Also known as:in nullo est erratum · no error · nil est erratum
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A common-law plea asserting that the record contains no error. The plea is made in response to an assignment of error and has the effect of admitting the well-pleaded facts while denying the existence of any reversible mistake.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Harmless Evidence Exclusion
Nora Nash offered a key email at trial. The court excluded it on a late objection. After judgment for the defense, Nash appealed. The appellate court reviewed the full record and concluded that the remaining admitted evidence on the same point was comprehensive, so the exclusion caused no prejudice to substantial rights.
State Law Standard on Appeal
Nicole Navarro won a jury verdict in a diversity case. The defendant moved for a new trial claiming the damages were excessive under state law. The district court applied the state standard and denied the motion. On appeal the circuit court affirmed, holding that the verdict survived review under the applicable state rule without any record error requiring reversal.
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.518 U.S. 415, 429–431 (1996)
William Gasperini, a journalist and photographer who had taken over 5,000 slide transparencies while reporting in Central America, agreed in 1990 to supply 300 of his original color transparencies to The Center for Humanities, Inc., for use in an educational videotape titled Conflict in Central America. After the project concluded, the Center could not locate or return the transparencies, prompting Gasperini to pursue legal remedies for their loss.
Gasperini, a California citizen, sued the Center, a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New York, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. He invoked diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and alleged state-law claims for breach of contract, conversion, and negligence. The Center conceded liability, so the case proceeded to trial solely on damages.
At the three-day jury trial, Gasperini's expert testified that the industry standard valued each lost transparency at $1,500 as the average license fee over the photographer's copyright term. Gasperini testified that his photography earnings from 1984 through 1993 totaled just over $10,000 and that he planned to publish a book of his best Central American photographs. The jury returned a verdict of $450,000, or $1,500 for each of the 300 slides.
The Center moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, invoking both the federal standard and New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5501(c). The District Court denied the motion without comment. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the judgment after applying the New York deviates-materially standard itself.
The Second Circuit surveyed Appellate Division decisions on similar awards and concluded that the verdict materially deviated from reasonable compensation because many slides were generic and Gasperini had limited earnings. It ordered a new trial unless Gasperini accepted a reduction to $100,000. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict over the proper standard.
Nexus Technologies sued a magazine for libel. The jury found for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, arguing the evidence of actual malice was insufficient. The appellate court examined the entire record and determined that the proof supported the verdict, leaving no error that affected the outcome.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967)
Curtis Publishing Co. published an article in the Saturday Evening Post in 1962 accusing Wally Butts, athletic director of the University of Georgia and a former head football coach, of disclosing Georgia's offensive plays and defensive patterns to Alabama coach Paul Bryant one week before the teams played.
Butts, who was employed by the private Georgia Athletic Association rather than the state, filed a diversity libel action in federal district court in Georgia seeking $5 million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages. The complaint was filed and the trial completed before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in New York Times, and the only defense raised by petitioner Curtis was one of substantial truth.
The evidence showed that Burnett had indeed overheard a conversation between Butts and the Alabama coach, but the content of that conversation was hotly disputed. Expert witnesses supported Butts by analyzing Burnett's notes and the films of the game itself. The Saturday Evening Post's version of the game and of the players' remarks about the game was severely contradicted.
The jury returned a verdict for $60,000 in general damages and for $3,000,000 in punitive damages. The trial court reduced the total to $460,000 by remittitur. Soon thereafter the Supreme Court handed down its decision in New York Times and Curtis immediately brought it to the attention of the trial court by a motion for new trial. The trial judge rejected Curtis' motion on two grounds. He first held that New York Times was inapplicable because Butts was not a public official. He also held that there was ample evidence from which a jury could have concluded that there was reckless disregard by defendant of whether the article was false or not.
Curtis appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which affirmed the judgment of the District Court by a two-to-one vote. The majority there did not reach the merits of petitioner's constitutional claim, holding that Curtis had clearly waived any right it may have had to challenge the verdict and judgment on any of the constitutional grounds asserted in Times, 351 F. 2d 702, 713, on the basis of Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91. Judge Rives dissented, arguing that the record did not support a finding of knowing waiver of constitutional defenses. Rehearing was denied, 351 F. 2d, at 733, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Separately, on September 30, 1962, the Associated Press distributed a news dispatch giving an eyewitness account of events on the campus of the University of Mississippi when a massive riot erupted because of federal efforts to enforce a court decree ordering the enrollment of James Meredith as a student. Walker was a private citizen at the time of the riot and publication. He had pursued a long and honorable career in the United States Army before resigning to engage in political activity. Walker initiated this libel action in the state courts of Texas, seeking a total of $2,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. A verdict of $500,000 compensatory damages and $300,000 punitive damages was returned. The trial judge found no evidence to support the jury's answers that there was actual malice and refused to enter the punitive award. Both sides appealed and the Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed both the award of compensatory damages and the striking of punitive damages. The Supreme Court of Texas denied a writ of error, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Nolan Nunez was charged with robbery. At trial the prosecutor commented on his silence after receiving Miranda warnings. The defense objected. The court sustained the objection, instructed the jury to disregard the comment, and the conviction was later upheld because the brief reference did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant.
Doyle v. Ohio426 U.S. 610 (1976)
Petitioners Jefferson Doyle and Richard Wood were arrested together in Tuscarawas County, Ohio, and charged with selling ten pounds of marijuana to William Bonnell, an informant working with the local narcotics unit. The evidence presented at their separate trials, held about one week apart in the Common Pleas Court, was identical in all material respects. Narcotics agents had arranged with Bonnell to set up a purchase using $1,320 collected from the unit, which Bonnell took to a bar in Dover, Ohio, where he met the petitioners.
Subsequently, Doyle obtained the marijuana and met Bonnell and Wood at a parking lot in New Philadelphia, Ohio, where the transaction occurred under surveillance by four agents. After discovering they had been paid $430 less than agreed, Doyle and Wood chased Bonnell but were stopped by local police acting on instructions from the agents. Agent Kenneth Beamer arrived, arrested both petitioners, and administered Miranda warnings before a search of the car uncovered the $1,320.
At trial, each petitioner testified that Bonnell had framed them by attempting to sell the marijuana to Doyle, who had changed his mind about the quantity, leading Bonnell to throw the money into the car and take the drugs back. During cross-examination, the prosecutor in each trial asked why the petitioner had not told this story to Agent Beamer at the time of arrest, and the trial court overruled defense objections to these questions. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District affirmed the convictions, and the Supreme Court of Ohio denied further review before the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Nalini Narula claimed title under a state grant that the legislature later repealed. She sued the current possessor. The court upheld the original grant. On appeal the reviewing court found the repeal invalid and affirmed the judgment, declaring no error in the record that would disturb the title determination.
Fletcher v. Peck10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810)
The suit was instituted on several covenants contained in a deed made by John Peck, the defendant in error, conveying to Robert Fletcher, the plaintiff in error, certain lands which were part of a large purchase made by James Gunn and others, in the year 1795, from the state of Georgia. The contract for which was made in the form of a bill passed by the legislature of that state.
The first count set forth a breach in the covenant that the legislature of the state of Georgia at the time of passing the act of sale had good right to sell and dispose of the same in manner pointed out by the said act. The second count assigned as a breach that the original grantees had promised and assured members of the legislature an interest in the lands if they voted for the bill. The third count alleged that a subsequent legislature passed an act annulling and rescinding the law under which the conveyance to the original grantees was made. The fourth count assigned as a breach that the right to the soil was in the United States and not in Georgia.
In the circuit court there were demurrers to three pleas and a special verdict found on an issue joined on the fourth plea. The pleas were all sustained and judgment was rendered for the defendant. After the opinion of the court was delivered on the initial demurrers, the parties agreed to amend the pleadings and the cause was continued for further consideration.
The special verdict found the grant of Carolina by Charles the second to the Earl of Clarendon and others. It found the subsequent erection of Georgia as a colony. It found the surrender of the grantees to the crown in 1752. It found the appointment of governors with commissions describing the boundaries. It found the 1763 proclamation creating new colonies and reserving lands on the western waters for the use of the Indians. It found the 1787 convention between South Carolina and Georgia settling their boundary line. The verdict described the situation of the lands in such manner that their lying within the limits of Georgia as defined in the proclamation of 1763, in the treaty of peace, and in the convention between that state and South Carolina has not been questioned. The case comes before this court on the amended pleadings consisting of sundry demurrers and the special verdict.
National Trust was convicted of wire fraud. It appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient. The appellate court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determined that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt, leaving the conviction undisturbed.
Jackson v. Virginia443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979)
On July 29, 1972, the body of Mary Houston Cole was discovered in a secluded church parking lot in Chesterfield County, Virginia. She had been shot twice at close range with a .38-caliber pistol. The victim had last been seen alive the previous evening in the company of petitioner Hugh Jackson, who was carrying a .38-caliber pistol.
Jackson had befriended Cole while he was imprisoned on a disorderly conduct charge at the local county jail. After his release she arranged for him to live in the home of her son and daughter-in-law. On the day of the killing Jackson had been drinking and had spent considerable time shooting at targets with his revolver. Late in the afternoon he unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Cole to drive him to North Carolina. She instead drove him to a local diner where both were observed by several police officers.
A deputy sheriff later observed Jackson and Cole preparing to leave the diner in her car. Jackson was in possession of his revolver and a kitchen knife was visible in the vehicle. Cole's body was found the following day and a half later, naked from the waist down with her slacks beneath her body. Six cartridge cases fired from Jackson's gun were recovered nearby. Jackson drove the victim's car to North Carolina, made a short trip to Florida, and was arrested several days later.
In a post-arrest statement introduced at trial, Jackson admitted shooting Cole but claimed the shooting occurred accidentally during a struggle. He said the victim had attacked him with a knife when he resisted her sexual advances. He stated he had first fired warning shots into the ground and reloaded before the fatal shots. At trial he asserted self-defense or, alternatively, that intoxication had prevented him from forming the specific intent required for first-degree murder under Virginia law.
The trial judge, sitting as factfinder, convicted Jackson of first-degree murder and sentenced him to thirty years in prison. Jackson's motion to set aside the judgment was denied. The Virginia Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of error alleging insufficient evidence.
Jackson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The District Court applied the Thompson v. Louisville no-evidence standard and granted relief after finding insufficient proof of premeditation. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that judgment.
What does the plea of nullum est erratum accomplish?
The plea asserts that the record contains no error. It functions as a denial of any reversible mistake while admitting the well-pleaded facts in the assignment of error.
How does Rule 61 relate to the concept of no error in the record?
Rule 61 directs courts to disregard errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights. This embodies the principle that only errors causing prejudice warrant disturbing a judgment.
Supporting sources
When may an appellate court find no error despite an evidentiary ruling?
An appellate court finds no error when the excluded or admitted evidence is cumulative of other properly received proof and the ruling therefore does not affect substantial rights.
Supporting sources
Does failure to object at trial always bar a later claim of error?
Failure to make a timely objection ordinarily forfeits the claim. The court will not disturb the judgment unless the unpreserved error is plain and affects substantial rights.
Supporting sources
…346-347, 348-349, 350-351, and possibly a fourth, see Brief for Nonfederal Respondents in No. 76-528, pp. 19-20, n. 8. We see
no error
in the Commission's actions in this respect. Footnotes : NRDC argues that the agency has in the past provided more than the minimum procedures specified in § 4 of the APA and…