/PRIN-suh-puhlz in the first and SEK-uhnd dih-GREE/·principle
Also known as:principal in the first degree · principal in the second degree · principals in the first degree · principals in the second degree · first-degree principal · second-degree principal
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Two categories of participants in a felony recognized at common law. A principal in the first degree is the person who personally commits the act or omission that constitutes the criminal offense. A principal in the second degree is a person who aids, commands, or encourages the principal in the first degree and who is present at the scene of the crime.
See Our Sources· 4 primary sources
Common Law
How its tested
Common Examples
5
Farmhand and Getaway Driver
Luis personally sets fire to a rival's shed. Mara waits nearby in a truck with the engine running to help him escape. At common law Mara qualifies as a principal in the second degree because she aids the first-degree principal while present at the scene.
Curator Removes Sculpture
Lina personally removes a sculpture from the museum. Malik stands nearby and deliberately looks away to prevent detection. At common law Malik is a principal in the second degree because he aids the first-degree principal while present at the scene.
Nurse Administers Overdose
Carla personally injects a lethal overdose. Dana stands in the doorway and urges Carla to finish the act. At common law Dana is a principal in the second degree because she encourages the first-degree principal while present at the scene.
Robbery Getaway Driver
One defendant enters a store and commits robbery while another waits in the car outside with the engine running. The waiting defendant is present and ready to assist the escape. Under common law the waiting defendant is a principal in the second degree.
Enmund v. Florida458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982)
On April 1, 1975, at approximately 7:45 a.m., Thomas and Eunice Kersey, aged 86 and 74, were robbed and fatally shot at their farmhouse in central Florida. Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong went to the back door of the Kersey house and asked for water for an overheated car. When Mr. Kersey came out of the house, Sampson Armstrong grabbed him, pointed a gun at him, and told Jeanette Armstrong to take his money. Mr. Kersey cried for help, and his wife came out of the house with a gun and shot Jeanette Armstrong, wounding her. Sampson Armstrong, and perhaps Jeanette Armstrong, then shot and killed both of the Kerseys, dragged them into the kitchen, and took their money and fled.
Two witnesses testified that they drove past the Kersey house between 7:30 and 7:40 a.m. They saw a large cream- or yellow-colored car parked beside the road about 200 yards from the house. A man was sitting in the car. Another witness testified that at approximately 6:45 a.m. he saw Ida Jean Shaw, petitioner's common-law wife and Jeanette Armstrong's mother, driving a yellow Buick with a vinyl top which belonged to her and petitioner Earl Enmund. Enmund was a passenger in the car along with an unidentified woman. At about 8 a.m. the same witness saw the car return at a high rate of speed. Enmund was driving, Ida Jean Shaw was in the front seat, and one of the other two people in the car was lying down across the back seat.
Enmund, Sampson Armstrong, and Jeanette Armstrong were indicted for the first-degree murder and robbery of the Kerseys. Enmund and Sampson Armstrong were tried together. The prosecutor maintained in his closing argument that Sampson Armstrong killed the old people. The judge instructed the jury on felony murder, including that the evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was actually present and was actively aiding and abetting the robbery or attempted robbery, and that the unlawful killing occurred in the perpetration of or in the attempted perpetration of the robbery. The jury found both Enmund and Sampson Armstrong guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery.
A separate sentencing hearing was held and the jury recommended the death penalty for both defendants. The trial judge then sentenced Enmund to death on the two counts of first-degree murder after finding four statutory aggravating circumstances and that none of the statutory mitigating circumstances applied. The Florida Supreme Court remanded for written findings as required by statute. The trial judge reiterated the findings, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Enmund's conviction and sentences after rejecting two of the four aggravating circumstances but concluding that the remaining two outweighed the absence of mitigating circumstances. The Florida Supreme Court found that there was no direct evidence at trial that Earl Enmund was present at the back door of the Kersey home when the plan to rob the elderly couple led to their being murdered. However, the jury could have concluded he was the person in the car by the side of the road near the scene of the crimes waiting to help the robbers escape.
We granted Enmund's petition for certiorari presenting the question whether death is a valid penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life.
Telegraph Message to Block Warning
Tally sends a message directing that a warning to the intended victim be withheld. The message reaches the scene in time to prevent the warning from being delivered. Under common law Tally's conduct at the scene makes him a principal in the second degree.
State ex. rel. Attorney General v. Tally102 Ala. 25, 15 So. 722, 739 (1894)
Evidence was taken at Huntsville by agreement of the parties to facilitate the hearing and to subserve the convenience of the witnesses, although the judges sat as individual members to avoid exercising judicial power away from the seat of government.
The information charged John B. Tally, judge of the ninth judicial circuit, with willful neglect of duty in failing to intervene to prevent the Skeltons from killing R. C. Ross and with complicity in the murder of Ross by the Skeltons. Tally was the brother-in-law of Robert, John, James, and Walter Skelton, whose sister Annie Skelton had been the object of Ross's criminal intimacy.
Ross left Scottsboro on January 6, 1894, fearing danger from the Skeltons but returned on January 30 because of his wife's illness and stayed secluded until February 4. On February 4, Ross left Scottsboro in a hack with armed companions for Stevenson. The Skeltons pursued on horseback, overtook the party at Stevenson, and killed Ross by shots from behind the depot platform, telegraph poles, and an oil house.
In Scottsboro that morning Tally went to the depot. After E. H. Ross sent a warning telegram to R. C. Ross, Tally sent a telegram to Huddleston reading "Do not let the party warned get away" with the instruction "say nothing."
Testimony including uncommunicated intentions and attorney-client communications was excluded. The defense offered explanations for the rental of a horse used by Walter Skelton and for Tally's brief meeting with Robert Skelton as the Skeltons departed.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What distinguishes a principal in the first degree from a principal in the second degree at common law?
A principal in the first degree personally commits the criminal act. A principal in the second degree aids or encourages that act while present at the scene. The distinction turns on who performs the essential elements of the offense versus who assists while physically or constructively present.
Can a person who is merely present at the scene without aiding be a principal in the second degree?
No. Mere presence alone does not suffice. The person must actively aid, command, or encourage the first-degree principal while present at the scene. Passive observation without assistance falls outside the definition.
Supporting sources
How does the common law classification of principals affect liability for completed felonies?
Both principals in the first and second degree are treated as equally guilty of the underlying felony. The categories determine who may be convicted directly for the offense rather than for a separate accessory crime. Modern statutes often abolish the distinction for punishment purposes.
Supporting sources
Does remote assistance via video link satisfy the presence requirement for a principal in the second degree?
Traditional common law requires actual physical presence at the scene. Electronic participation from a remote location does not meet the presence element even if it allows real-time direction. Such conduct is instead classified as accessory before the fact.
Supporting sources
or as an accessory before the fact under the statute (Code § 3704), which makes all persons concerned in the commission of a felony, whether they commit the act directly or aid or abet in…
principal in the first degree
, he may…
and not as accessories, the intent of this section being that as to all accessories before the fact the law heretofore applicable in cases of misdemeanor only shall apply to all crimes. .…
Criminal Law & ProcedureInchoate crimes; parties · Parties to crimeUBEFoundational