proceedings. The same exclusion applies to statements made during plea discussions that do not result in a guilty plea.
No. Termination of a proceeding by a nolo contendere plea is not itself determinative that the director met the required standard of conduct. The corporation must still determine whether the director acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief that the conduct served corporate interests.
Only if each client gives informed consent in a signed writing after disclosure of the existence and nature of all pleas and each person's participation. The lawyer must also ensure the aggregate structure does not create unwaived conflicts.