Also known as: prima-facie genuine · prima facie
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An item that a statute or rule declares presumptively authentic. The presumption relieves the proponent of producing extrinsic evidence of genuineness before the item is admitted.
Paula Pierce, the defendant in a criminal trial, offered a certified transcript of voir dire to support her Batson motion. The transcript bore the clerk's official seal and signature. Because the document carried a statutory declaration of genuineness, the court admitted it without requiring live testimony from the court reporter. The prima facie showing shifted the burden to the prosecutor to supply a race-neutral explanation for the strikes.
Penelope Price petitioned to probate a will and attached an affidavit from the attesting witnesses. The affidavit stated that the testator signed in their presence and that the witnesses signed immediately afterward. Under the probate code the affidavit supplied prima facie proof of due execution. The court therefore placed the burden on the contestant to prove lack of capacity or undue influence.
Parker Phillips bought a home treadmill from Peak Performance. The sales contract contained a clause excluding consequential damages. The exclusion was accompanied by a statutory declaration that the document itself was prima facie genuine. The court admitted the contract without further authentication testimony.
Pierre Poulin was prosecuted for burning a cross on a neighbor's lawn. The state introduced a photograph of the burning cross taken by a police officer at the scene. The photograph carried a statutory declaration of authenticity. The court treated the image as prima facie genuine and allowed the jury to decide whether the act was intended to intimidate.
Philip Powell applied for a position at Patriot Insurance and submitted a resume containing a signature block. The company later claimed the signature was forged. Because the resume was accompanied by a federal statute declaring such employment records prima facie genuine, the court admitted the document without further authentication. Powell then had to rebut the presumption with evidence of forgery.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., an aerospace and aircraft manufacturer headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, employed over 30,000 people. Percy Green, a black citizen of St. Louis, worked for the company as a mechanic and laboratory technician from 1956 until August 28, 1964. He was laid off in the course of a general reduction in the work force. Green, a long-time activist in the civil rights movement, protested vigorously that his discharge and the general hiring practices of the company were racially motivated. Green and other members of the Congress on Racial Equality illegally stalled their cars on the main roads leading to the plant. This blocked access to it at the time of the morning shift change. On July 2, 1965, a lock-in took place wherein a chain and padlock were placed on the front door of a building to prevent the occupants, petitioner’s employees working in the building, from leaving. The full extent of Green's involvement remains uncertain. Three weeks after the lock-in, on July 25, 1965, the company publicly advertised for qualified mechanics. Green promptly applied for re-employment. The company turned down Green. It based its rejection on his participation in the stall-in and lock-in. Shortly thereafter, Green filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. He claimed that the company had refused to rehire him because of his race and persistent involvement in the civil rights movement. This was in violation of sections 703(a)(1) and 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Commission made no finding on Green's allegation of racial bias under section 703(a)(1). However, it did find reasonable cause to believe the company had violated section 704(a) by refusing to rehire him because of his civil rights activity. After the Commission unsuccessfully attempted to conciliate the dispute, it advised Green in March 1968 of his right to institute a civil action in federal court within 30 days. On April 15, 1968, Green brought the present action. He claimed initially a violation of section 704(a) and, in an amended complaint, a violation of section 703(a)(1) as well. The District Court dismissed the claim of racial discrimination under section 703(a)(1) on the ground that the Commission had failed to make a determination of reasonable cause. The District Court also found that the company's refusal to rehire Green was based solely on his participation in the illegal demonstrations and not on his legitimate civil rights activities. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed that unlawful protests were not protected under section 704(a). It reversed the dismissal of Green's section 703(a)(1) claim. The court held that a prior Commission determination of reasonable cause was not a jurisdictional prerequisite. It ordered the case remanded for trial.
View casePortia Price offered an expert report in a products-liability case. The report included a notarized certificate from the expert stating that the opinions were based on reliable methods. Under the governing evidentiary rule the certificate rendered the report prima facie genuine. The opposing party therefore bore the burden of producing evidence that the methodology was unreliable.
Two minors brought suit against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, claiming they suffered limb reduction birth defects because their mothers had taken Bendectin, a drug prescribed for morning sickness to about 17.5 million pregnant women in the United States between 1957 and 1982. Limb reduction defects occur in fewer than one birth out of every 1000. Scientists do not know the mechanism by which any teratogen causes such defects. The plaintiffs offered testimony from three groups of experts. One group proposed to testify to a statistical link between Bendectin ingestion during pregnancy and limb reduction defects based on reanalyses of published studies that had reported no such association. A second group proposed to testify that Bendectin causes limb reduction defects in humans because it causes such defects in laboratory animals. A third group proposed to testify based on the similarity of Bendectin's chemical structure to other drugs suspected of causing birth defects. The district court granted summary judgment to Merrell Dow after excluding the plaintiffs' expert testimony. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded for consideration under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. On remand, the Ninth Circuit examined the affidavits and prior trial testimony of the plaintiffs' experts. None of the experts had studied the effect of Bendectin on limb reduction defects before being hired to testify in this or related cases. None had published his work on Bendectin in a scientific journal. The only review their work had received was by judges and juries. Plaintiffs' epidemiological experts made vague assertions of a statistically significant relationship between Bendectin and birth defects but did not state that the relative risk exceeded two. With the exception of Dr. Palmer, the remaining experts were willing to testify only that Bendectin is capable of causing birth defects. Dr. Palmer alone was willing to testify that Bendectin did cause the limb defects in each of the children, based on his review of the plaintiffs' medical records and his conclusion that Bendectin is a teratogen.
View caseThe proponent need only establish that the document falls within the terms of the statute declaring it presumptively authentic. Once that threshold is met, the item is admitted without extrinsic evidence of genuineness. The opponent may still challenge authenticity through other means, but the initial burden of production is satisfied by the statutory declaration itself.
No. The declaration addresses only authenticity and genuineness for admission purposes. The opponent remains free to contest the truth of the contents through cross-examination or contradictory evidence. The presumption affects only the need for foundational testimony, not the ultimate weight or credibility of the document.
Yes. Once the statutory presumption arises, the opposing party may introduce any competent evidence, including circumstantial facts, tending to show that the signature or document is not authentic. The court then determines whether the presumption has been rebutted before deciding admissibility or weight.
…has been consistently reaffirmed in subsequent decisions. Although Swain v. Alabama recognized that a defendant could make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination on proof that the peremptory challenge system was being perverted, the Court went on to observe that a defendant could not establish a prima facie case of…