Also known as: powers of attorney · power-of-attorney · POA
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An instrument by which a principal grants authority to an agent to perform acts on the principal's behalf. The grant may be general or limited to specific transactions. A durable power of attorney remains effective after the principal's incapacity.
Pearl Porter owns a commercial building and grants Patrick Phan a power of attorney to convey the property. Patrick signs and delivers the warranty deed to the buyer at closing. The deed is effective because Patrick acted as an authorized attorney-in-fact.
Perry Pratt executes a durable power of attorney naming Philip Powell as agent to manage his investments. Perry later suffers a stroke and becomes unable to communicate. Philip continues to buy and sell securities on Perry's behalf without interruption.
Patricia Patel executes a power of attorney appointing Paul Peterson to make medical treatment choices if she cannot communicate. After an accident leaves Patricia in a persistent vegetative state, Paul directs physicians to withdraw life support in accordance with her known wishes.
On the night of January 11, 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan lost control of her car as she traveled down Elm Road in Jasper County, Missouri. The vehicle overturned, and Cruzan was discovered lying face down in a ditch without detectable respiratory or cardiac function. Paramedics were able to restore her breathing and heartbeat at the accident site, and she was transported to a hospital in an unconscious state. An attending neurosurgeon diagnosed her as having sustained probable cerebral contusions compounded by significant anoxia. The Missouri trial court found that permanent brain damage generally results after six minutes in an anoxic state, and it was estimated that Cruzan was deprived of oxygen from twelve to fourteen minutes. She remained in a coma for approximately three weeks and then progressed to an unconscious state in which she was able to orally ingest some nutrition. Surgeons implanted a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube in Cruzan with the consent of her then husband. Subsequent rehabilitative efforts proved unavailing. She now lies in a Missouri state hospital in what is commonly referred to as a persistent vegetative state in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function. The State of Missouri is bearing the cost of her care. After it had become apparent that Nancy Cruzan had virtually no chance of regaining her mental faculties, her parents Lester and Joyce Cruzan, who serve as coguardians, asked hospital employees to terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures. All agree that such a removal would cause her death. The employees refused to honor the request without court approval. The parents then sought and received authorization from the state trial court for termination. The trial court found that a person in Nancy's condition had a fundamental right under the State and Federal Constitutions to refuse or direct the withdrawal of death prolonging procedures. The court also found that Nancy's expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in conversation with a housemate friend suggested that given her present condition she would not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed by a divided vote. The court recognized a right to refuse treatment embodied in the common-law doctrine of informed consent but expressed skepticism about the application of that doctrine in the circumstances of this case. The court found that Cruzan's statements to her roommate regarding her desire to live or die under those conditions were unreliable for determining her intent and thus insufficient to support the coguardians' claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy's behalf. It rejected the argument that Cruzan's parents were entitled to order the termination of her medical treatment, concluding that no person can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the formalities required under Missouri's Living Will statutes or the clear and convincing inherently reliable evidence absent here. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question whether Cruzan has a right under the United States Constitution which would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under these circumstances.
View caseA tenant grants his partner a power of attorney to handle lease renewals and building management decisions. When the landlord attempts to evict, the partner uses the authority to negotiate continued occupancy and sign necessary documents on the tenant's behalf.
Miguel Braschi resided with Leslie Blanchard in a rent-controlled apartment at 405 East 54th Street from the summer of 1975 until Blanchard's death in September 1986. Stahl Associates Company owned the apartment building. In November 1986, Stahl Associates served Braschi with a notice to cure, claiming he was a mere licensee with no right to occupy the apartment because only Blanchard was the tenant of record. In December 1986, Stahl Associates served a notice to terminate, giving Braschi one month to vacate. Braschi initiated an action for a permanent injunction and a declaration of his entitlement to occupy the apartment. He moved for a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court found that the long-term interdependent nature of the ten-year relationship fulfilled the definitional criteria of family and issued the preliminary injunction. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the regulation protects only family members within traditional, legally recognized familial relationships. Braschi appealed. The two men had lived together as permanent life partners for more than ten years. They regarded one another as spouses, their families were aware of the relationship, and they attended family functions together. Braschi listed the apartment as his address on his driver's license and passport. They shared all financial obligations, maintained joint checking and savings accounts, and Blanchard executed a power of attorney in Braschi's favor and named him beneficiary of his life insurance policy and primary legatee of his estate.
View caseA joint tenant executes a power of attorney authorizing her attorney to sever the tenancy. The attorney prepares and records a deed conveying the tenant's interest to a straw party and then back to the tenant, breaking the right of survivorship.
Mr. and Mrs. Riddle purchased a parcel of real estate, taking title as joint tenants. Several months before her death, Mrs. Riddle retained an attorney to plan her estate. After reviewing pertinent documents, he advised her that the property was held in joint tenancy and that, upon her death, the property would pass to her husband. Distressed upon learning this, she requested that the joint tenancy be terminated so that she could dispose of her interest by will. As a result, the attorney prepared a grant deed whereby Mrs. Riddle granted to herself an undivided one-half interest in the subject property. The document also provided that “The purpose of this Grant Deed is to terminate those joint tenancies formerly existing between the Grantor, Frances P. Riddle, and Jack C. Riddle, her husband. ...” He also prepared a will disposing of Mrs. Riddle’s interest in the property. Both the grant deed and will were executed on December 8, 1975. Mrs. Riddle died 20 days later. The trial court refused to sanction her plan to sever the joint tenancy and quieted title to the property in her husband. The executrix of the will of Frances Riddle appeals from that judgment.
View caseA corporate officer holding a power of attorney from a shareholder negotiates and completes a stock sale. The buyer later challenges the transaction, claiming the officer lacked authority to bind the shareholder.
Repide owned three-fourths of the shares of the corporation's stock. He served as administrator general of the company with large powers at the time of the stock purchase. Repide engaged in negotiations that led to the sale of the company’s lands, together with all the other friar lands, to the Government at a price that greatly enhanced the value of the stock. Before the negotiations for the sale were completed, Repide employed an agent to purchase the stock. He concealed from the plaintiff’s agent his own identity and his knowledge of the state of the negotiations and their probable result. The Court of First Instance at Manila gave judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on two grounds. One ground was that the agent of the plaintiff had no authority to make the sale. The other ground was that the defendant had been guilty of fraud in concealing facts from the seller affecting the value of the stock at the time the sale was concluded. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the islands, the judgment was affirmed by a divided court on the ground of lack of authority of the plaintiff’s agent to make the sale. The court did not affirm on the ground of fraud. When the motion for a new trial was granted on account of newly-discovered evidence, the majority of the court held that the second power of attorney authorized the sale. The majority also held there was no fraud, so the judgment for the plaintiff was reversed and the complaint was dismissed. This court reviews the judgment of the Supreme Court dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff.
View caseA power of attorney is valid if signed by the principal or by another person in the principal's conscious presence at the principal's direction. Acknowledgment before a notary creates a presumption that the signature is genuine but is not required for validity.
A power of attorney terminates upon the principal's death, upon the principal's incapacity unless the instrument is durable, upon revocation by the principal, or when the instrument's stated purpose is accomplished.
No. A judge is prohibited from serving as a fiduciary for non-family members because doing so creates a conflict with judicial duties and may appear to exploit the judicial office.
…method of planning for the future. Several States have recognized the practical wisdom of such a procedure by enacting durable power of attorney statutes that specifically authorize an individual to appoint a surrogate to make medical treatment decisions. Some state courts have suggested that an agent appointed pursuant to a general…