Also known as: PAC · political action committee · political action committees · Political Action Committee
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A segregated fund established by a corporation or labor union to collect voluntary contributions from employees or members and make political contributions and expenditures in federal elections.
Pacific Bank forms a PAC and donates to a state official who later awards the bank a lucrative bond-counsel engagement. The firm's managing partner, who solicited the contributions, faces discipline because the donations were made to obtain the legal work.
Prosperity Investments establishes a PAC that contributes directly to federal candidates. The PAC's activities are upheld because the contributions come from a separate segregated fund rather than the corporation's general treasury.
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Communications Act of 1934, and other statutes to address the role of soft money and issue advocacy in federal elections. Plaintiffs included a diverse group of entities and individuals such as the National Rifle Association and the American Civil Liberties Union who alleged that BCRA was unconstitutional. Defendants included the Federal Election Commission and the Attorney General of the United States. The case was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and heard by a three-judge panel pursuant to special procedures in BCRA Section 403. The District Court received a voluminous record from the parties and issued a judgment on May 1, 2003, that upheld some provisions of BCRA and invalidated others. All losing parties filed direct appeals to the Supreme Court within ten days, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction on June 5, 2003, ordering expedited briefing and argument on September 8, 2003. More than a century of federal legislation preceded BCRA, beginning with the Tillman Act of 1907 that banned corporate contributions in connection with federal elections. Congress later extended prohibitions to unions, required disclosure of contributions and expenditures, and enacted FECA in 1971 with further amendments in 1974 that imposed contribution limits, expenditure ceilings, and created the FEC. The Supreme Court addressed constitutional challenges to the 1974 amendments in Buckley v. Valeo. After Buckley, the FEC permitted political parties to fund mixed-purpose activities such as voter registration and generic advertising in part with soft money not subject to FECA's source and amount limits. Soft-money fundraising by the national parties grew from $21.6 million in 1984 to $498 million in 2000, with large corporate and union donations often motivated by a desire for access to federal candidates. National parties transferred substantial soft money to state parties, which could use higher percentages for mixed activities under FEC allocation rules. The use of soft money also supported so-called issue ads that avoided express advocacy of a candidate's election or defeat and therefore fell outside FECA's disclosure and source restrictions. These ads frequently aired in the 60 days before federal elections, referred to clearly identified candidates, and were funded by corporations, unions, and tax-exempt organizations using misleading names. A Senate investigation into 1996 federal election practices documented both parties' use of soft money to obtain special access for large donors and the coordination of issue ads with candidates. The District Court compiled extensive evidence from declarations, expert reports, and internal party documents showing that federal officeholders solicited soft-money donations, that parties maintained tallies crediting donors to particular candidates, and that large soft-money contributions were often made to secure influence rather than for ideological reasons.
View caseParagon Construction's union PAC makes expenditures on television ads supporting a candidate. The expenditure is protected because the PAC operates independently and the speech is not coordinated with the campaign.
Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation with an annual budget of about $12 million. Most of its funds come from donations by individuals, though it accepts a small portion from for-profit corporations. In January 2008, Citizens United released a 90-minute documentary film entitled Hillary: The Movie. The film mentions Senator Hillary Clinton by name and depicts interviews with political commentators, most of them critical of her. Hillary was released in theaters and on DVD, but Citizens United wanted to increase distribution by making the film available through video-on-demand. In December 2007, a cable company offered to make Hillary available on a video-on-demand channel called Elections '08 for a payment of $1.2 million. The proposal was to make the film available to viewers free of charge. To promote the video-on-demand offering, Citizens United produced two 10-second ads and one 30-second ad. Each ad includes a short statement about Senator Clinton followed by the name of the movie and the movie's website address. Citizens United desired to promote the offering by running the advertisements on broadcast and cable television within 30 days of primary elections. Before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, federal law prohibited corporations from using general treasury funds to make independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate in connection with certain federal elections. BCRA §203 amended the law to prohibit any electioneering communication. An electioneering communication is any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election when publicly distributed so that it can be received by 50,000 or more persons in a relevant state. Concerned about possible civil and criminal penalties for violating 2 U.S.C. §441b, Citizens United filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in December 2007. It sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that §441b is unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and that BCRA's disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements are unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and the ads. The District Court denied Citizens United's motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the Federal Election Commission's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was reargued after the Court requested supplemental briefs addressing whether Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the relevant portion of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission should be overruled.
View caseProgressive Healthcare employees contribute to a PAC that funds litigation against a state voter-identification statute. The PAC's standing is recognized because the law imposes burdens on the organization's members who seek to vote.
In 2005, the Indiana General Assembly enacted Senate Enrolled Act No. 483, referred to as the Voter ID Law or SEA 483. The statute requires citizens voting in person at primary and general elections to present a government-issued photo identification card. It does not apply to absentee ballots submitted by mail. There is an exception for persons living and voting in a state-licensed facility such as a nursing home. Voters who lack compliant photo identification may cast a provisional ballot. The ballot will be counted only if they execute an appropriate affidavit before the circuit court clerk within ten days following the election. A voter who is indigent or has a religious objection to being photographed may cast a provisional ballot that will be counted only if she executes an appropriate affidavit before the circuit court clerk within 10 days following the election. The state offers free photo identification to qualified voters able to establish their residence and identity. Promptly after the enactment of SEA 483 in 2005, the Indiana Democratic Party and the Marion County Democratic Central Committee filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the state officials responsible for its enforcement. A second suit seeking the same relief was brought on behalf of two elected officials and several nonprofit organizations representing groups of elderly, disabled, poor, and minority voters. The cases were consolidated, and the State of Indiana intervened to defend the validity of the statute. After discovery, District Judge Barker prepared a comprehensive 70-page opinion explaining her decision to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment. She found that petitioners had not introduced evidence of a single, individual Indiana resident who will be unable to vote as a result of SEA 483 or who will have his or her right to vote unduly burdened by its requirements. She rejected as utterly incredible and unreliable an expert's report that up to 989,000 registered voters in Indiana did not possess either a driver's license or other acceptable photo identification. She estimated that as of 2005, when the statute was enacted, around 43,000 Indiana residents lacked a state-issued driver's license or identification card. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Four judges voted to grant a petition for rehearing en banc. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePaula Pierce, a judicial candidate, receives contributions from a lawyers' PAC. The state may not prohibit the candidate from announcing positions on legal issues because the PAC support does not create an appearance of bias requiring recusal.
Since Minnesota's admission to the Union in 1858, the State's Constitution has provided for the selection of all state judges by popular election. Since 1912, those elections have been nonpartisan. Since 1974, they have been subject to a legal restriction which states that a candidate for a judicial office, including an incumbent judge, shall not announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. The Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct containing this announce clause is based on the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct. In 1996, petitioner Gregory Wersal ran for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court. During his campaign, he distributed literature criticizing several Minnesota Supreme Court decisions on issues such as crime, welfare, and abortion. A complaint was filed against him with the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility challenging the propriety of this literature under the announce clause. The Lawyers Board dismissed the complaint, expressing doubt whether the clause could constitutionally be enforced, but Wersal withdrew from the election out of concern for his law practice. In 1998, Wersal ran again for the same office. Early in that race, he sought an advisory opinion from the Lawyers Board on enforcement of the announce clause but received an equivocal response because he had not submitted specific announcements. Shortly thereafter, Wersal and other plaintiffs including the Minnesota Republican Party filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. They sought a declaration that the announce clause violates the First Amendment and an injunction against its enforcement. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court found in favor of respondents, holding that the announce clause did not violate the First Amendment. Over a dissent, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View casePilar Pena's PAC donates to candidates who support extending copyright terms. The contributions are lawful because the PAC is a separate entity and the donations do not violate limits on direct corporate expenditures.
In 1998 Congress enacted the Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the duration of all federal copyrights by twenty years. For works created by identified natural persons the new term runs from creation until seventy years after the author's death. For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire the term is ninety-five years from publication or one hundred twenty years from creation, whichever expires first. The statute applied these extended terms both to copyrights already in existence and to works created after its effective date. Petitioners are individuals and businesses whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaration that the extension of existing copyrights exceeded Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and violated the First Amendment. On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings the district court entered judgment for the Attorney General. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. A majority of the panel upheld the statute against both challenges, while Judge Sentelle dissented in part on the Copyright Clause issue. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the extension of existing copyrights exceeds Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and whether the extension violates the First Amendment.
View caseA PAC is a separate segregated fund that may receive voluntary contributions and make contributions to candidates. Direct contributions from a corporation's general treasury to federal candidates remain prohibited.
Supporting sources
Lawyers may participate in the political process through PAC contributions, but contributions made for the purpose of obtaining a government legal engagement or judicial appointment violate professional conduct rules.
McConnell upheld the requirement that corporations and unions use PACs rather than general treasury funds for federal election contributions and expenditures.
Supporting sources
…but it expressly permitted corporations and unions to establish and administer separate segregated funds (commonly known as political action committees, or PACs) for election-related contributions and expenditures. Id. , at 12-13. See Pipefitters v. United States , 407 U.S. 385, 409-410 (1972). As the 1972 presidential elections made…