Tax Regulation Research
Attorney Alex Rivera researched a client's tax issue. He located the relevant provision in the Internal Revenue Code defining taxable income. The IRS accepted the interpretation from that statute in the audit.
Also known as: primary source · primary authority
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Official pronouncements of governmental lawmakers that form the basis of legal doctrine. They include court decisions, statutes, and regulations.
Attorney Alex Rivera researched a client's tax issue. He located the relevant provision in the Internal Revenue Code defining taxable income. The IRS accepted the interpretation from that statute in the audit.
Paula Pierce sought to enjoin a state prosecution. Her brief quoted the Supreme Court opinion setting limits on federal interference with state proceedings. The district court treated the opinion as controlling and denied the injunction.
John Harris, Jr., was indicted in a California state court charged with violation of the California Penal Code §§ 11400 and 11401, known as the Criminal Syndicalism Act. He then filed a complaint in the Federal District Court asking that court to enjoin District Attorney Evelle J. Younger of Los Angeles County from prosecuting him. Harris alleged that the prosecution and the presence of the Act inhibited him in the exercise of his rights of free speech and press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Jim Dan and Diane Hirsch, members of the Progressive Labor Party, intervened as plaintiffs claiming that the prosecution of Harris would inhibit them from peacefully advocating the program of their party to replace capitalism with socialism. Farrell Broslawsky, an instructor in history at Los Angeles Valley College, also intervened claiming that the prosecution made him uncertain whether he could teach about the doctrines of Karl Marx or read from the Communist Manifesto as part of his classwork. None of the intervenors had been indicted, arrested, or threatened with prosecution. A three-judge Federal District Court convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 held that it had jurisdiction and power to restrain the District Attorney from prosecuting. The court held that the State's Criminal Syndicalism Act was void for vagueness and overbreadth in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It accordingly restrained the District Attorney from further prosecution of the pending action against Harris, as reported at 281 F. Supp. 507 (1968). Younger appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253. At the time the federal suit was filed, Harris was actually being prosecuted by California for a violation of the Criminal Syndicalism Act. The intervenors claimed only that they felt inhibited by the Act and the pending prosecution of Harris, without alleging any threat of prosecution against themselves.
View casePatricia Patel filed suit alleging agency action harmed recreational and irrigation interests. Her complaint and motion cited the Supreme Court decision clarifying the zone-of-interests test for standing. The court applied that decision to uphold her standing.
The Klamath Project is a series of lakes, rivers, dams, and irrigation canals in northern California and southern Oregon. It was undertaken pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902. The project is administered by the Bureau of Reclamation. In 1988 the Lost River Sucker and Shortnose Sucker were listed as endangered. In 1992 the Bureau notified the Fish and Wildlife Service that operation of the project might affect the two species. After formal consultation, the Service issued a biological opinion. It concluded that long-term operation of the Klamath Project was likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the suckers. The opinion identified reasonable and prudent alternatives that included maintenance of minimum water levels on Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs. The Bureau later notified the Service that it intended to operate the project in compliance with the biological opinion. Petitioners are two Oregon irrigation districts that receive Klamath Project water and the operators of two ranches within those districts. They filed suit against the director and regional director of the Service and the Secretary of the Interior. The complaint alleges that the Bureau has followed essentially the same procedures for storing and releasing water from the reservoirs throughout the twentieth century. No scientifically or commercially available evidence shows the sucker populations have declined or will decline as a result of project operations. No such evidence shows the water-level restrictions will benefit the fish. The complaint further states that petitioners use the reservoirs and related waterways for recreational, aesthetic, commercial, and irrigation purposes. The restrictions recommended in the biological opinion will substantially reduce the quantity of available irrigation water and irreparably damage those uses. The complaint sets forth three relevant claims for relief. The first and second claims allege that the Service's jeopardy determination and the minimum water levels violated section 7 of the ESA. The third claim alleges that the imposition of minimum water elevations constituted an implicit critical-habitat determination that violated section 4 of the ESA because it failed to take economic impact into account. Each claim also asserts that the action violated the APA prohibition on arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful agency action. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that petitioners' recreational, aesthetic, and commercial interests did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the ESA. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that only plaintiffs who allege an interest in the preservation of endangered species fall within that zone. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePaige Porter challenged a federal land transfer as violating the Establishment Clause. Her memorandum relied on the Supreme Court decision requiring concrete injury for taxpayer standing. The court dismissed the claim for lack of standing under that precedent.
In 1942 the Department of the Army acquired approximately 181 acres northwest of Philadelphia and constructed the Valley Forge General Hospital on the site. The hospital provided medical care to members of the Armed Forces for the next thirty years. In April 1973 the Secretary of Defense proposed closing the installation as part of a plan to reduce the number of military facilities in the United States, after which the General Services Administration declared the property surplus. In August 1976 the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare conveyed a 77-acre tract of the former hospital grounds to petitioner Valley Forge Christian College. The appraised value of the tract at the time of transfer was $577,500, but the Secretary applied a 100 percent public benefit allowance that allowed the college to take title without any cash payment. The deed conveyed the land in fee simple subject to conditions subsequent that required the college to use the property for thirty years solely for the educational purposes described in its application. Valley Forge Christian College is a nonprofit educational institution operating under the supervision of the Assemblies of God. Its stated purpose is to offer systematic collegiate training to men and women for Christian service as ministers or laymen, and its degree programs are designed to train leaders for church-related ministries. Faculty members must have been baptized in the Holy Spirit and be living consistent Christian lives, and all members of the college administration must be affiliated with the Assemblies of God. In September 1976 respondents Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., a nonprofit organization with approximately 90,000 taxpayer members, and four of its employees learned of the conveyance through a news release. Two months later they filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, later transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking a declaration that the conveyance was null and void and an order requiring the college to return the property to the United States. The District Court granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, finding that respondents lacked standing as taxpayers and had failed to allege any actual or concrete injury beyond a generalized grievance common to all taxpayers. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed by a divided vote. It held that respondents possessed standing as citizens claiming injury in fact to their shared individuated right to a government that shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1981.
View casePierre Poulin brought a wrongful-death action after a maritime accident. Counsel cited the Supreme Court decision recognizing a general maritime wrongful-death action. The court permitted the claim to proceed on that authority.
Edward Moragne was a longshoreman employed by Gulf Florida Terminal Company. On April 23, 1967, he was killed while working aboard the vessel Palmetto State in the Port of Miami, Florida. A beam supporting hatch covers fell on him during the stowage of a cargo of fertilizer. Petitioner, his widow and representative of his estate, brought suit in the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, against respondent States Marine Lines, Inc., the vessel owner. She sought damages for wrongful death and for pain and suffering prior to death. The claims rested on theories of both negligence and unseaworthiness. States Marine removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on diversity grounds under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. It filed a third-party complaint against Gulf Florida Terminal Company. The complaint asserted that any negligence or unseaworthiness resulted from Gulf's stevedoring operations. Both defendants moved to dismiss the wrongful-death claim based on unseaworthiness. The District Court dismissed the unseaworthiness portion of the complaint, citing The Tungus v. Skovgaard, and certified the order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether the Florida wrongful-death statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.01, encompassed unseaworthiness. The state court answered in the negative. On return to the Court of Appeals, that court affirmed the dismissal. Earlier related proceedings in state court had produced an affirmance by the Florida District Court of Appeal, 236 So. 2d 80, and denial of certiorari by the Florida Supreme Court, 239 So. 2d 829. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePortia Price faced an enhanced sentence based on judicial fact-finding. Defense counsel submitted the Supreme Court opinion holding that facts increasing the statutory maximum must be found by a jury. The court reduced the sentence accordingly.
In 1998, Ralph Howard Blakely abducted his estranged wife Yolanda from their orchard home in Grant County, Washington. He bound her with duct tape and forced her at knifepoint into a wooden box in the bed of his pickup truck while imploring her to dismiss divorce and trust proceedings. When their 13-year-old son Ralphy returned from school, Blakely ordered him to follow in another car under threat of harming Yolanda with a shotgun. Ralphy escaped at a gas station and sought help, but Blakely continued with Yolanda to a friend's house in Montana before his arrest. The State initially charged Blakely with first-degree kidnapping but reached a plea agreement that reduced the charge to second-degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm. Blakely entered a guilty plea admitting the elements of the reduced charge along with the domestic-violence and firearm allegations, but no other relevant facts. Washington law classified the offense as a class B felony carrying a statutory maximum of ten years, yet specified a standard sentencing range of 49 to 53 months for this offender score and offense level. At sentencing the State recommended a term within the standard range. After hearing Yolanda's account of the incident, the judge rejected the recommendation and conducted a three-day bench hearing that included testimony from Blakely, Yolanda, Ralphy, a police officer, and medical experts. The judge issued 32 findings of fact detailing the defendant's motivation, methods, and violation of a restraining order, then concluded that Blakely had acted with deliberate cruelty, a statutorily enumerated aggravating factor. The judge imposed an exceptional sentence of 90 months, 37 months above the standard maximum. Blakely appealed, contending that the sentencing procedure deprived him of the right to jury determination of facts essential to his sentence. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the state supreme court's earlier rejection of a similar challenge, and the Washington Supreme Court denied discretionary review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the sentencing procedure under the Sixth Amendment.
View casePrimary sources are the official pronouncements of governmental lawmakers such as court decisions, statutes, and regulations. Secondary sources discuss or analyze those pronouncements but are not themselves law.
No. A state supreme court decision binds lower courts in that state, while a decision from another jurisdiction is only persuasive. Statutes bind within their enacting jurisdiction.
Secondary materials may summarize or interpret primary sources inaccurately. Direct review of the court decision, statute, or regulation ensures the researcher applies the actual rule correctly.
…public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings have never been specifically identified but the primary sources of the policy are plain. One is the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the…