Evidence sufficient on its face to establish a fact or to shift the burden of production unless the opposing party introduces contrary proof.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Peremptory Challenges Show Racial Pattern
Defense counsel in a criminal trial notes that the prosecutor used seven of eight peremptory strikes against Black venire members. Counsel supplies the strike pattern and demographic data. The court finds the statistics establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination and requires the prosecutor to offer race-neutral explanations.
Intestacy Petitioner Supplies Basic Facts
Dylan petitions for a declaration of intestacy after Jordan's death. He files the death certificate, proof of venue in State A, and a family tree showing he is the sole heir. These documents meet the prima facie requirements of death, venue, and heirship, shifting the burden to any will proponent.
Patricia buys a blender that explodes and injures her hand. The sales contract limits consequential damages for personal injury. Because the goods are consumer products, the limitation is prima facie unconscionable and the seller must prove the clause is conscionable.
Cross Burning With Possible Expressive Purpose
Philip burns a cross on his own rural property during a protest against local policies. The state charges him with intimidation and treats the act itself as prima facie evidence of intent. Philip introduces evidence that the burning was part of an artistic performance, requiring the court to consider that proof before finding intent.
Expert Testimony Threshold Showing
Priscilla offers an epidemiologist's study linking a drug to birth defects. The study meets basic reliability markers under the governing test. This presentation supplies prima facie evidence of scientific validity, shifting to the opponent the task of demonstrating flaws that would exclude the testimony.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)
Two minors brought suit against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, claiming they suffered limb reduction birth defects because their mothers had taken Bendectin, a drug prescribed for morning sickness to about 17.5 million pregnant women in the United States between 1957 and 1982.
Limb reduction defects occur in fewer than one birth out of every 1000. Scientists do not know the mechanism by which any teratogen causes such defects. The plaintiffs offered testimony from three groups of experts. One group proposed to testify to a statistical link between Bendectin ingestion during pregnancy and limb reduction defects based on reanalyses of published studies that had reported no such association. A second group proposed to testify that Bendectin causes limb reduction defects in humans because it causes such defects in laboratory animals. A third group proposed to testify based on the similarity of Bendectin's chemical structure to other drugs suspected of causing birth defects.
The district court granted summary judgment to Merrell Dow after excluding the plaintiffs' expert testimony. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded for consideration under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
On remand, the Ninth Circuit examined the affidavits and prior trial testimony of the plaintiffs' experts. None of the experts had studied the effect of Bendectin on limb reduction defects before being hired to testify in this or related cases. None had published his work on Bendectin in a scientific journal. The only review their work had received was by judges and juries.
Plaintiffs' epidemiological experts made vague assertions of a statistically significant relationship between Bendectin and birth defects but did not state that the relative risk exceeded two. With the exception of Dr. Palmer, the remaining experts were willing to testify only that Bendectin is capable of causing birth defects. Dr. Palmer alone was willing to testify that Bendectin did cause the limb defects in each of the children, based on his review of the plaintiffs' medical records and his conclusion that Bendectin is a teratogen.
Preston challenges a statute that presumes certain filled milk products are injurious. The statute supplies prima facie evidence of harm from the legislative findings. The producer must then come forward with proof that its product poses no health risk to rebut the presumption.
United States v. Carolene Products Co.304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
In March 1923, Congress enacted the Filled Milk Act. The statute prohibits the shipment in interstate commerce of skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat so as to resemble milk or cream.
Carolene Products Company was indicted for the shipment in interstate commerce of packages of Milnut. Milnut is a compound of condensed skimmed milk and coconut oil made in imitation or semblance of condensed milk or cream. The United States indicted Carolene Products in the district court for the southern district of Illinois for violation of the Act by the shipment in interstate commerce of packages of Milnut.
The indictment stated in the words of the statute that Milnut is an adulterated article of food injurious to the public health. It further stated that Milnut is not a prepared food product of the type excepted from the prohibition of the Act. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the indictment on the authority of an earlier case in the same court.
The case was brought to the Supreme Court on appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act of March 2, 1907. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has meanwhile upheld the Filled Milk Act as an appropriate exercise of the commerce power in a separate case.
Prior to passage of the Act, Congress held committee hearings. Eminent scientists and health experts testified during those hearings. An extensive investigation was made of the commerce in milk compounds in which vegetable oils have been substituted for natural milk fat. The investigation also examined the effect upon the public health of the use of such compounds as a food substitute for milk. The conclusions drawn from evidence presented at the hearings were embodied in reports of the House Committee on Agriculture and the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.
Carolene Products assailed the statute as beyond the power of Congress over interstate commerce. It also complained that the statute denies equal protection of the laws and deprives it of its property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The challenge focused particularly on the statute's purportedly binding and conclusive legislative declaration that the product is an adulterated article of food injurious to the public health.
Does prima facie evidence shift the burden of persuasion?
No. It satisfies the burden of production and shifts only the burden of going forward with evidence. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the party who originally bore it.
How does prima facie evidence differ from a presumption?
Prima facie evidence supplies enough proof to support a finding if unrebutted. A presumption is a legal rule that may compel a finding unless rebutted and may also shift the burden of persuasion depending on the jurisdiction.
What must a defendant show to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection?
The defendant must produce evidence that permits an inference of purposeful discrimination, such as a pattern of strikes against members of a cognizable racial group. Once shown, the burden shifts to the striking party to offer a race-neutral explanation.
Is a limitation of consequential damages for personal injury in consumer goods always unconscionable?
No. The limitation is only prima facie unconscionable. The seller may still prove the clause is conscionable under the circumstances of the particular transaction.
Can a state make cross burning itself prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate?
No. The state must permit the defendant to introduce evidence that the burning served an expressive, non-threatening purpose before the fact-finder may infer intent.
380 U.S. 460 (1965)
…to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions. We are reminded by the Erie opinion that neither…