Also known as: pleas of no contest · no contest plea · no-contest plea · nolo contendere · nolo plea
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A form of plea in criminal proceedings by which the defendant neither admits nor denies guilt but consents to the entry of a judgment of conviction. The plea produces the same sentencing consequences as a guilty plea yet prevents the plea itself from serving as an admission of factual guilt in later civil or criminal proceedings.
Pablo Perez faces federal fraud charges and enters a nolo contendere plea with court consent. When a victim later sues him civilly for the same conduct, the court excludes the plea itself from evidence. The exclusion prevents the civil plaintiff from treating the criminal resolution as an admission of wrongdoing.
Penelope Price and four co-defendants receive a package offer requiring each to plead guilty or nolo contendere or the deal collapses. Their lawyer presents the offer in a group meeting and obtains signed consents. The court later finds the consents invalid because the lawyer failed to explain how one client's choice would bind the others.
Pierre Poulin is arrested in a different district and files a written statement requesting to plead nolo contendere and waive trial in the charging district. Both United States attorneys must still supply written approval before the clerk transmits the file. Without the second written approval the transfer cannot occur.
Philip Powell enters a nolo contendere plea to a felony and is convicted. In a later civil suit the plaintiff attempts to introduce the judgment to prove an essential fact. The court excludes the judgment because it rests on a nolo plea rather than a guilty plea or trial verdict.
Parker Phillips tells the court he will accept judgment but refuses to admit guilt. The judge explains the three available pleas and gives him an opportunity to choose. When Phillips still declines, the court enters a not guilty plea on his behalf rather than treating his statement as a nolo contendere plea.
In 1959, petitioner Brady was charged with kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). The indictment charged that the victim of the kidnapping was not liberated unharmed, so Brady faced a maximum penalty of death if the jury recommended it. Represented by competent counsel throughout, Brady first elected to plead not guilty. He made no serious attempt to reduce the possibility of a death penalty by waiving a jury trial because the trial judge was unwilling to try the case without a jury. Upon learning that his codefendant, who had confessed to the authorities, would plead guilty and be available to testify against him, Brady changed his plea to guilty. The trial judge twice questioned Brady as to the voluntariness of his plea before accepting it. Brady was sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment, later reduced to thirty years. In 1967, Brady sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his plea of guilty was not voluntarily given because the statute operated to coerce his plea, because his counsel exerted impermissible pressure upon him, and because his plea was induced by representations with respect to reduction of sentence and clemency. He also alleged that the trial judge had not fully complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. After a hearing, the District Court for the District of New Mexico denied relief. The District Court found that Brady's counsel did not put impermissible pressure on him to plead guilty and that no representations were made with respect to a reduced sentence or clemency. The court determined that Brady decided to plead guilty when he learned that his codefendant was going to plead guilty. The court concluded that the plea was voluntarily and knowingly made. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, determining that the District Court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and specifically approving the finding that Brady's plea of guilty was voluntary. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the claim that the Court of Appeals was in error in not reaching a contrary result on the authority of United States v. Jackson.
View casePavel Petrov states he is innocent yet wishes to resolve the case without trial. The court accepts a nolo contendere plea after confirming the plea is voluntary and serves the public interest. The conviction stands even though Petrov never admitted the underlying facts.
On December 2, 1963, Henry C. Alford was indicted in North Carolina for first-degree murder. The court appointed counsel who interviewed witnesses identified by Alford, but those witnesses provided statements indicating Alford's guilt rather than supporting his claim of innocence. The prosecutor agreed to accept a plea of guilty to a charge of second-degree murder, and on December 10, 1963, Alford pleaded guilty to the reduced charge. Before the plea was finally accepted by the trial court, the court heard the sworn testimony of a police officer who summarized the State's case. Although there was no eyewitness to the crime, the testimony indicated that shortly before the killing Alford took his gun from his house, stated his intention to kill the victim, and returned home with the declaration that he had carried out the killing. After the summary presentation of the State's case, Alford took the stand. He testified that he had not committed the murder but that he was pleading guilty because he faced the threat of the death penalty if he did not do so. In response to the questions of his counsel, he acknowledged that his counsel had informed him of the difference between second- and first-degree murder and of his rights in case he chose to go to trial. After eliciting information about Alford's prior criminal record, which was a long one, the trial court sentenced him to 30 years' imprisonment, the maximum penalty for second-degree murder. Alford sought post-conviction relief in the state court. Among the claims raised was the claim that his plea of guilty was invalid because it was the product of fear and coercion. After a hearing, the state court in 1965 found that the plea was "willingly, knowingly, and understandingly" made on the advice of competent counsel and in the face of a strong prosecution case. Subsequently, Alford petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, first in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, and then in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Both courts denied the writ on the basis of the state court's findings that Alford voluntarily and knowingly agreed to plead guilty. On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that Alford's guilty plea was made involuntarily. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1969.
View caseA defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or nolo contendere with the court's consent. The court must enter a not guilty plea if the defendant refuses to plead or an organizational defendant fails to appear.
A lawyer representing multiple clients may not participate unless each client gives informed consent in a signed writing that discloses the existence and nature of all pleas and each person's participation.
Evidence of the nolo contendere plea itself is not admissible against the defendant who entered it. The same exclusion applies to statements made during proceedings on the plea or during plea discussions that did not produce a guilty plea.
The court must consider the parties' views and the public interest in the effective administration of justice. The plea must also be voluntary and not the product of force, threats, or improper promises.
…the Texas Constitution. Tex. Const., Art. 1, § 3a. Those contentions were rejected. The petitioners, having entered a plea of nolo contendere , were each fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25. App. to Pet. for Cert. 107a-110a. The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the petitioners' federal…