Also known as: paramount laws · supreme law · highest law
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A foundational principle establishing the United States Constitution as the highest law that binds all courts and officials. Courts must apply the Constitution over any conflicting state or federal statute.
The Wyoming Restaurant Association challenged a state health code that banned food additives already approved under a federal program with uniform national standards. Officials had enforced the state ban against restaurants serving meals to customers. The court held that the federal approval controlled and the state code could not be applied.
Gretchen filed a state-court claim alleging violations of labor protections in an international digital trade pact. The President issued a memorandum directing state agencies to enforce the pact directly. The Department of Labor declined to apply the pact because Congress had passed no implementing legislation.
Earl claimed overtime under an international labor-standards agreement that contained an express non-self-executing declaration. A presidential memorandum directed the Department of Homeland Security to enforce the agreement in state wage disputes. The hearing officer applied only State A labor statutes because the agreement lacked domestic effect.
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses. To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building. A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district. Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application. The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses. Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.
View caseThe Bank of the United States operated a branch in Maryland after Congress chartered it under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Maryland imposed a tax on the bank that would have impaired its operations. The Court held that the federal charter controlled and the state tax could not stand.
In April 1816, Congress passed an act entitled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States." The Bank organized in Philadelphia pursuant to the act and in 1817 established a branch in the City of Baltimore that from that time until May 1, 1818, transacted business by issuing bank notes, discounting promissory notes, and performing other customary operations under the authority of the corporate body established at Philadelphia. On February 11, 1818, the General Assembly of Maryland passed an act entitled "An act to impose a tax on all banks, or branches thereof, in the State of Maryland, not chartered by the legislature." The Maryland statute provided that any such branch could not lawfully issue notes except upon stamped paper of specified denominations furnished by the Treasurer of the Western Shore, or could relieve itself from that requirement by paying annually in advance to the Treasurer the sum of $15,000. Officers offending against the provisions forfeited $500 for each offense, and persons circulating unstamped notes forfeited up to $100, with penalties recoverable by indictment or action of debt. James W. McCulloch, cashier of the Baltimore branch, on the days set forth in the declaration issued bank notes to George Williams in Baltimore in part payment of a promissory note discounted by the branch, and those notes were not issued on stamped paper as prescribed by the Maryland act; neither the bank nor its branch had paid the $15,000 in advance before or since the issuance of those notes. John James, who sued as well for himself as for the State of Maryland, brought an action of debt against McCulloch in the County Court of Baltimore County to recover the penalties. The parties submitted a statement of agreed facts to the court, which rendered judgment against McCulloch; the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed that judgment, and McCulloch brought the cause to the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of error.
View caseThe President issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate steel mills during a labor dispute. Steel companies challenged the order as lacking statutory or constitutional authority. The Court held that the order could not override existing legal constraints on executive power.
In the latter part of 1951, a dispute arose between steel companies including Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. and their employees represented by the United Steelworkers of America, C.I.O., over terms and conditions to be included in new collective bargaining agreements. Long-continued conferences failed to resolve the dispute. On December 18, 1951, the union gave notice of an intention to strike when the existing agreements expired on December 31. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service intervened without success. On December 22, 1951, President Truman referred the dispute to the Federal Wage Stabilization Board to investigate and make recommendations for fair and equitable terms of settlement. The Board's report resulted in no settlement. On April 4, 1952, the union gave notice of a nationwide strike to begin at 12:01 a.m. on April 9. The President believed that the proposed work stoppage would immediately jeopardize national defense because steel is an indispensable component of substantially all weapons and other war materials. A few hours before the strike was to begin, on April 8, 1952, the President issued Executive Order 10340 directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the steel mills and keep them running. The Secretary immediately issued possessory orders calling upon the presidents of the seized companies to serve as operating managers for the United States. Obeying the Secretary's orders under protest, the companies brought proceedings against him in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Their complaints charged that the seizure was not authorized by an act of Congress or by any constitutional provision and asked the court to declare the orders invalid and to issue preliminary and permanent injunctions. The Government opposed the motion for a preliminary injunction, asserting that the President had inherent power supported by the Constitution, historical precedent, and court decisions. On April 30, 1952, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from continuing the seizure and possession of the plants. On the same day the Court of Appeals stayed the District Court's injunction. Deeming it best that the issues be promptly decided by the Supreme Court, the Court granted certiorari on May 3, 1952, and set the cause for argument on May 12.
View caseNew York granted Aaron Ogden an exclusive license to operate steamboats between New York and New Jersey. Thomas Gibbons operated under a federal coasting license on the same route. The Court held that the federal license controlled and the state monopoly could not be enforced.
In 1798 the New York Legislature granted Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive right for twenty years to navigate the waters within the jurisdiction of the state with boats moved by fire or steam, a privilege later renewed and extended in 1803 and 1807. The right was assigned first to John R. Livingston and then to Aaron Ogden, who thereby claimed authority to operate steamboats between Elizabethtown, New Jersey, and New York City. Thomas Gibbons, meanwhile, took possession of two steamboats, the Stoudinger and the Bellona, which he employed in the same waters while holding a license issued under the federal Act of February 18, 1793, for enrolling and licensing vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries. Gibbons filed a bill in the Court of Chancery of New York against Ogden seeking an injunction to restrain Ogden from navigating those waters with steamboats. The bill recited the state grants and the assignment to Ogden, alleged that Ogden was violating the exclusive privilege, and prayed for injunctive relief. Gibbons answered that his vessels were duly enrolled and licensed under the 1793 federal statute and insisted on his right to navigate between Elizabethtown and New York notwithstanding the state legislation. The Chancellor awarded the injunction and, after hearing, perpetuated it on the ground that the New York acts were valid. The Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors, the highest court of the state to which the cause could be carried, affirmed the decree. Gibbons then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
View caseThe state law must yield because the Supremacy Clause establishes federal law as the supreme law of the land. A state health code banning an additive that federal policy affirmatively approves creates a direct conflict that invalidates the state measure.
No. A non-self-executing treaty has no domestic legal effect absent implementing legislation from Congress. The President cannot direct state agencies or courts to enforce such a treaty through a memorandum alone.
No. Treaties and executive agreements are not co-equal with the Constitution and cannot authorize action that violates constitutional limits. An agreement that purports to override those limits exceeds permissible scope.
No. A non-self-executing treaty has no domestic legal effect absent implementing legislation from Congress. The President cannot direct state agencies or courts to enforce such a treaty through a memorandum alone.