Also known as: plea negotiations · plea negotiate · plea negotiated · plea negotiating · plea bargaining · plea bargain
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Discussions between a prosecutor and defense counsel aimed at resolving criminal charges through a guilty plea in exchange for concessions on sentencing or charges. The process constitutes a critical stage at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. Statements made during these discussions receive protection from later use against the defendant unless a knowing and voluntary waiver occurs.
Piper Patel faced federal fraud charges and met with prosecutors to explore a plea. She signed a written waiver of evidentiary protections before making statements. At trial after the deal collapsed, the government used those statements to impeach her testimony on cross-examination.
Phuong Pham negotiated a plea after indictment on drug charges. The parties discussed facts that would affect the applicable sentencing range. The court later applied those facts when imposing sentence under the advisory guidelines.
Respondent Freddie Booker was charged with possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The jury heard evidence that he possessed 92.5 grams in his duffel bag and found him guilty. Based on the jury's findings and his criminal history, the Guidelines called for a base sentence of 210 to 262 months. At sentencing, the district judge found by a preponderance that Booker possessed an additional 566 grams of crack and had obstructed justice. These findings raised the range to 360 months to life. The judge imposed 360 months. In the companion case, respondent Ducan Fanfan was convicted of conspiracy involving at least 500 grams of cocaine. The jury verdict authorized up to 78 months. The judge found additional facts that would have raised the range to 188 to 235 months but declined to apply them after Blakely. The Seventh Circuit held Booker's sentence violated the Sixth Amendment under Blakely and Apprendi. It remanded for resentencing based on jury findings. The Government sought certiorari in both cases, which the Court granted.
View casePilar Pena received a plea offer from the prosecutor. Her attorney never conveyed the terms to her before the deadline passed. The court later examined whether that omission satisfied the performance prong of an ineffective-assistance claim.
In September 1976, respondent David Washington committed a series of crimes over a ten-day period in the Miami area that included three brutal stabbing murders along with torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, Washington surrendered to police and gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third criminal episode. The State of Florida indicted him for kidnapping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him. Washington waived his right to a jury trial against counsel's advice and pleaded guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder counts. In the plea colloquy he stated that he had committed a string of burglaries but had no significant prior criminal record and that he had been under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family. Counsel spoke with Washington about his background, contacted his wife and mother by telephone, but did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination. At the sentencing hearing before the trial judge, counsel's strategy relied primarily on the plea colloquy to convey remorse and emotional stress and argued that these factors justified sparing Washington the death penalty. Counsel successfully moved to exclude Washington's rap sheet and decided not to request a presentence report because it would have included his criminal history. The trial judge found multiple aggravating circumstances for each murder and no mitigating circumstances, sentencing Washington to death on each of the three murder counts. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Washington sought collateral relief in state court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on six grounds including failure to request a psychiatric report, investigate and present character witnesses, and seek a presentence investigation report. He submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives willing to testify and two reports from a psychiatrist and psychologist. The state trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Washington then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. After an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel testified, the District Court denied relief, concluding that although counsel made errors in judgment by failing to investigate mitigating evidence further, no prejudice resulted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for application of a new framework it developed for analyzing ineffectiveness claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding.
View casePearl Porter considered accepting a plea deal that waived certain rights. Prosecutors withheld impeachment material about a key witness. The court assessed whether the nondisclosure rendered the plea involuntary.
After immigration agents found 30 kilograms of marijuana in Angela Ruiz's luggage, federal prosecutors offered her what is known in the Southern District of California as a "fast track" plea bargain. That bargain—standard in that district—asks a defendant to waive indictment, trial, and an appeal. In return, the Government agrees to recommend to the sentencing judge a two-level departure downward from the otherwise applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines sentence. In Ruiz's case, a two-level departure downward would have shortened the ordinary Guidelines-specified 18-to-24-month sentencing range by 6 months, to 12-to-18 months. The prosecutors' proposed plea agreement contains a set of detailed terms. Among other things, it specifies that "any [known] information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant" "has been turned over to the defendant," and it acknowledges the Government's "continuing duty to provide such information." At the same time, it requires that the defendant "waiv[e] the right" to receive "impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses." The agreement also requires waiver of the right to receive information supporting any affirmative defense the defendant raises if the case goes to trial. Because Ruiz would not agree to this last-mentioned waiver, the prosecutors withdrew their bargaining offer. The Government then indicted Ruiz for unlawful drug possession. And despite the absence of any agreement, Ruiz ultimately pleaded guilty. At sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the same two-level downward departure that the Government would have recommended had she accepted the "fast track" agreement. The Government opposed her request, and the District Court denied it, imposing a standard Guideline sentence instead. Relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3742, Ruiz appealed her sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court's sentencing determination. The Government sought certiorari. It stressed what it considered serious adverse practical implications of the Ninth Circuit's constitutional holding. It added that the holding is unique among courts of appeals. The Supreme Court granted the Government's petition.
View casePenelope Price met with prosecutors to discuss possible cooperation in exchange for immunity. She produced documents under a grant of immunity tied to the plea talks. The government later sought to use the documents in a separate prosecution.
In August 1994, an Independent Counsel was appointed to investigate possible violations of federal law relating to the Whitewater Development Corporation. In December 1994, Webster Hubbell pleaded guilty to charges of mail fraud and tax evasion arising out of his billing practices as a member of an Arkansas law firm from 1989 to 1992. He was sentenced to 21 months in prison. As part of the plea agreement, Hubbell promised to provide the Independent Counsel with full, complete, accurate, and truthful information about matters relating to the Whitewater investigation. While Hubbell was incarcerated in October 1996, the Independent Counsel served him with a subpoena duces tecum calling for the production of 11 categories of documents before a grand jury sitting in Little Rock, Arkansas. Hubbell appeared before the grand jury and initially invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. After being granted immunity pursuant to an order under 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a), he produced 13,120 pages of documents and records. The documents provided the Independent Counsel with information that led to a second prosecution. On April 30, 1998, a grand jury in the District of Columbia returned a 10-count indictment charging Hubbell with tax-related crimes and mail and wire fraud. The District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the Independent Counsel's use of the subpoenaed documents violated 18 U.S.C. § 6002. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings to determine the extent of the Government's independent knowledge of the documents. On remand, the Independent Counsel acknowledged that he could not satisfy the reasonable particularity standard and entered into a conditional plea agreement with Hubbell. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the precise scope of a grant of immunity with respect to the production of documents in response to a subpoena.
View casePatricia Patel entered a plea to a reduced charge. The parties stipulated to facts that would increase the maximum sentence. The court treated those facts as admitted when calculating the final sentence.
In 1998, Ralph Howard Blakely abducted his estranged wife Yolanda from their orchard home in Grant County, Washington. He bound her with duct tape and forced her at knifepoint into a wooden box in the bed of his pickup truck while imploring her to dismiss divorce and trust proceedings. When their 13-year-old son Ralphy returned from school, Blakely ordered him to follow in another car under threat of harming Yolanda with a shotgun. Ralphy escaped at a gas station and sought help, but Blakely continued with Yolanda to a friend's house in Montana before his arrest. The State initially charged Blakely with first-degree kidnapping but reached a plea agreement that reduced the charge to second-degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm. Blakely entered a guilty plea admitting the elements of the reduced charge along with the domestic-violence and firearm allegations, but no other relevant facts. Washington law classified the offense as a class B felony carrying a statutory maximum of ten years, yet specified a standard sentencing range of 49 to 53 months for this offender score and offense level. At sentencing the State recommended a term within the standard range. After hearing Yolanda's account of the incident, the judge rejected the recommendation and conducted a three-day bench hearing that included testimony from Blakely, Yolanda, Ralphy, a police officer, and medical experts. The judge issued 32 findings of fact detailing the defendant's motivation, methods, and violation of a restraining order, then concluded that Blakely had acted with deliberate cruelty, a statutorily enumerated aggravating factor. The judge imposed an exceptional sentence of 90 months, 37 months above the standard maximum. Blakely appealed, contending that the sentencing procedure deprived him of the right to jury determination of facts essential to his sentence. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the state supreme court's earlier rejection of a similar challenge, and the Washington Supreme Court denied discretionary review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the sentencing procedure under the Sixth Amendment.
View caseThe Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversarial proceedings, including plea discussions that occur after indictment. Counsel must be present or the defendant must waive the right knowingly. Failure to provide counsel at this stage can invalidate statements or the resulting plea.
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Statements made during plea negotiations are generally inadmissible against the defendant under Federal Rule of Evidence 410. A defendant may waive this protection through a knowing and voluntary agreement. Once waived, the statements may be used for impeachment or other limited purposes.
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A defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that a reasonable probability exists the outcome would have differed but for the deficient performance. In the plea context this often requires showing the defendant would have accepted a more favorable offer and that the court would have approved it.
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