Also known as: prevent harm · preventing harm · harm prevention
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
2 senses
A principle that determines when the failure of a third person to intervene breaks the chain of causation in negligence cases. The principle ordinarily treats such failure as a non-superseding cause unless the duty to prevent harm has shifted because of lapse of time or other circumstances.
A principle that determines when the failure of a third person to intervene breaks the chain of causation in negligence cases. The principle ordinarily treats such failure as a non-superseding cause unless the duty to prevent harm has shifted because of lapse of time or other circumstances.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
A principle that justifies regulation of noxious property uses as a valid exercise of police power rather than a compensable taking.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
A principle that justifies regulation of noxious property uses as a valid exercise of police power rather than a compensable taking.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Peter Park negligently leaves an open excavation near a busy sidewalk. A city inspector notices the hazard but walks away without posting barriers. A pedestrian falls in and is injured. The inspector's inaction does not relieve Peter of liability because the failure of a third person to prevent the harm is not a superseding cause.
Pablo Perez leaves a dangerous chemical spill on his property. Years later the current owner ignores repeated warnings and takes no steps to contain it. When a neighbor is harmed, the long passage of time shifts the duty to prevent harm to the new owner, making the new owner's inaction a superseding cause that cuts off Pablo's liability.
Perry Pratt keeps an unrestrained alligator in a retention basin on his vacant lot. Teenagers regularly trespass to swim there. One is attacked. Because the possessor's duty to prevent harm to foreseeable trespassers from a wild animal is judged by the same negligence standards that apply to other dangerous conditions, the court evaluates whether Pratt acted reasonably in light of known risks.
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 452(1), the failure of a third person to act to prevent harm threatened by the actor's negligence is ordinarily not a superseding cause. Liability remains unless the duty has shifted to the third person because of lapse of time or other circumstances under subsection (2).
Supporting sources
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 512 provides that the possessor's negligence liability for failing to prevent harm to a trespasser from a wild animal is judged by the same rules that govern other dangerous conditions on the land. The presence of the animal does not create a special, more limited duty framework.
Supporting sources
Preston Pratt buys two beachfront lots intending to build homes. A new state law bars all construction to protect the dunes from erosion. Because the regulation prevents a use that would cause harm to the coastal environment, the court treats it as a valid exercise of police power rather than a compensable taking even though it deprives the lots of all economic value.
Owner keeps a pig farm that creates runoff harming downstream water. A county ordinance bans the operation to prevent the harm. The court upholds the ban as police-power regulation rather than a taking because the use itself constitutes a common-law nuisance.
Developer plans high-density construction on eroding shoreline lots. State coastal commission imposes strict setbacks to prevent harm to dunes and neighboring properties. The court finds the restriction a valid prevention-of-harm measure that avoids takings liability.
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council the Court recognized that regulations preventing harmful or noxious uses of property have long been upheld without compensation. When the prohibited use would constitute a common-law nuisance or similar harm, the regulation is treated as an exercise of police power rather than a taking.
Supporting sources
…and those that confer a benefit. But this distinction is difficult to sustain. Almost any regulation can be characterized as preventing harm or conferring a benefit. We think the better approach is to focus on the owner's reasonable, investment-backed expectations. The South Carolina Supreme Court also erred in assuming that…