plea discussions

In November 1974, Michael Jay Collins was indicted on fifteen separate felony counts, including one count of attempted burglary, six counts of burglary, two counts of forcible rape, three counts of assault with intent to commit rape, and three counts of forcible oral copulation, with a prior felony conviction also alleged. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Collins pleaded guilty to one count of oral copulation, the force allegation and prior conviction allegation were stricken, and the other fourteen counts were dismissed. After a hearing in February 1975, the court suspended criminal proceedings, found Collins to be a mentally disordered sex offender, and committed him to Patton State Hospital for an indefinite period. While Collins remained at the hospital, the Legislature repealed the former version of Penal Code section 288a and replaced it with a new section effective January 1, 1976, which no longer criminalized oral copulation between consenting nonprisoner adults. Criminal proceedings were reinstated in April 1976 after a determination that Collins was no longer a danger to others. Collins objected to the court's jurisdiction to sentence him due to the statutory change, but the court overruled the objection and imposed a sentence of one to fifteen years in state prison, crediting him with 556 days served at the hospital. Collins then appealed from the judgment of conviction.

After immigration agents found 30 kilograms of marijuana in Angela Ruiz's luggage, federal prosecutors offered her what is known in the Southern District of California as a "fast track" plea bargain. That bargain—standard in that district—asks a defendant to waive indictment, trial, and an appeal. In return, the Government agrees to recommend to the sentencing judge a two-level departure downward from the otherwise applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines sentence. In Ruiz's case, a two-level departure downward would have shortened the ordinary Guidelines-specified 18-to-24-month sentencing range by 6 months, to 12-to-18 months. The prosecutors' proposed plea agreement contains a set of detailed terms. Among other things, it specifies that "any [known] information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant" "has been turned over to the defendant," and it acknowledges the Government's "continuing duty to provide such information." At the same time, it requires that the defendant "waiv[e] the right" to receive "impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses." The agreement also requires waiver of the right to receive information supporting any affirmative defense the defendant raises if the case goes to trial. Because Ruiz would not agree to this last-mentioned waiver, the prosecutors withdrew their bargaining offer. The Government then indicted Ruiz for unlawful drug possession. And despite the absence of any agreement, Ruiz ultimately pleaded guilty. At sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the same two-level downward departure that the Government would have recommended had she accepted the "fast track" agreement. The Government opposed her request, and the District Court denied it, imposing a standard Guideline sentence instead. Relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3742, Ruiz appealed her sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court's sentencing determination. The Government sought certiorari. It stressed what it considered serious adverse practical implications of the Ninth Circuit's constitutional holding. It added that the holding is unique among courts of appeals. The Supreme Court granted the Government's petition.

Paul Lewis Hayes was indicted by a Fayette County, Ky., grand jury on a charge of uttering a forged instrument in the amount of $88.30. This offense was then punishable by a term of 2 to 10 years in prison. After arraignment, Hayes, his retained counsel, and the Commonwealth’s Attorney met in the presence of the Clerk of the Court to discuss a possible plea agreement. During these conferences the prosecutor offered to recommend a sentence of five years in prison if Hayes would plead guilty to the indictment. He also said that if Hayes did not plead guilty, he would return to the grand jury to seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act. This would subject Hayes to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment by reason of his two prior felony convictions. Hayes chose not to plead guilty. The prosecutor obtained an indictment charging him under the Habitual Criminal Act. The recidivist charge was fully justified by the evidence. The prosecutor possessed this evidence at the time of the original indictment. Hayes’ refusal to plead guilty led to the habitual criminal indictment. A jury found Hayes guilty on the principal charge. In a separate proceeding the jury found that he had twice before been convicted of felonies. He was sentenced to a life term in the penitentiary. The Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected Hayes’ constitutional objections to the enhanced sentence in an unpublished opinion. On Hayes’ petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied the writ. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider a constitutional question of importance in the administration of criminal justice.