Also known as: places of abode · abode
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A location constituting a person's dwelling or usual residence.
Pamela Phillips, a dual citizen, signed a handwritten will while on a coding retreat in Toronto. She maintained a rented apartment containing her personal effects in Berlin at the time of signing. Because Berlin constituted her place of abode, the will satisfies the choice-of-law rule even though it lacks witnesses required by State A.
Paige Porter, a convicted felon, stayed more than five days at her sister's house without registering with the local police. The sister's house was Paige's place of abode during that period, triggering the registration duty under the ordinance.
The Los Angeles Municipal Code defined a "convicted person" to include any individual convicted of an offense punishable as a felony in California after January 1, 1921, or equivalent out-of-state offenses. The code made it unlawful for such a person to remain in Los Angeles for more than five days without registering with the Chief of Police. It also made it unlawful to enter the city five or more times in a thirty-day period without registering. Failure to register constituted a continuing offense with each day counting separately. Virginia Lambert had lived in Los Angeles for more than seven years at the time of her arrest. During that time she had been convicted in Los Angeles of forgery, a felony under California law. She had not registered as required by the municipal code when she was arrested on suspicion of another offense and charged with violating the registration law. At her trial Lambert offered proof that she lacked actual knowledge of the duty to register, but the court refused to consider this defense. The jury convicted her, and the court fined her two hundred fifty dollars while placing her on three years' probation. She moved for arrest of judgment and a new trial, but the trial court denied the motions. The Appellate Department of the Superior Court affirmed the judgment on appeal. The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) to review the case.
View casePatrick Phan, executor of an estate, received the summons and complaint when a process server left copies with his wife at their shared residence. The residence was Patrick's place of abode, satisfying the federal rule for service on an individual.
On February 6, 1963, petitioner, a citizen of Ohio, filed her complaint in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming damages in excess of $10,000 for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident in South Carolina, allegedly caused by the negligence of one Louise Plumer Osgood, a Massachusetts citizen deceased at the time of the filing of the complaint. Respondent, Mrs. Osgood's executor and also a Massachusetts citizen, was named as defendant. On February 8, service was made by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint with respondent's wife at his residence, concededly in compliance with Rule 4 (d) (1). Respondent filed his answer on February 26, alleging, inter alia, that the action could not be maintained because it had been brought contrary to and in violation of the provisions of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 197, Section 9. On October 17, 1963, the District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure posed by the decision below.
View casePortia Price kept handguns at the apartment where she had lived for two years. That apartment was her place of abode, so any notice requirement tied to possession at that location was triggered.
The District of Columbia generally prohibits the possession of handguns. It is a crime to carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns is prohibited. Wholly apart from that prohibition, no person may carry a handgun without a license, but the chief of police may issue licenses for one-year periods. District of Columbia law also requires residents to keep their lawfully owned firearms unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device unless they are located in a place of business or are being used for lawful recreational activities. Respondent Dick Heller is a D.C. special police officer authorized to carry a handgun while on duty at the Federal Judicial Center. He applied for a registration certificate for a handgun that he wished to keep at home, but the District refused. He thereafter filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia seeking, on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city from enforcing the bar on the registration of handguns, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits the carrying of a firearm in the home without a license, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of functional firearms within the home. The District Court dismissed respondent's complaint. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, construing his complaint as seeking the right to render a firearm operable and carry it about his home in that condition only when necessary for self-defense. The Court of Appeals directed the District Court to enter summary judgment for respondent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePriya Prasad, a Chicago resident, was served with process at the single-family home she owned and occupied. The home was her place of abode, providing a constitutional basis for the state's exercise of jurisdiction.
In 2008, the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller. The Court held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. It struck down a District of Columbia law that banned handgun possession in the home. Chicago and the village of Oak Park maintained laws effectively banning handgun possession by almost all private citizens. Chicago's Municipal Code required a valid registration certificate for any firearm. It prohibited registration of most handguns. Oak Park made it unlawful to possess any firearm, including pistols, revolvers, and other handguns. Otis McDonald, Adam Orlov, Colleen Lawson, and David Lawson were Chicago residents. Along with the National Rifle Association and two Oak Park residents, they filed federal suits challenging these ordinances after the Heller decision. Chicago enacted its handgun ban in 1982 to protect residents from loss of property and injury or death from firearms. The petitioners argued that the bans left them vulnerable to criminals. They pointed to Chicago Police Department statistics showing that the city's handgun murder rate had increased since the ban. Chicago residents faced one of the highest murder rates in the country along with elevated rates of other violent crimes. Several petitioners had personal experiences with threats and violence. Otis McDonald, in his late seventies and living in a high-crime neighborhood, faced violent threats from drug dealers because of his community activism with alternative policing strategies. Colleen Lawson's home had been targeted by burglars. She believed possessing a handgun would decrease her chances of serious injury or death if threatened again. The Chicago petitioners and two groups filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. They sought a declaration that the handgun ban and related ordinances violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. A separate action challenged the Oak Park law. A third action also challenged the Chicago ordinances. All three cases were assigned to the same district judge. The District Court rejected the claims. It noted that the Seventh Circuit had upheld a handgun ban a quarter century earlier. It also noted that Heller had refrained from addressing whether the Second Amendment applied to the States. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It relied on three nineteenth-century cases—United States v. Cruikshank, Presser v. Illinois, and Miller v. Texas—that had been decided after the Slaughter-House Cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePriscilla Parks maintained a leased farmhouse in State A while visiting family abroad. The farmhouse remained her place of abode, supporting the finding that she had not acquired a new domicile in Nevada.
In 1916 petitioner Williams married Carrie Wyke in North Carolina and lived with her there until May 1940. In 1920 petitioner Hendrix married Thomas Hendrix in North Carolina and lived with him there until May 1940. At that time both petitioners went to Las Vegas, Nevada. On June 26, 1940, each filed a divorce action in the Nevada court. The defendants in those actions entered no appearance and were not served with process in Nevada. Service by publication was made for Thomas Hendrix and a North Carolina sheriff delivered process to Carrie Williams in North Carolina. The Nevada court granted Williams a divorce on August 26, 1940, on the ground of extreme cruelty after finding that he had been a bona fide resident of Clark County for more than six weeks. The Nevada court granted Hendrix a divorce on October 4, 1940, on the grounds of wilful neglect and extreme cruelty after making the same finding as to her residence. Petitioners married each other in Nevada on October 4, 1940, and thereafter returned to North Carolina where they lived together until the indictment was returned. They were tried and convicted of bigamous cohabitation under § 4342 of the North Carolina Code, and each was sentenced for a term of years to a state prison. At trial they pleaded not guilty and offered exemplified copies of the Nevada divorce decrees and their subsequent marriage, contending the decrees were valid in North Carolina. The State contended that the Nevada decrees were not entitled to recognition because the defendants had not been served in Nevada and had not appeared there. The trial court instructed the jury that a Nevada divorce decree based on substituted service would not be recognized in North Carolina. The trial court also instructed the jury that petitioners bore the burden of satisfying the jury of the bona fides of their Nevada residence. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the convictions. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePlace of abode supplies an independent validating ground even when the testator's domicile lies elsewhere. The statute lists domicile, place of abode, and nationality as separate alternatives, so a temporary but fixed residence suffices.
Supporting sources
Yes, when the testator maintains a fixed dwelling during the assignment. The UPC permits reference to the law of the place of abode at execution, and a six-month rental that contains personal effects qualifies.
Supporting sources
Service is proper when the papers are left with a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there. The rule expressly authorizes this method at the defendant's dwelling or usual place of abode.
Supporting sources
Yes. The statute looks to the place of abode at execution or at death, so a valid connection at either time is enough even if the testator later moves.
Supporting sources
…a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein . . . ." Respondent filed his answer on February 26, alleging, inter alia , that the action could not be maintained…