Also known as: presiding jurors · foreperson · foreman · jury foreperson
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The juror who chairs the jury during deliberations and speaks for the jury in court by announcing the verdict. The presiding juror is usually elected by the jury at the start of deliberations and may sign indictments or report the number of concurring jurors.
Priya Prasad serves as the presiding juror on a federal grand jury investigating a securities fraud scheme. After twelve jurors vote to indict the defendant, Priya signs the indictment and returns it in open court to the magistrate judge. The return satisfies the concurrence requirement and allows the case to proceed to arraignment.
Pearl Porter is elected presiding juror in a capital murder trial. During penalty phase deliberations she organizes discussion of aggravating and mitigating factors and later announces the jury's unanimous recommendation of death in open court. The trial judge accepts the recommendation and imposes sentence.
On November 21, 1973, Troy Gregg and Floyd Allen were hitchhiking north in Florida when they were picked up by Fred Simmons and Bob Moore in their car. Their car broke down. Simmons purchased another vehicle with some of the cash he was carrying. While still in Florida, the group picked up Dennis Weaver, who rode with them to Atlanta, where he was let out about 11 p.m. A short time later the four men stopped for a rest along the highway in Gwinnett County, Georgia. The next morning the bodies of Simmons and Moore were discovered in a nearby ditch. On November 23, after reading about the shootings in an Atlanta newspaper, Weaver communicated with the Gwinnett County police and related information concerning the journey with the victims, including a description of the car. The next afternoon, Gregg and Allen, while in Simmons' car, were arrested in Asheville, North Carolina. In the search incident to the arrest a .25-caliber pistol, later shown to be that used to kill Simmons and Moore, was found in Gregg's pocket. After receiving Miranda warnings and signing a written waiver, Gregg signed a statement admitting he shot Simmons and Moore but claiming self-defense. At the guilt stage of the bifurcated trial, a medical examiner testified that Simmons died from a bullet wound in the eye and that Moore died from bullet wounds in the cheek and in the back of the head. The examiner further testified that both men had several bruises and abrasions about the face and head. Gregg testified claiming self-defense after Simmons and Moore allegedly attacked with a pipe and knife, but the jury convicted him of two counts of armed robbery and two counts of murder. At the penalty stage before the same jury, neither side presented additional evidence. The trial judge instructed the jury that it could recommend either a death sentence or a life prison sentence on each count. The judge further charged the jury that in determining the sentence it was free to consider mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The judge instructed that death could not be imposed unless the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt one of the aggravating circumstances. The jury found the first and second aggravating circumstances and returned verdicts of death on each count. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and the death sentences for murder after reviewing the record and comparing the sentences to similar cases, but it vacated the death sentences for armed robbery. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the challenge to the death sentences under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
View caseParker Phillips, the presiding juror, receives a note from another juror alleging racial animus expressed by a third juror during deliberations. Parker reports the allegation to the trial judge, who conducts an inquiry and ultimately grants a new trial on the basis of the reported statements.
In 2007, two teenage sisters were sexually assaulted in the bathroom of a Colorado horse-racing facility. The girls identified the assailant as a racetrack employee, and police arrested Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez. Each girl separately identified him as the man who assaulted her. State prosecutors charged Peña-Rodriguez with harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted sexual assault on a child. Before the jury was empaneled, members of the venire received a written questionnaire asking if anything would make it difficult to be a fair juror. The court and defense counsel repeatedly asked prospective jurors whether they could be fair and impartial. None of the empaneled jurors expressed reservations based on racial bias. After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Peña-Rodriguez of unlawful sexual contact and harassment but failed to reach a verdict on the attempted sexual assault charge. When the jury was discharged, the court gave the mandated instruction that whether jurors discussed the case was their own decision. Following discharge, two jurors remained in the jury room to speak privately with defense counsel. They reported that during deliberations another juror, identified as H.C., had expressed anti-Hispanic bias toward Peña-Rodriguez and his alibi witness. With the trial court's supervision, counsel obtained sworn affidavits from the two jurors. The affidavits stated that H.C. said Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they wanted with women. The affidavits further stated that nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls. H.C. believed Peña-Rodriguez was guilty because he is Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want. H.C. did not find the alibi witness credible because the witness was an illegal. The trial court acknowledged H.C.'s apparent bias. It denied Peña-Rodriguez's motion for a new trial on the ground that Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) generally prohibits a juror from testifying about statements made during deliberations in a proceeding inquiring into the validity of the verdict. A divided panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the statements did not fall within an exception to the rule. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed by a 4-3 vote. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether there is a constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule for instances of racial bias.
View casePierre Poulin is selected as presiding juror after the court denies a challenge to the jury array. During trial Pierre maintains order in the jury room and later delivers the verdict of guilty on all counts. The defendant later claims the array was improperly constituted.
Petitioners Daniel D. Glasser, Norton I. Kretske, and Samuel H. Roth, together with Louis Kaplan and Anthony Horton, were found guilty upon an indictment charging them with a conspiracy to defraud the United States under § 37 of the Criminal Code. Glasser had served as assistant United States attorney in charge of liquor cases from March 1935 until April 1939. Kretske assisted him from October 1934 until April 1937 before entering private practice. Roth was a private attorney. Kaplan was an automobile dealer reputedly engaged in the illicit alcohol traffic. Horton was a professional bondsman. The second count alleged that the defendants conspired to defraud the United States of its governmental function to be honestly represented in court free from corruption. This was to be accomplished by soliciting payments to influence Glasser and Kretske in their official duties. Before trial all defendants moved to quash the indictment on the grounds that the grand jury was illegally constituted because women were excluded and that the indictment had not been properly returned in open court. Glasser, Kretske, and Roth also demurred. The motions and demurrers were overruled. Trial began on February 5, 1940. After Kretske's counsel sought a continuance that was denied, McDonnell was appointed Kretske's attorney. On February 6, after Kretske expressed dissatisfaction, the court appointed William Scott Stewart, who had already entered an appearance for Glasser, to represent Kretske as well. Glasser objected on the record, stating that he wanted his own lawyer representing him. He noted inconsistencies in the defense because statements about payments to take care of Glasser would not be binding on him and could create an impression that the defendants were together. After further discussion Stewart was appointed for Kretske and represented both defendants throughout the month-long trial. The government called witnesses including accountant Brantman, who testified he gave Kretske $3000 on behalf of Abosketes, Abosketes himself, Frank and Anthony Hodorowicz, Edward Dewes, and others who described payments to Kretske to fix liquor-violation cases, references to "Red" or the red-head, and Roth's representation of defendants in those matters. The jury, composed of six men and six women, returned a guilty verdict on March 8, 1940. Glasser and Kretske received sentences of fourteen months' imprisonment and Roth was fined $500. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of Glasser, Kretske, and Roth. Glasser and Roth filed affidavits alleging that women on the petit jury panel had been drawn exclusively from the membership of the Illinois League of Women Voters. The record is barren of any actual tender of proof on the motion for new trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePaige Porter serves as presiding juror in a trial before a mayor who also acts as judge and receives fees only upon conviction. After the jury convicts the defendant, Paige announces the verdict. The Supreme Court later holds the fee arrangement violates due process.
Tumey was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by Mayor Pugh of the Village of North College Hill and charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor within Hamilton County. Upon appearing before the mayor, Tumey moved for dismissal on the ground that the mayor was disqualified to try the case. The mayor denied the motion, conducted the trial, convicted Tumey, fined him one hundred dollars, and ordered that he remain imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid. Tumey carried the case on error to the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County. That court reversed the judgment. The State obtained review in the Court of Appeals of the first appellate district of Ohio, which reversed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas and affirmed the mayor's judgment. The Supreme Court of Ohio refused to require the Court of Appeals to certify its record and subsequently dismissed Tumey's petition in error. The Village of North College Hill had a population of 1,104 according to the federal census, while Hamilton County had more than half a million residents. Under the Ohio statutes and Village Ordinance No. 125, the mayor received his costs in each case only if the defendant was convicted, and the village received one half of the fines collected from prohibition violations, with part of those funds used to compensate deputy marshals and prosecutors based on percentages of the fines collected. From May 11, 1923, to December 31, 1923, Mayor Pugh received $696.35 from liquor cases in addition to his regular salary. The duties of the mayor were primarily executive, including serving as chief conservator of the peace and supervising the finances of the village. The case came before the United States Supreme Court on a writ of error directed to the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
View casePaula Pierce, the presiding juror, is asked after trial whether a fellow juror made biased statements during deliberations. She declines to testify about the content of deliberations. The court refuses to consider the proffered evidence and upholds the verdict.
Gregory Warger was riding his motorcycle on a highway outside Rapid City, South Dakota, when a truck driven by Randy Shauers struck him from behind. Warger claims he was stopped at the time of the accident, while Shauers claims that Warger suddenly pulled out in front of him. The accident resulted in serious injuries to Warger that ultimately required the amputation of his left leg. Warger sued Shauers for negligence in Federal District Court. During jury selection, counsel for both parties conducted lengthy voir dire of the prospective jurors. Warger's counsel asked whether any jurors would be unable to award damages for pain and suffering or for future medical expenses. Counsel also asked whether there was any juror who thought they could not be a fair and impartial juror on this kind of case. Prospective juror Regina Whipple, who was later selected as the jury foreperson, answered no to each of these questions. The jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of Shauers. Shortly thereafter, one of the jurors contacted Warger's counsel to express concern over juror Whipple's conduct. The complaining juror subsequently signed an affidavit claiming that Whipple had spoken during deliberations about a motor vehicle collision in which her daughter was at fault for the collision and a man died, and had related that if her daughter had been sued, it would have ruined her life. Relying on this affidavit, Warger moved for a new trial. The District Court refused to grant a new trial, holding that the only evidence that supported Warger's motion, the complaining juror's affidavit, was barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseThe jury itself usually elects the presiding juror at the start of deliberations, although in federal grand jury proceedings the court appoints the foreperson and deputy foreperson.
The presiding juror chairs deliberations, signs indictments, records the number of concurring jurors, and announces the verdict in open court.
A court may excuse a juror for good cause and impanel an alternate. If the presiding juror is excused, the jury elects a replacement or the court appoints one.
…provision of the statute requiring proof of the publication in a newspaper to be made by the "affidavit of the printer, or his foreman, or his principal clerk," is satisfied when the affidavit is made by the editor of the paper. The term "printer," in their judgment, is there used not to indicate the person who sets up the…