Also known as: preemption defences · pre-emption defense · preemption defenses · preemption · federal preemption
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A defense asserting that federal law displaces state-law claims because Congress intended to occupy the field or because state requirements conflict with federal mandates.
Piper Patel operates a sports betting platform in a state that enacted a licensing scheme after federal law barred states from authorizing such activities. She sues state officials for refusing to process her application. The officials raise a preemption defense, but the court rejects it because the federal statute targeted state legislative action rather than private conduct.
Paula Pierce sues a former employee and his new employer for misappropriating manufacturing processes she developed. The defendants assert a preemption defense based on federal patent law. The court rejects the defense because state trade secret protection supplements rather than conflicts with patent policy.
Harshaw Chemical Co., an unincorporated division of petitioner Kewanee Oil Co., commenced research in 1949 into the growth of synthetic crystals useful in the detection of ionizing radiation and was able to produce one less than two inches in diameter. By 1966, as the result of expenditures in excess of one million dollars, Harshaw was able to grow a seventeen-inch crystal, something no one else had done previously. Harshaw had developed many processes, procedures, and manufacturing techniques in the purification of raw materials and the growth and encapsulation of the crystals which enabled it to accomplish this feat. Some of these processes Harshaw considers to be trade secrets. The individual respondents are former employees of Harshaw who formed or later joined respondent Bicron. While at Harshaw the individual respondents executed, as a condition of employment, at least one agreement each, requiring them not to disclose confidential information or trade secrets obtained as employees of Harshaw. Bicron was formed in August 1969 to compete with Harshaw in the production of the crystals, and by April 1970 had grown a seventeen-inch crystal. Petitioner brought this diversity action in United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio seeking injunctive relief and damages for the misappropriation of trade secrets. The District Court, applying Ohio trade secret law, granted a permanent injunction against the disclosure or use by respondents of twenty of the forty claimed trade secrets until such time as the trade secrets had been released to the public, had otherwise generally become available to the public, or had been obtained by respondents from sources having the legal right to convey the information. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the findings of fact by the District Court were not clearly erroneous and that the District Court properly applied Ohio law relating to trade secrets. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, finding Ohio's trade secret law to be in conflict with the patent laws of the United States. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a question on which there is a conflict in the courts of appeals: whether state trade secret protection is preempted by operation of the federal patent law.
View casePhoebe Park is injured in a car crash and sues the manufacturer for failing to install a more advanced airbag. The manufacturer raises a preemption defense citing federal safety standards that permitted the chosen design. The court accepts the defense because the federal standard preempts conflicting state tort duties.
In 1987, petitioner Alexis Geier, then four months old, was a passenger in a 1987 Honda Accord that crashed into a tree. The car was equipped with manual shoulder and lap belts but had no airbag. The lap and shoulder belt did not prevent Alexis from striking her head on the dashboard, and she suffered serious injuries as a result. Alexis and her parents sued the car's manufacturer, American Honda Motor Company, Inc., and its American distributor, Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc., in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They claimed that American Honda had designed its car negligently and defectively because it lacked a driver's side airbag. American Honda moved for summary judgment on the ground that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and FMVSS 208 preempted the lawsuit. The District Court dismissed the lawsuit. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Act or the safety standard preempts a no-airbag lawsuit. FMVSS 208, promulgated under the Act, required auto manufacturers to equip some but not all of their 1987 and later model vehicles with passive restraints. The standard required manufacturers to equip 10 percent of their 1987 vehicles, 25 percent of their 1988 vehicles, 40 percent of their 1989 vehicles, and 100 percent of their 1990 and later vehicles with one of several different passive restraint systems, including airbags, automatic safety belts, or other passive restraints providing at least the same level of crash protection.
View casePreston Pratt sues a television station for airing his name in connection with a crime report. The station raises a preemption defense grounded in federal constitutional protections for accurate reporting of public records. The court sustains the defense because federal rules override state privacy torts in that setting.
In August 1971, appellee Cohn's 17-year-old daughter was raped and murdered in Georgia. Six youths were indicted for murder and rape. Although there was substantial press coverage of the crime and of subsequent developments, the identity of the victim was not disclosed pending trial, perhaps because of Ga. Code Ann. § 26-9901 (1972). In April 1972, during court proceedings in which five defendants entered guilty pleas, reporter Wassell for petitioner Cox Broadcasting Corporation examined the indictments made available in the courtroom. Wassell obtained the victim's name from those public records and broadcast it on WSB-TV that day and again the following day. In May 1972, Cohn filed suit in the Superior Court of Fulton County against Cox Broadcasting and Wassell. The complaint alleged invasion of privacy arising from the television broadcasts that named his deceased daughter and sought money damages. The trial court granted summary judgment to Cohn on the issue of liability. The Georgia Supreme Court initially held that the complaint stated a common-law claim for public disclosure. On rehearing the court sustained the constitutionality of the state statute prohibiting publication of a rape victim's name. The United States Supreme Court postponed decision on jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits and reviewed the case after the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the constitutional challenge to liability.
View casePriscilla Parks sues several utilities for contributing to climate change through greenhouse gas emissions. The defendants raise a preemption defense based on federal environmental statutes that regulate the same conduct. The court accepts the defense because federal law occupies the field and leaves no room for state common-law claims.
In July 2004, two groups of plaintiffs filed separate complaints in the Southern District of New York against the same five major electric power companies. The first group included eight States and New York City. The second group joined three nonprofit land trusts. The defendants were four private companies and the Tennessee Valley Authority, a federally owned corporation. According to the complaints, the defendants are the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States, with collective annual emissions of 650 million tons constituting 25 percent of emissions from the domestic electric power sector. The plaintiffs asserted that by contributing to global warming, the defendants’ carbon-dioxide emissions created a substantial and unreasonable interference with public rights, in violation of the federal common law of interstate nuisance or state tort law. The States and New York City alleged that public lands, infrastructure, and health were at risk from climate change. The trusts urged that climate change would destroy habitats for animals and rare species on land they owned and conserved. All plaintiffs sought injunctive relief requiring each defendant to cap its carbon dioxide emissions and then reduce them by a specified percentage each year for at least a decade. The District Court dismissed both suits as presenting non-justiciable political questions. The Second Circuit reversed. On threshold questions, the Court of Appeals held that the suits were not barred by the political question doctrine and that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged Article III standing. Turning to the merits, the Second Circuit held that all plaintiffs had stated a claim under the federal common law of nuisance and that the Clean Air Act did not displace federal common law. Responding to the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Environmental Protection Agency undertook greenhouse gas regulation. In December 2009, the Agency concluded that greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. EPA issued a joint final rule regulating emissions from light-duty vehicles and initiated a joint rulemaking covering medium- and heavy-duty vehicles. EPA also began phasing in requirements that new or modified major greenhouse gas emitting facilities use the best available control technology and commenced a rulemaking under section 111 of the Act to set limits on greenhouse gas emissions from new, modified, and existing fossil-fuel fired powerplants. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2010. Four Members of the Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing under Massachusetts v. EPA, while four Members would hold that none of the plaintiffs have Article III standing. The Court therefore affirmed, by an equally divided Court, the Second Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction and proceeded to the merits.
View casePaul Peterson sues a manufacturer for patent infringement over a specialized metal product. The defendant raises a preemption defense arguing that federal patent law displaces any conflicting state claim. The court accepts the defense and retains jurisdiction.
In 1994, the Internal Revenue Service seized real property in Michigan belonging to Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc., to satisfy the company's federal tax delinquency. The IRS provided notice of the seizure to Grable by certified mail, which Grable received before selling the property to Darue Engineering & Manufacturing. Grable did not redeem the property within the 180-day statutory period following the sale. After that period had passed, the Government gave Darue a quitclaim deed. Five years later, Grable brought a quiet title action in Michigan state court against Darue. Grable claimed that Darue’s record title was invalid because the IRS had failed to notify Grable of its seizure of the property in the exact manner required by federal statute. Grable asserted that the statute required personal service rather than service by certified mail. Darue removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The district court declined to remand after finding that the claim posed a significant question of federal law and granted summary judgment to Darue. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the jurisdictional question alone.
View caseThe defense applies when Congress has imposed a specific design requirement and intended to prevent states from imposing stricter or different standards. Courts examine the federal statute for evidence of that intent.
No. State trade secret protection is not preempted when it addresses different subject matter and does not conflict with the objectives of the patent system.
Supporting sources
Congressional intent is the touchstone. A court must determine whether the federal statute was meant to occupy the field or to conflict with the state rule at issue.
Usually not. Minimum standards leave room for state requirements that are more protective unless the statute expressly or impliedly precludes them.
…which see Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Train Dispatchers , 499 U.S. 117, 111 S.Ct. 1156, 113 L.Ed.2d 95 (1991)—courts usually read preemption clauses to leave private contracts unaffected. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens , — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 817, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995), provides a nice illustration. A federal statute preempts…