Also known as: plea discussion · plea bargaining · plea negotiations
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Statements exchanged between a defendant and a prosecutor during negotiations aimed at resolving criminal charges through a guilty plea, when those negotiations fail to produce a final plea or the plea is later withdrawn.
Pedro Pacheco met with federal prosecutors after indictment on fraud charges and acknowledged certain transactions during the meeting. No plea agreement was reached. Months later the victim sued Pedro in civil court and sought to introduce his statements from the meeting to prove liability. The court excluded the statements because they arose in unsuccessful plea discussions.
Paige Porter signed a written waiver before plea talks began, agreeing that any statements she made could be used to impeach her at trial if she testified inconsistently. The talks collapsed without a plea. At trial the prosecutor introduced her earlier statements after she gave contrary testimony. The court admitted the statements because the waiver was knowing and voluntary.
Pilar Pena met with the prosecutor before any formal offer and asked what sentencing reduction might be available in exchange for a plea. She made several factual admissions during the conversation. No plea resulted. At trial the government offered her statements to prove the charges. The court excluded them as statements made during plea discussions that did not produce a guilty plea.
Parker Phillips discussed a possible reduced charge with the district attorney in exchange for cooperation. The talks ended without agreement. The prosecutor later sought to use Parker's admissions at trial. The trial court barred the evidence under the state analog to the federal rule protecting plea discussions.
In November 1974, Michael Jay Collins was indicted on fifteen separate felony counts, including one count of attempted burglary, six counts of burglary, two counts of forcible rape, three counts of assault with intent to commit rape, and three counts of forcible oral copulation, with a prior felony conviction also alleged. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Collins pleaded guilty to one count of oral copulation, the force allegation and prior conviction allegation were stricken, and the other fourteen counts were dismissed. After a hearing in February 1975, the court suspended criminal proceedings, found Collins to be a mentally disordered sex offender, and committed him to Patton State Hospital for an indefinite period. While Collins remained at the hospital, the Legislature repealed the former version of Penal Code section 288a and replaced it with a new section effective January 1, 1976, which no longer criminalized oral copulation between consenting nonprisoner adults. Criminal proceedings were reinstated in April 1976 after a determination that Collins was no longer a danger to others. Collins objected to the court's jurisdiction to sentence him due to the statutory change, but the court overruled the objection and imposed a sentence of one to fifteen years in state prison, crediting him with 556 days served at the hospital. Collins then appealed from the judgment of conviction.
View casePerry Pratt received a plea offer that required waiver of certain discovery rights. He rejected the offer and proceeded to trial. On appeal he argued the government should have disclosed impeachment material before the plea discussions. The court held that the Constitution does not require such disclosure during unsuccessful plea talks.
After immigration agents found 30 kilograms of marijuana in Angela Ruiz's luggage, federal prosecutors offered her what is known in the Southern District of California as a "fast track" plea bargain. That bargain—standard in that district—asks a defendant to waive indictment, trial, and an appeal. In return, the Government agrees to recommend to the sentencing judge a two-level departure downward from the otherwise applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines sentence. In Ruiz's case, a two-level departure downward would have shortened the ordinary Guidelines-specified 18-to-24-month sentencing range by 6 months, to 12-to-18 months. The prosecutors' proposed plea agreement contains a set of detailed terms. Among other things, it specifies that "any [known] information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant" "has been turned over to the defendant," and it acknowledges the Government's "continuing duty to provide such information." At the same time, it requires that the defendant "waiv[e] the right" to receive "impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses." The agreement also requires waiver of the right to receive information supporting any affirmative defense the defendant raises if the case goes to trial. Because Ruiz would not agree to this last-mentioned waiver, the prosecutors withdrew their bargaining offer. The Government then indicted Ruiz for unlawful drug possession. And despite the absence of any agreement, Ruiz ultimately pleaded guilty. At sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the same two-level downward departure that the Government would have recommended had she accepted the "fast track" agreement. The Government opposed her request, and the District Court denied it, imposing a standard Guideline sentence instead. Relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3742, Ruiz appealed her sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court's sentencing determination. The Government sought certiorari. It stressed what it considered serious adverse practical implications of the Ninth Circuit's constitutional holding. It added that the holding is unique among courts of appeals. The Supreme Court granted the Government's petition.
View casePeter Park faced a misdemeanor forgery charge. The prosecutor offered to drop it if he pleaded guilty to a felony and warned that refusal would trigger a habitual-offender indictment. Park rejected the offer. After conviction on the felony the prosecutor obtained the recidivist indictment. The court upheld the prosecutor's conduct as a legitimate exercise of charging discretion during plea discussions.
Paul Lewis Hayes was indicted by a Fayette County, Ky., grand jury on a charge of uttering a forged instrument in the amount of $88.30. This offense was then punishable by a term of 2 to 10 years in prison. After arraignment, Hayes, his retained counsel, and the Commonwealth’s Attorney met in the presence of the Clerk of the Court to discuss a possible plea agreement. During these conferences the prosecutor offered to recommend a sentence of five years in prison if Hayes would plead guilty to the indictment. He also said that if Hayes did not plead guilty, he would return to the grand jury to seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act. This would subject Hayes to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment by reason of his two prior felony convictions. Hayes chose not to plead guilty. The prosecutor obtained an indictment charging him under the Habitual Criminal Act. The recidivist charge was fully justified by the evidence. The prosecutor possessed this evidence at the time of the original indictment. Hayes’ refusal to plead guilty led to the habitual criminal indictment. A jury found Hayes guilty on the principal charge. In a separate proceeding the jury found that he had twice before been convicted of felonies. He was sentenced to a life term in the penitentiary. The Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected Hayes’ constitutional objections to the enhanced sentence in an unpublished opinion. On Hayes’ petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied the writ. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider a constitutional question of importance in the administration of criminal justice.
View caseStatements qualify when made during negotiations with a prosecutor about a possible guilty plea that ultimately fails or produces a withdrawn plea. The protection applies in both civil and criminal cases and extends to preliminary inquiries about available deals.
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A defendant may waive the protection if the waiver is knowing and voluntary. Once waived, statements from unsuccessful plea talks may be used for impeachment or other purposes at trial.
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The federal rule limits protection to discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority. Conversations solely with police officers generally fall outside the rule because they lack the formal bargaining character the rule seeks to encourage.
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The Sixth Amendment requires effective assistance during plea discussions because they constitute a critical stage. Counsel's failure to communicate a formal offer can constitute deficient performance if the defendant shows a reasonable probability of acceptance and entry of the plea.
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