Also known as: plaintiffs case-in-chief · plaintiff case in chief · case-in-chief
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The initial phase of a trial during which the prosecution presents witnesses, documents, and other evidence to establish the elements of its charges.
Pierre Poulin faced charges after officers obtained statements without counsel. The prosecution sought to introduce those statements during its case-in-chief to prove guilt. The court excluded them because the Sixth Amendment violation barred affirmative use, though the statements remained available for impeachment if Poulin testified.
Perry Pratt stood trial for firearm possession. The government offered his earlier conviction during its case-in-chief. The court balanced the risk of unfair prejudice against the need to prove an element and limited the evidence to avoid suggesting propensity.
In 1993, Johnny Lynn Old Chief was arrested following a fracas that involved at least one gunshot. The ensuing federal charges included not only assault with a dangerous weapon and using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence but violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The earlier crime charged in the indictment against Old Chief was assault causing serious bodily injury. Old Chief's 1988 conviction arose from an incident in which he knowingly and unlawfully assaulted Rory Dean Fenner, resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of federal law on an Indian reservation. He received a sentence of five years' imprisonment, as reflected in the order of judgment and commitment dated December 18, 1988. Before trial, Old Chief filed a motion asking the district court to bar the government from mentioning or introducing evidence of the name and nature of his prior conviction. He offered instead to stipulate that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year and proposed a jury instruction stating that fact. The Assistant United States Attorney refused to join in a stipulation, insisting on his right to prove his case his own way, and the District Court agreed, ruling orally that, "If he doesn't want to stipulate, he doesn't have to." The district court denied the motion, ruling that the government was not required to stipulate. At trial, over renewed objection, the Government introduced the order of judgment and commitment for Old Chief's prior conviction. This document disclosed that on December 18, 1988, he "did knowingly and unlawfully assault Rory Dean Fenner, said assault resulting in serious bodily injury," for which Old Chief was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. The jury found Old Chief guilty on all counts. Old Chief appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's evidentiary ruling. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the circuits on the admissibility of the details of prior convictions when a defendant offers to stipulate.
View casePriya Prasad was prosecuted under a cross-burning law. The state introduced evidence of her conduct during its case-in-chief. The court examined whether the statute reached protected speech and required the prosecution to prove intent to intimidate.
Virginia Code Annotated § 18.2-423 makes it unlawful for any person, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn or cause to be burned a cross on the property of another, a highway, or other public place. The statute further provides that any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons. In 1998 three individuals were separately convicted under this statute in two incidents. Barry Black was convicted for leading a cross burning at a Ku Klux Klan rally on private property in Carroll County. Richard Elliott and Jonathan O'Mara were convicted for burning a cross on the lawn of their African-American neighbor James Jubilee in Virginia Beach. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the convictions of both Elliott and O'Mara. The Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the appeals and held the statute unconstitutional on its face. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2002 to review the decision.
View casePortia Price faced trial on assault charges. The prosecution attempted to introduce prior misconduct during its case-in-chief. The court excluded the evidence because it served only to show propensity rather than a permissible purpose.
In 1947 Solomon Michelson stood trial in federal court on a charge of bribing a revenue agent. The government introduced evidence that Michelson had made a substantial cash payment to the agent. Michelson testified in his own defense, admitting the payment but claiming the agent had demanded, threatened, and induced it. On direct examination Michelson's counsel brought out that he had been convicted in 1927 of a misdemeanor involving counterfeit watch dials. Cross-examination further showed that in 1930, when applying for a license to deal in second-hand jewelry, Michelson had answered "No" to a question asking whether he had ever been arrested or summoned for any offense. Michelson called five character witnesses who had known him for fifteen to thirty years. Each witness testified on direct examination that Michelson's reputation for honesty, truthfulness, and being a law-abiding citizen was very good, based on conversations with others in the community. On cross-examination the prosecutor asked four of the witnesses whether they had ever heard that Michelson had been arrested on October 11, 1920, for receiving stolen goods. None of the witnesses had heard of the incident. Outside the presence of the jury the prosecutor assured the trial judge that the arrest had occurred and produced a supporting record that defense counsel did not challenge. The trial judge gave the jury limiting instructions on three separate occasions concerning the purpose of the questions. Michelson was convicted on the bribery count. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
View casePatrick Phan was charged under a statute banning depictions of animal cruelty. The government presented videos during its case-in-chief. The court assessed whether the statute swept too broadly and whether the evidence satisfied constitutional limits on protected speech.
On the evening of April 15, 1989, two white Air Force police officers named Jane Smith and Tony McCormack were walking back to their dormitories at Fort Dix, New Jersey, after seeing a movie. They sat under a glass-enclosed bus shelter to avoid light rain. A black male wearing a wool cap and tan nylon jogging suit entered the shelter, drew a small silver handgun, robbed McCormack of his wallet containing an unsigned $100 money order, and forced Smith to perform fellatio on him while threatening to shoot McCormack. After the assailant fled when a car drove by, the victims contacted military police. Investigator Christine Amos suggested they look at a wanted board containing eight posters with composite sketches and photographs. McCormack immediately identified a photograph of defendant Richard Stevens, and Smith agreed it resembled the attacker though he appeared heavier in the photo. Smith then went to Walson Army Community Hospital where a doctor administered a rape crisis kit and attempted to secure semen samples from her saliva and clothing, producing three glass slides. The FBI laboratory later performed serological testing on one slide containing sufficient semen, which consumed all material on the slide and prevented DNA testing. A consent order had directed the FBI to preserve samples if possible after its own tests so Stevens could conduct DNA testing. The government made remaining materials available to the defense nearly six weeks later, but testing proved inconclusive. Stevens was indicted on charges of aggravated sexual assault and robbery within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Stevens's first trial ended in a mistrial after the jury deadlocked. At the second trial in March 1990, the district court permitted expert testimony on cross-racial identifications, weapon focus, and stress but excluded testimony on the lack of correlation between confidence and accuracy in identifications. The court also excluded testimony from Tyrone Mitchell, who had been robbed at gunpoint three days later at Fort Dix in a similar manner; Mitchell did not identify Stevens, and the fruits of both crimes ended up near Fort Meade, Maryland. The jury convicted Stevens on both counts, and the district court sentenced him to 168 months of incarceration. Stevens appealed, challenging the destruction of the semen sample, the wanted board identification, the admission of pretrial services testimony, the limits on expert testimony, and the exclusion of the Mitchell evidence. The Third Circuit reviewed the record developed at the Wade hearing, the Brady motion hearing, the Downing hearing on expert testimony, and the trial proceedings.
View casePearl Porter repeatedly interrupted proceedings during the prosecution's case-in-chief. The court ordered her removal after warnings. The trial continued without her presence once the judge determined her conduct prevented an orderly presentation of evidence.
Illinois v. Allen arose from the trial of respondent William Allen in an Illinois state court on an armed robbery charge. On August 12, 1956, Allen entered a tavern in Illinois, ordered a drink, and took $200 from the bartender at gunpoint. A jury convicted Allen and sentenced him to 10 to 30 years in the Illinois State Penitentiary. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in People v. Allen, 37 Ill. 2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1 (1967), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1967. Allen later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. He alleged that the trial judge had wrongfully removed him from the courtroom and thereby deprived him of his constitutional right to remain present throughout his trial. The district court declined to issue the writ. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed in 1969, with Judge Hastings dissenting. The disruptions began on the first day of trial, September 9, 1957. Allen had refused court-appointed counsel and elected to represent himself, though the judge directed appointed counsel to sit with him and protect the record. During voir dire Allen examined the first juror at great length, then argued abusively with the judge when told to limit questions to juror qualifications. He proclaimed that appointed counsel would not act for him, threatened that the judge would be a corpse at lunchtime, tore the attorney's file, and threw the papers on the floor. After the judge warned that one more outbreak would result in removal, Allen continued, declaring there would be no trial and that shackles, a straitjacket, and tape would do no good. The judge ordered Allen removed and the voir dire continued without him. After the noon recess Allen was brought back, complained about the fairness of the proceedings, and stated he wanted his sister and friends present to testify. When counsel moved to exclude witnesses, Allen again protested that there would be no proceeding and that he would keep talking through the trial. The judge ordered him removed a second time. Allen remained out of the courtroom during the State's case-in-chief except for several identification appearances, during one of which he responded to the judge with vile and abusive language. After the prosecution rested, the judge reiterated that Allen could return if he agreed to behave properly; Allen gave assurances and was permitted to remain for the rest of the trial, which was conducted by appointed counsel. The Court of Appeals opinion set out these events in detail and concluded that the defendant should not have been excluded despite his conduct, stating that the proper course was to restrain him by whatever means necessary, including shackling and gagging.
View caseA court may grant judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff has been fully heard and no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff on an essential element. The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but speculation or unsupported projections do not create a legally sufficient basis.
A party must make a timely, specific objection on the record stating the ground unless the ground is apparent from context. A general or vague objection fails to preserve the claim for appeal.
Deposition testimony may be used only to the extent the statements would be admissible if the deponent testified live. Hearsay, improper lay opinions, or other evidentiary defects remain grounds for exclusion even when read from a transcript.
No. The plaintiff need only prove the elements of its claim. The defendant must establish the facts supporting any claimed privilege once the issue is raised.
…affirmed. Held: The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution’s case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. (a)…