Also known as: particularized harm · particularized injury
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
An injury that is concrete and particularized to the plaintiff. The injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way rather than constituting a generalized grievance shared equally by all citizens.
The specific harm that results from a tortious act. Liability attaches when the defendant intends the harm or creates or increases the risk of that harm and the harm occurs through foreseeable or intervening forces within the created risk.
An injury that is concrete and particularized to the plaintiff. The injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way rather than constituting a generalized grievance shared equally by all citizens.
The specific harm that results from a tortious act. Liability attaches when the defendant intends the harm or creates or increases the risk of that harm and the harm occurs through foreseeable or intervening forces within the created risk.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Citizens for Clean Government sued a federal agency alleging it violated a statute by failing to issue public integrity regulations. The complaint asserted only that the violation undermined public trust in government without identifying any distinct harm to the organization or its members. The court dismissed the suit because the asserted injury was a generalized grievance shared by all citizens rather than a concrete and particularized injury to the plaintiff.
1 common questions
A particularized injury affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. A generalized grievance is an undifferentiated interest shared equally by all citizens in having the government follow the law. The latter does not confer standing even when Congress authorizes citizen suits.
Supporting sources
Preston Pratt deliberately released a chemical near Paige Porter's property with the purpose of causing her specific respiratory distress. The chemical reached Porter and caused the intended breathing difficulty even though an unexpected wind shift carried it farther than Pratt expected. Pratt remained liable for the respiratory harm because he acted with the purpose of causing that particular harm.
Phoenix Technologies negligently stored flammable materials in a way that increased the risk of fire spreading to neighboring properties. A third party later ignited a small blaze that the stored materials caused to reach and damage Progressive Healthcare's building. Phoenix remained liable for the fire damage because its conduct created the risk of that particular harm and was a substantial factor in causing it.
Philip Powell intentionally damaged Priya Prasad's equipment knowing the risk of lost production. Prasad failed to take available steps to limit further losses after learning of the damage. Prasad could still recover damages for the particular harm Powell intended because the tortfeasor acted with awareness of the harm and reckless disregard for it.
Consolidated Rail Corp. negligently allowed a chemical spill that forced People Express Airlines to cancel flights and lose revenue. The airline suffered direct economic losses traceable to the particular harm created by the spill. The court permitted recovery because the negligent conduct increased the risk of that specific economic injury and the harm was within the scope of the created risk.
On July 22, 1981, a fire began in the Port Newark freight yard of defendant Consolidated Rail Corporation when ethylene oxide manufactured by defendant BASF Wyandotte Company escaped from a tank car owned by defendant Union Tank Car Company and leased to BASF. The tank car was punctured during a coupling operation with another rail car and ignited. The municipal authorities evacuated the area within a one-mile radius surrounding the fire, which included the North Terminal building of Newark International Airport where plaintiff People Express Airlines’ business operations are based. People Express employees were prohibited from using the North Terminal for twelve hours, although the feared explosion never occurred. The plaintiff contends that it suffered business-interruption losses as a result of the evacuation. These losses consisted of cancelled scheduled flights and lost reservations because employees were unable to answer the telephones to accept bookings. Fixed operating expenses allocable to the evacuation period were incurred and paid despite the offices being closed. No physical damage to airline property and no personal injury occurred. According to the original complaint, each defendant acted negligently and these acts proximately caused the plaintiff’s harm. An amended complaint alleged additional counts of nuisance and strict liability. Conrail moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that absent property damage or personal injury economic loss was not recoverable in tort. The trial court also granted summary judgment motions by BASF and Union Car on the same reasoning. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and remanded the cause to the trial court. This Court granted defendant Union Car’s petition for certification, in which Conrail and BASF joined. Plaintiff asserted at oral argument that at least some of the defendants were aware from prior experiences that ethylene oxide is a highly volatile substance. Further, emergency response plans in case of an accident had been prepared. When the fire occurred that gave rise to this lawsuit, some of the defendants’ consultants helped determine how much of the surrounding area to evacuate.
2 common questions
Liability continues when the defendant's negligent conduct created or increased the risk of that particular harm and was a substantial factor in causing it. An intervening force does not relieve liability unless the harm was intentionally caused by a third person outside the scope of the risk created by the defendant.
Supporting sources
No duty to mitigate prevents recovery when the tortfeasor intended the harm or was aware of it and recklessly disregarded it. The injured party may still recover unless that party intentionally or heedlessly failed to protect its own interests with knowledge of the danger.
Supporting sources
…from our coordinate branches of government, it would seem to serve justice better for a court of law to fashion a remedy in a particular case, and perhaps be corrected by the legislature, than for innocent victims to have no redress at all. E.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell , 96 N.J. 538 (1984). “[T]he difficulties of adjudication…