Also known as:preponderance tests · preponderance of the evidence · preponderance standard
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard of proof in civil matters under which a party prevails by showing that a fact is more likely true than not.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Slayer Status in Probate
Portia Price petitioned the probate court to bar her brother from inheriting under their mother's will after he was accused of causing the death. The court conducted a civil hearing and weighed the evidence of the brother's pre-flight modifications to the plane and his comments about taking over the family business. Because the facts showed it was more likely than not that the brother feloniously and intentionally killed the decedent, the court applied the preponderance test and denied him any share of the estate.
Admitting Prior Acts Evidence
The prosecution sought to introduce evidence that Pearl Porter had previously diverted nonprofit funds through self-dealing invoices. At the pretrial hearing the court examined the invoices and board minutes but did not require the government to prove the prior acts by a preponderance. The judge instead checked whether the jury could reasonably find the acts occurred and whether their probative value on intent outweighed unfair prejudice under the applicable standard.
Patrick Phan's will left his training facility shares to the captain of his toughest team, but two former players, Phoebe Park and Pierre Poulin, each claimed the bequest. The probate court reviewed extrinsic evidence of the testator's statements and the timing of the facilities' acquisitions. After determining that the donor's intention was established by a preponderance of the evidence, the court awarded the shares to Phoebe Park.
Distinguishing Criminal Standard
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding Paige Porter was charged with theft. The court noted that the prosecution must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance of the evidence. Because the evidence left reasonable doubt on the element of intent, the court entered a finding in favor of the juvenile.
In re Winship397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)
During a 1967 adjudicatory hearing conducted pursuant to section 742 of the New York Family Court Act, a judge in New York Family Court found that the twelve-year-old appellant had entered a locker and stolen one hundred twelve dollars from a woman's pocketbook. The petition which charged appellant with delinquency alleged that his act, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime or crimes of larceny. The judge acknowledged that the proof might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but relied on section 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act, which provides that any determination at the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing that a juvenile did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence.
After a subsequent dispositional hearing, appellant was ordered placed in a training school for an initial period of eighteen months, subject to annual extensions of his commitment until his eighteenth birthday, six years in appellant's case. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, affirmed without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed by a four-to-three vote, expressly sustaining the constitutionality of section 744(b). The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
After a jury convicted Paragon Construction of fraud, the company challenged the verdict on appeal. The reviewing court examined whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt rather than applying a mere preponderance test. Finding the evidence sufficient under that stricter standard, the court affirmed the conviction.
Jackson v. Virginia443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979)
On July 29, 1972, the body of Mary Houston Cole was discovered in a secluded church parking lot in Chesterfield County, Virginia. She had been shot twice at close range with a .38-caliber pistol. The victim had last been seen alive the previous evening in the company of petitioner Hugh Jackson, who was carrying a .38-caliber pistol.
Jackson had befriended Cole while he was imprisoned on a disorderly conduct charge at the local county jail. After his release she arranged for him to live in the home of her son and daughter-in-law. On the day of the killing Jackson had been drinking and had spent considerable time shooting at targets with his revolver. Late in the afternoon he unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Cole to drive him to North Carolina. She instead drove him to a local diner where both were observed by several police officers.
A deputy sheriff later observed Jackson and Cole preparing to leave the diner in her car. Jackson was in possession of his revolver and a kitchen knife was visible in the vehicle. Cole's body was found the following day and a half later, naked from the waist down with her slacks beneath her body. Six cartridge cases fired from Jackson's gun were recovered nearby. Jackson drove the victim's car to North Carolina, made a short trip to Florida, and was arrested several days later.
In a post-arrest statement introduced at trial, Jackson admitted shooting Cole but claimed the shooting occurred accidentally during a struggle. He said the victim had attacked him with a knife when he resisted her sexual advances. He stated he had first fired warning shots into the ground and reloaded before the fatal shots. At trial he asserted self-defense or, alternatively, that intoxication had prevented him from forming the specific intent required for first-degree murder under Virginia law.
The trial judge, sitting as factfinder, convicted Jackson of first-degree murder and sentenced him to thirty years in prison. Jackson's motion to set aside the judgment was denied. The Virginia Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of error alleging insufficient evidence.
Jackson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The District Court applied the Thompson v. Louisville no-evidence standard and granted relief after finding insufficient proof of premeditation. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that judgment.
The state sought to commit Premier Manufacturing's former executive to a mental hospital indefinitely. The trial court instructed the jury to apply the preponderance test. On appeal the court held that due process requires clear and convincing evidence for such a commitment, so the order was reversed.
When does the preponderance test apply instead of the reasonable-doubt standard?
The preponderance test governs civil proceedings such as slayer determinations and will construction. Criminal cases require proof beyond a reasonable doubt for each element of the offense.
Supporting sources
Does a criminal conviction automatically establish slayer status under the preponderance test?
A final criminal conviction for the felonious and intentional killing conclusively establishes slayer status in the subsequent civil proceeding. Absent such a conviction the court must independently weigh the evidence under the preponderance standard.
Supporting sources
How does the preponderance test affect admission of uncharged misconduct evidence?
The trial court need not find the prior act proved by a preponderance before admitting it. The evidence is admissible if the jury could reasonably find the act occurred and its probative value on a non-propensity issue is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
Supporting sources
What burden applies when resolving an ambiguity in a donative document?
The donor's intention must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Once that threshold is met the text is construed in accordance with the proved intention.
Supporting sources
397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970)
…that "[a]ny determination at the conclusion of [an adjudicatory] hearing that a [juvenile] did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence." During a subsequent dispositional hearing, appellant was ordered placed in a training school for an initial period of 18 months, subject to annual extensions of his commitment…