Also known as: PI · personal injury
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A recovery for personal injury that counts as individual property under marital property statutes except to the extent it reimburses expenses paid from marital property.
After a car crash Piper Patel received a settlement check for her broken leg and lost wages. Medical bills had been paid from the couple's joint account. The portion of the settlement that repaid those joint expenses is classified as marital property while the balance remains Piper's individual property.
Priscilla Parks bought a new car from a dealer. Six days later the steering failed and she suffered a fractured pelvis. The portion of any later settlement that repaid medical bills paid from marital funds is classified as marital property while the balance remains her individual property.
In May 1955, Claus H. Henningsen purchased a new 1955 Plymouth Plaza Club Sedan from Bloomfield Motors, Inc., an authorized De Soto and Plymouth dealer for Chrysler Corporation. Mr. Henningsen intended the car as a Mother's Day gift for his wife, Helen Henningsen, and communicated that intention to the dealer. He alone signed a one-page printed purchase-order form. The reverse side contained, in fine six-point script type, a warranty clause limiting the manufacturer's obligation to replacement of defective parts within ninety days or four thousand miles and disclaiming all other warranties, express or implied. The front of the form contained two even smaller paragraphs directing attention to the back-side conditions. The form was a standardized document prepared by the manufacturer and used by all its dealers. No one called the fine-print provisions to Mr. Henningsen's attention, and he did not read them. The car was delivered on May 9, 1955, after the dealer performed the items listed in Chrysler's New Car Preparation Service Guide. On May 19, 1955, while Mrs. Henningsen was driving north on Route 36 in Highlands, New Jersey, at twenty to twenty-two miles per hour on a smooth, paved highway, she heard a loud noise from the front of the car. The steering wheel spun in her hands and the vehicle veered sharply into a highway sign and brick wall. The car had been driven only 468 miles, had required no servicing, and had exhibited no unusual behavior before the accident. An insurance appraiser with eleven years of experience examined the wrecked vehicle and concluded that something in the steering mechanism from the wheel down to the front wheels had broken or dropped off. Plaintiffs also presented expert testimony that the steering failure resulted from a latent manufacturing defect that could not have been discovered by reasonable inspection. The negligence counts against both defendants were dismissed at trial. The case was submitted to the jury solely on the implied-warranty claims. The jury returned verdicts for both plaintiffs against Chrysler Corporation and Bloomfield Motors, Inc. Defendants appealed and plaintiffs cross-appealed from the dismissal of the negligence claim. The Supreme Court of New Jersey certified the matter directly before consideration by the Appellate Division.
View caseAn officer stopped Perry Pratt on suspicion of casing a store. A later claim alleged excessive force caused injury. Any recovery would be individual property except to the extent it reimbursed expenses paid from marital property.
On October 31, 1963, Cleveland police detective Martin McFadden, a 39-year veteran assigned to downtown Cleveland for 30 years, observed John W. Terry and Richard Chilton standing on the corner of Huron Road and Euclid Avenue. McFadden took up a post of observation 300 to 400 feet away. He watched as the two men walked back and forth along Huron Road, pausing repeatedly to look in the window of a store before conferring with each other. This pattern repeated roughly a dozen times over ten to twelve minutes. A third man, Katz, joined them briefly before departing, after which Terry and Chilton followed the same path. By this time McFadden had become thoroughly suspicious that the men were casing the store for a robbery and feared they might be armed. McFadden approached the three men in front of Zucker's store, identified himself as a police officer, and asked their names. When they mumbled responses, he grabbed Terry, spun him around, patted down the outer clothing of his overcoat, and felt a pistol in the left breast pocket. He removed a .38-caliber revolver from Terry's pocket and ordered the men into the store, where he similarly frisked Chilton and discovered another revolver while finding no weapons on Katz. Terry and Chilton were arrested and charged with carrying concealed weapons. Prior to trial they moved to suppress the revolvers as the product of an unlawful search. The trial court denied the motion after hearing McFadden's testimony, finding that the officer had reasonable cause to believe the defendants were acting suspiciously and that the frisk was necessary for his protection. After the denial, Terry and Chilton waived jury trial, were convicted, and sentenced to one to three years in the penitentiary. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePablo Perez operated a laundry that city officials closed under an ordinance applied only to Chinese-owned businesses. Any recovery for resulting harm would be individual property except to the extent it reimbursed expenses paid from marital property.
Yick Wo and Wo Lee were Chinese subjects operating laundries in San Francisco. Both petitioners complied with every requisite deemed necessary by law or public officers for the protection of neighboring property from fire and against injury to the public health. The ordinances of the supervisors of the county and city of San Francisco conferred upon the supervisors a naked and arbitrary power to grant or withhold consent without reference to the personal character or qualifications of applicants or the adaptation of the buildings. They did not point to a regulation of the business of keeping and conducting laundries with a view to protection against fire. Applications for consent submitted by Yick Wo, Wo Lee, and more than two hundred other Chinese subjects were denied by the supervisors. At the same time, eighty individuals who were not Chinese subjects received permission to carry on the same business under similar conditions. Yick Wo was convicted and imprisoned for violating the ordinances. His case was brought to the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of error from the Supreme Court of California. Wo Lee's parallel case advanced through the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California. The matters reached the Supreme Court of the United States for review of federal questions arising under the Constitution and treaties.
View casePamela Phillips sued in her home state after suffering a severe back injury in another state. The defendant moved to transfer venue. Any recovery would be individual property except to the extent it reimbursed expenses paid from marital property.
On October 4, 1960, a commercial airliner scheduled to fly from Boston to Philadelphia plunged into Boston Harbor shortly after departing from a Boston airport. This crash led to the institution of over 150 actions for personal injury and wrongful death against the airline, manufacturers of the aircraft, the United States, and in some cases the Massachusetts Port Authority. More than 100 of these actions were brought in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. More than 45 actions were instituted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The present case involves 40 wrongful death actions brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by personal representatives of victims of the crash. These plaintiffs are described as Pennsylvania fiduciaries representing the estates of Pennsylvania decedents. The defendants moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer these actions to the District of Massachusetts. The defendants alleged that most of the witnesses resided there and that over 100 other actions were already pending in that district. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to transfer the actions. The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred and should vacate its transfer order. The Court of Appeals concluded that a transfer could be granted only if the plaintiffs had qualified to sue in Massachusetts at the time the suits were brought in Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review important questions concerning the construction and operation of § 1404(a). Prior citations in the case include the District Court decision at 204 F. Supp. 426 and the Court of Appeals decision at 309 F. 2d 953.
View casePierce Patterson alleged that an independent counsel's prolonged investigation caused reputational and emotional harm. Any recovery would be individual property except to the extent it reimbursed expenses paid from marital property.
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View caseThe recovery is individual property except for the portion that reimburses expenses already satisfied from marital property. That portion is treated as marital property under the statute.
Supporting sources
No. The disclaimer does not bind the injured spouse who did not sign the purchase order, allowing the personal injury action to proceed.
Supporting sources
…Stat. 1240. The Commission's function was to receive and adjudicate certain claims for compensation from those who had suffered personal injury or property damage at the hands of the enemy during World War II. Commissioners were appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, but the statute made no provision…