Also known as:presumption of parentage · presumption of paternity · presumptions of paternity · paternity presumption · parentage presumption
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A statutory rule that treats specified relationships or conduct as establishing legal parentage of a child. The rule attaches automatically when a person is married to the woman who gives birth and the child is born during the marriage or within three hundred days after termination, when the person resides with the child for the first two years and holds the child out as the person's own, or through other listed conduct. The presumption remains in force unless overcome by a court adjudication or a valid statutory denial of parentage.
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Uniform Acts
Restatements
How its tested
Common Examples
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Challenge to Marital Presumption
Paul Peterson and Phoebe Park married in State A. Phoebe gave birth to a daughter during the marriage. Paul is listed on the birth certificate and the family health plan. Six months later a former partner obtains genetic testing showing a 99.9 percent probability he is the biological father and files an action to be declared the legal parent. The court treats Paul as the presumed parent and requires a full adjudication before any change in legal status can occur.
Holding-Out Presumption in Same-Sex Marriage
Perry Pratt and Pilar Pena are married. Perry gives birth to twins. Pilar resides with the children from birth, appears with them at school events, and lists them as dependents on her employer benefits. After the relationship ends Pilar stops providing support. The county seeks child support from Pilar, who claims no genetic tie. The court recognizes Pilar as a presumed parent based on her conduct and requires an adjudication to overcome that status.
Elisa B. v. Superior Court117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005)
Elisa B. and Emily B. entered into a lesbian relationship in 1993 and began living together six months later. They introduced each other to friends as their partner, exchanged rings, opened a joint bank account, and believed they were in a committed relationship. They discussed having children and decided that they both wished to give birth, with Emily as the stay-at-home mother and Elisa as the primary breadwinner because Elisa earned more than twice as much money as Emily.
They chose a donor at a sperm bank so the children would be biological brothers and sisters. Elisa became pregnant in February 1997 and gave birth to Chance in November 1997. Emily began the insemination process in June of 1997 and became pregnant in August 1997, giving birth prematurely in March 1998 to twins Ry and Kaia. Ry had medical problems including Down’s syndrome and required heart surgery. Elisa was present when Emily was inseminated and picked up additional sperm to inseminate Emily at their home.
They jointly selected the children’s names, joining their surnames with a hyphen. They each breast-fed all of the children. Elisa claimed all three children as her dependents on her tax returns and obtained a life insurance policy on herself naming Emily as the beneficiary. Elisa’s parents referred to the twins as their grandchildren, and her sister referred to Elisa as the twins’ mother. Elisa treated all of the children as hers and told a prospective employer that she had triplets. Elisa and Emily identified themselves as coparents of Ry at an organization arranging care for his Down’s syndrome.
Elisa and Emily separated in November 1999. Elisa promised to support Emily and the twins as much as she possibly could and initially paid the mortgage payments of approximately $1,500 per month on the house in which Emily and the twins continued to live, as well as other expenses. When they sold the house and Emily and the twins moved into an apartment in November 2000, Elisa paid Emily $1,000 a month. In early 2001, Elisa stated she lost her position as a full-time employee and told Emily she no longer could support her and the twins. At the time of trial, Elisa was earning $95,000 a year. Emily applied for aid.
On June 7, 2001, the El Dorado County District Attorney filed a complaint in superior court to establish that Elisa B. is a parent of two-year-old twins Kaia B. and Ry B., who were born to Emily B., and to order Elisa to pay child support. After a hearing, the superior court rendered a written decision on July 11, 2002, ordering Elisa to pay child support in the amount of $907.50 per child for a total of $1815 per month. Elisa petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, and the court directed the superior court to vacate its order and dismiss the action. The Supreme Court granted review.
Marital Presumption Against Later Biology Claim
Paige Porter is married to Pedro Pacheco when she gives birth. The couple lives together and Pedro is named on the birth certificate. Four years later a man who had a brief relationship with Paige obtains DNA results and petitions for parentage. The court holds that the marital presumption controls until a formal adjudication determines whether the presumption is overcome.
Michael H. v. Gerald D.491 U.S. 110 (1989)
In May 1976 Carole D. and Gerald D. married in Las Vegas and established a home in Playa del Rey, California.
In the summer of 1978 Carole began an adulterous affair with neighbor Michael H. In September 1980 she conceived Victoria D., who was born on May 11, 1981. Gerald was listed as father on the birth certificate and has always held her out as his daughter. Soon after delivery Carole told Michael she believed he might be the father.
Blood tests performed in October 1981 showed a 98.07 percent probability that Michael was Victoria's father. During the first three years of her life, Victoria remained always with Carole, but found herself within a variety of quasi-family units.
In November 1982 Michael filed a filiation action in California Superior Court seeking to establish paternity and visitation rights. In March 1983 the court appointed a guardian ad litem for Victoria, who filed a cross-complaint asserting a right to maintain filial relationships with both men.
In April 1984 Carole and Michael signed a stipulation acknowledging Michael as Victoria's natural father, but Carole later directed her attorneys not to file it. In June 1984 Carole reconciled with Gerald; they now reside together with Victoria and two later-born children in New York.
In May 1984 Michael and Victoria sought visitation pendente lite. A court-appointed psychologist recommended sole custody with Carole and limited visitation for Michael; the Superior Court ordered such visitation. On October 19, 1984 Gerald moved for summary judgment under California Evidence Code § 621. On January 28, 1985 the Superior Court granted the motion, finding no triable issues of fact as to paternity, and denied continued visitation. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court and upheld the constitutionality of the statute in 1987. The California Supreme Court denied discretionary review. On February 29, 1988, the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of the present appeal.
Intent-Based Presumption in Surrogacy
Progressive Healthcare arranges a gestational surrogacy. Phoebe Park, the intended mother, and her spouse are parties to the agreement. The surrogate gives birth and the child is placed with the intended parents. A genetic donor later claims rights. The court applies the presumption arising from the intended parents' conduct and agreement, requiring adjudication to resolve any competing claim.
Johnson v. Calvert851 P.2d 776, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874, and cert. dismissed sub nom. Baby Boy J. v. Johnson, 510 U.S. 938 (1993)
In 1984 Crispina Calvert underwent a hysterectomy that left her ovaries capable of producing eggs. She and her husband Mark desired a child genetically related to both of them. In 1989 Anna Johnson, a licensed vocational nurse who had previously given birth to a daughter, learned of Crispina's situation from a coworker and offered to serve as a surrogate.
On January 15, 1990, Mark, Crispina, and Anna signed a written contract providing that an embryo created from Mark's sperm and Crispina's egg would be implanted in Anna, who would carry the child to term and relinquish all parental rights to the Calverts upon birth. In exchange the Calverts agreed to pay Anna $10,000 in installments, with the final payment due six weeks after birth, and to purchase a $200,000 life insurance policy on Anna's life. The zygote was implanted on January 19, 1990, and an ultrasound confirmed Anna's pregnancy less than a month later.
During the pregnancy relations between the parties deteriorated. Anna felt the Calverts were not providing sufficient attention or obtaining the required insurance policy in a timely manner. In July 1990 Anna demanded the balance of the payments or she would refuse to relinquish the child. The following month the Calverts filed suit in superior court seeking a declaration that they were the legal parents of the unborn child. Anna filed her own action to be declared the mother, the cases were consolidated, and the parties agreed to the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the child.
The child was born on September 19, 1990. Blood samples taken from Anna and the child excluded Anna as the genetic mother. The parties stipulated that Mark and Crispina were the genetic parents. After a trial in October 1990 the superior court ruled that the Calverts were the child's genetic, biological, and natural parents, that Anna had no parental rights, that the surrogacy contract was enforceable, and that Anna was not entitled to visitation. Anna appealed. The Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division Three, affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court of California granted review.
5 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
Does proof of biology automatically displace a marital presumption of parentage?
No. The presumption remains in effect until overcome by a court adjudication or a valid statutory denial of parentage. Genetic evidence may be presented in the adjudication but does not by itself terminate the presumed parent's status.
Supporting sources
When does the former-spouse presumption apply after divorce?
The presumption attaches when the child is born not later than three hundred days after the marriage ends by divorce or death. The timing of the birth relative to termination of the marriage controls, regardless of separation or caregiving by another adult.
Supporting sources
Can a presumed parent be challenged after the child reaches adulthood?
A proceeding may be commenced after the child becomes an adult only if the child initiates it. An outsider who files after majority lacks standing unless the child also commences a parallel action.
Supporting sources
What standard governs resolution of competing parentage claims?
The court adjudicates parentage in the best interest of the child after considering the length and quality of the existing relationship, the child's welfare, genetic evidence, and other enumerated factors.
Supporting sources
Does a legal separation end the marital presumption?
No. Only a decree terminating the marriage ends the presumption window. Legal separation papers alone do not terminate the marriage, so a child born within three hundred days after death or divorce remains subject to the presumption.
Supporting sources
, and rebuttal standards. Dissenting opinions Dissenting opinion Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-25, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989), rehearing denied, 492 U.S.…
paternity
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