/pri-LIM-uh-ner-ee in-JUNK-shuhnz/·procedural term
Also known as:preliminary injunction · preliminary injunctive relief
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An equitable remedy by which a court orders a party to take or refrain from specified actions during the pendency of litigation. The remedy requires notice to the adverse party and security in an amount the court deems proper to cover costs and damages if the injunction is later found wrongful. Courts exercise discretion after weighing factors including the threat of irreparable harm, the balance of hardships, the movant's likelihood of success on the merits, and the public interest.
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6
Notice Requirement Before Injunction
Pearl Porter filed suit against Premier Manufacturing alleging ongoing trespass by pesticide drift onto her organic fields. She moved for a preliminary injunction without first notifying the company. The court refused to issue the order until Premier received notice and an opportunity to be heard on the motion.
Extraordinary Relief in Partnership Dispute
Philip Powell, a limited partner in a venture, brought a derivative action against the general partner for self-dealing. He sought a preliminary injunction to halt further transfers of partnership assets. The court considered whether to grant the extraordinary relief after the partnership appointed a special litigation committee.
Security Bond for Injunction
Paige Porter obtained a preliminary injunction halting Precision Tools from using disputed trade secrets. The court required her to post a bond in an amount sufficient to cover any costs and damages Precision Tools might sustain if the injunction later proved wrongful.
Notice Costs in Class Litigation
Portia Price sued on behalf of a class of investors alleging securities violations. The district court scheduled a hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction to determine whether the class could shift notice costs to the defendants based on a strong showing of likely success.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin417 U.S. 156, 171 (1974)
In May 1966 petitioner Morton Eisen filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of himself and all other odd-lot traders on the New York Stock Exchange. The complaint charged respondent brokerage firms Carlisle & Jacquelin and DeCoppet & Doremus with monopolizing odd-lot trading and setting the differential at an excessive level in violation of the Sherman Act. It also charged the Exchange with failing to regulate the differential in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The class was later limited to traders during the period from May 1, 1962, through June 30, 1966. Throughout that period odd-lot trading was handled exclusively by special dealers. The two respondent firms together handled 99 percent of the Exchange's odd-lot business. They were compensated by a differential of 12.5 cents per share on stocks trading below $40 and 25 cents per share on stocks trading at or above $40. Petitioner's individual stake in the damages sought was $70.
The District Court dismissed the suit as a class action in September 1966. The Court of Appeals issued Eisen I, holding the dismissal appealable as a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. It also issued Eisen II, reversing the dismissal and remanding for further inquiry into the requirements of Rule 23, including notice, manageability, and adequacy of representation. After evidentiary hearings on remand, the District Court in 1971 held the suit maintainable as a class action.
The District Court found that some 2,250,000 class members could be identified by name and address with reasonable effort. Individual notice to them would cost approximately $225,000 at six cents per letter. It approved a limited notice plan costing about $21,720. After a preliminary hearing on the merits, the court ordered respondents to bear 90 percent of that cost. Respondents appealed. In Eisen III the Court of Appeals held that individual notice to all identifiable members was required, that the representative plaintiff must bear the notice costs, and that the class action was unmanageable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1973.
Buffer Zone Injunction Review
Penelope Price, operating a clinic, obtained an injunction establishing buffer zones around the facility to protect patients from protesters. The appellate court reviewed the scope of the order to ensure it did not burden more speech than necessary to serve the government's interests.
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.512 U.S. 753 (1994)
Respondents operate a medical clinic in Melbourne, Florida, that offers abortions among other services. The clinic is located on Dixie Highway, a major traffic artery in the city. The clinic property occupies less than one acre and is bounded on the north and south by other commercial property, on the west by a two-lane road, and on the east by a parking lot and an intersecting street.
In September 1992, a group of antiabortion protesters began picketing the clinic. The protesters, whose number varied from 10 to 40 on any given day, engaged in a variety of activities near the clinic. They sang, chanted, and carried signs and banners. They also distributed literature to, and engaged in conversations with, people approaching the clinic. Although the protesters were generally nonviolent, they occasionally trespassed onto clinic property and blocked access to the clinic. They also picketed the nearby residences of some of the clinic's employees.
In response to these activities, the clinic obtained an injunction from the Florida Circuit Court. The initial injunction prohibited trespassing on or entering clinic property, blocking or interfering with access to or egress from the clinic, physically or verbally abusing persons entering or leaving the clinic, making loud or raucous noise within earshot of the clinic during specified hours, physically approaching any person seeking clinic services within 300 feet unless the person indicates a desire to communicate, using any images observable by patients inside the clinic, and picketing or demonstrating within 300 feet of clinic employees' residences.
After the initial injunction proved insufficient, protesters continued to impede access to the clinic by congregating on the paved portion of Dixie Way and marching in front of the clinic's driveways. Sidewalk counselors approached vehicles heading toward the clinic. The number of people congregating varied from a handful to 400, and the noise varied from singing and chanting to the use of loudspeakers and bullhorns. The trial court issued a broader amended injunction that established a 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveway, noise restrictions during surgical procedures and recovery periods, a 300-foot no-approach zone around the clinic, a 300-foot buffer zone around employees' residences, and an in concert provision. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the amended injunction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the Florida Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
Contract Performance Injunction
Pacific Bank sought a preliminary injunction compelling Gulf Oil to continue supplying fuel under an existing contract after Gulf threatened to cut off deliveries. The court examined whether the threatened breach would cause irreparable harm that damages could not adequately remedy.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.415 F. Supp. 429 (1975)
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. and Gulf Oil Corporation maintained a business relationship spanning several decades involving the sale and purchase of aviation fuel. On June 27, 1972, following months of arm's length negotiation, the parties executed a contract under which Gulf agreed to supply Eastern's requirements of jet fuel at specified cities in the Eastern system through January 31, 1977. The agreement was Gulf's standard form aviation fuel contract and incorporated a price escalation clause tied to the average of the posted prices for West Texas sour crude oil 30.0-30.9 gravity as listed for Gulf, Shell, and Pan American in Platt's Oilgram Crude Oil Supplement.
The contract price mechanism operated against the backdrop of U.S. government price controls in effect from 1972 through the fall of 1973. In late 1973 the Arab oil embargo occurred. OPEC unilaterally increased the price of their crude to the world market some 400% between September, 1973, and January 15, 1974. This triggered implementation of two-tier price controls under which old oil remained frozen at controlled levels while new and released oil prices rose from approximately $5 to $11 per barrel. Platt's continued publishing only the controlled old oil postings for West Texas Sour, and Eastern paid contract prices that rose from 11 cents to 15 cents per gallon.
On March 8, 1974, Gulf demanded that Eastern accept a price increase or face cutoff of jet fuel supplies within fifteen days. Eastern filed its complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida alleging breach and seeking preliminary and permanent mandatory injunctions. By agreement of the parties a preliminary injunction preserving the status quo was entered on March 20, 1974, requiring Gulf to continue performance and Eastern to pay according to contract terms pending final disposition.
Gulf answered and asserted that the contract lacked mutuality, was not a binding requirements contract, and was commercially impracticable. At trial the parties presented evidence concerning Eastern's fuel liftings at Gulf stations, which varied daily, weekly, and monthly due to weather, schedules, aircraft loads, and fuel freighting practices that Gulf had accepted without objection over thirty years of dealing. Gulf introduced evidence of its increased crude oil costs, including intra-company transfer prices that incorporated profits from its overseas and domestic production subsidiaries, while the record showed Gulf recorded net profits after taxes of approximately $800 million in 1973 and more than $1.065 billion in 1974.
5 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What factors does a court weigh when deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction?
A court compares the threat of irreparable harm if the injunction is denied, the hardship an injunction would impose on the defendant, the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits, and the public interest. Additional equitable considerations include the nature of the interest at stake, the adequacy of money damages, any delay by the plaintiff, and the practicality of framing and enforcing the order.
Must a movant post security before a preliminary injunction issues?
Yes. The court may issue a preliminary injunction only if the movant gives security in an amount the court considers proper to pay costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined. The United States and its agencies are exempt from this requirement.
Can a preliminary injunction issue without notice to the adverse party?
No. The court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party. When an order is issued without notice, the motion for a preliminary injunction must be set for hearing at the earliest possible time and the party who obtained the order must proceed with the motion or the court must dissolve it.
How does a preliminary injunction differ from a temporary restraining order?
A preliminary injunction requires notice to the adverse party and may last until the case is resolved or modified by the court. A temporary restraining order may issue without notice in exigent circumstances but expires after a short period, typically no more than fourteen days, unless extended for good cause.
Is a preliminary injunction automatically available whenever a continuing trespass or nuisance is alleged?
No. Even when a plaintiff alleges a continuing trespass or nuisance, the court must conduct a comparative appraisal of irreparable harm, hardship, delay, likelihood of success, and public interests rather than granting relief as of right.
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