Also known as: practically certainty · MPC knowledge · purposeful intent
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Awareness that a particular result is virtually inevitable from one's conduct. This standard marks the boundary between knowing and reckless mental states under modern criminal codes. It requires the actor to understand that the result will almost certainly follow from the chosen actions.
Elena, a night nurse, knew that administering a powerful sedative immediately after another medication would dangerously suppress breathing in frail patients like Mr. Rivera. She deliberately timed the injections to follow each other closely after he insulted her. Mr. Rivera stopped breathing and died. Elena's awareness that death was virtually certain from the timing satisfies the practically certain standard for a knowing mental state.
Erica resented her supervising partner Quinn for taking credit for her work. She lured him to an empty file room after hours, concealed a heavy marble statue nearby in advance, and struck him repeatedly in the head even after he lost consciousness. The sustained blows to a vital area showed she understood death was virtually certain to result from the attack.
In the early morning hours of August 26, 1976, respondents Clifford Bailey, James T. Cogdell, Ronald C. Cooley, and Ralph Walker, federal prisoners at the District of Columbia jail, crawled through a window from which a bar had been removed, slid down a knotted bedsheet, and escaped from custody. Federal authorities recaptured them after they had remained at large for a period of time ranging from one month to three and one-half months. Respondents' defense of duress or necessity centered on the conditions in the jail during the months of June, July, and August 1976, and on various threats and beatings directed at them during that period. The prosecution's case in chief against Bailey, Cooley, and Walker established that each respondent was in federal custody on August 26, 1976, that they had disappeared apparently through a cell window at approximately 5:35 a.m. on that date, and that they had been apprehended individually between September 27 and December 13, 1976. Respondents introduced evidence of frequent fires in the maximum-security cellblock, beatings and threats of death directed at Cooley and Bailey by guards, and inadequate medical attention for Walker's epilepsy. Respondent Cooley, who had eluded the authorities for one month, testified that his people had tried to contact the authorities but never got in touch with anybody and that the FBI would kill him when he was apprehended. Respondent Bailey, who was apprehended on November 19, 1976, stated that he had the jail officials called several times but did not turn himself in because he would still be under the threats of death and the FBI was telling his people that they were going to shoot him. Respondent Walker, apprehended on December 13, 1976, testified that he called the FBI three times, that an agent assured him the FBI would not harm him but could not promise he would not be returned to the D.C. jail, and that he last called in mid-October. Respondent Cogdell offered no testimony on his post-escape conduct beyond a possible assertion that he may have written letters. The District Court refused to submit to the jury any instructions on respondents' defense of duress or necessity. It did not charge the jury that escape was a continuing offense. The court ruled that respondents had failed as a matter of law to present evidence sufficient to support such a defense because they had not turned themselves in after they had escaped the allegedly coercive conditions. After receiving instructions to disregard the evidence of the conditions in the jail, the jury convicted Bailey, Cooley, and Walker of violating 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). Two months later Cogdell was convicted by a separate jury after the District Court ruled he could not present evidence of conditions at the jail absent testimony as to what he did after escape. By a divided vote the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed each respondent's conviction and remanded for new trials. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseRecklessness requires only conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. Awareness that a result is practically certain means the actor understands the outcome is virtually inevitable, elevating the mental state to knowing under modern codes.
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No. Circumstantial evidence such as the choice of method, timing, and targeting of a known vulnerability can establish that the defendant was aware death was practically certain even without an express admission.
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Yes. Purpose requires a conscious object to cause the result while knowledge requires awareness that the result is practically certain. Evidence of deliberate planning and use of a deadly method often permits a jury to find either mental state.
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The standard defines the mental state for a result element. If death does not occur the homicide charge fails, though the same facts may support attempted murder or other offenses.
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…a specific wrongful purpose, is consciously aware of the nature of his conduct or of the result which will (or which is practically certain to) be caused ." Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 4-3, Committee Comments, at 256 (Smith-Hurd 1972). Thus in Muir the indictment charged that the defendant "with the intent to commit…