Also known as: remand · remanded · remanding · remanded for further proceedings
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A procedural directive by which an appellate court or federal district court returns a case to a lower court or state court for further proceedings consistent with the higher court's ruling. The directive may address jurisdictional defects, bias concerns, or the need for additional fact-finding. It restores authority to the receiving court while limiting the scope of issues that may be reconsidered.
Orla O'Malley sued Omega Energy in state court on state-law claims. Omega removed the action, asserting federal question jurisdiction. Orla moved to remand more than thirty days later, citing a procedural defect in the notice of removal. The district court denied the motion because the statutory deadline had passed and subject-matter jurisdiction existed.
Oscar Ortiz prevailed before a judge who held a substantial personal financial stake in similar pending litigation. The court of appeals found the appearance of bias intolerable under due process. It vacated the judgment and directed further proceedings before a different judge.
Otto Osman obtained a favorable judgment from a judge who had served as trustee of a university negotiating with the opposing party. The conflict surfaced after judgment. The appellate court vacated the decision and remanded for proceedings before a judge free of the statutory disqualification.
Onyx O'Reilly challenged a coastal commission's permit condition requiring a public access easement. The trial court invalidated the condition and sent the matter back for an evidentiary hearing on whether the development created a direct impact on public access.
The Nollans own a beachfront lot in Ventura County, California. A concrete seawall approximately eight feet high separates the beach portion of their property from the rest of the lot. The historic mean high tide line determines the lot's oceanside boundary. The Nollans originally leased their property with an option to buy, and the building on the lot was a small bungalow totaling 504 square feet. The Nollans' option to purchase was conditioned on their promise to demolish the bungalow and replace it. On February 25, 1982, they submitted a permit application to the California Coastal Commission proposing to demolish the existing structure and replace it with a three-bedroom house. The Commission informed them that the permit would be granted subject to the condition that they allow the public an easement to pass across a portion of their property bounded by the mean high tide line and their seawall. On June 3, 1982, the Nollans filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the Ventura County Superior Court to invalidate the access condition. The court remanded the case to the Commission for a full evidentiary hearing. After the hearing, the Commission reaffirmed the condition. The Superior Court ruled in favor of the Nollans on statutory grounds and directed that the permit condition be struck. While the Commission's appeal to the California Court of Appeal was pending, the Nollans tore down the bungalow, built the new house, and bought the property. The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court. The Nollans appealed to this Court, raising only the constitutional question.
View caseOriana Oberman sued state officials alleging that legislative districts violated equal protection. The Supreme Court found the claim justiciable and returned the case to the district court for development of the factual record on invidious discrimination.
In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties. The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass. Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties. Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment. A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.
View caseOlga O'Neill sued after coastal regulations barred all development on her beachfront lots. The Supreme Court held that a total deprivation of economic use requires compensation unless background nuisance principles prohibit the use. It remanded for the state court to determine whether any such principles applied.
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation. Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures. Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.
View caseA motion to remand based on any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be filed within thirty days after the notice of removal. After that deadline the defect is waived and the federal court may retain the case.
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The judgment is vacated and the case is returned to a neutral tribunal for further proceedings. The risk of actual or apparent bias requires a fresh adjudication before a different decision-maker.
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Yes. The statute imposes an objective standard. When the violation is neither harmless nor trivial, the judgment is vacated and the matter is remanded for proceedings before a judge free of the disqualification.
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The lower court must first determine whether background principles of state property or nuisance law already prohibited the owner's intended use. Only after that inquiry can the court decide whether a compensable taking occurred.
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…The ordinance is an arbitrary and irrational regulation. The judgment of the Ohio Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Concurring opinions Concurring — Mr. Justice Brennan I join the plurality opinion of Mr. Justice Powell. I write separately to emphasize that…