privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States
/PRIV-uh-lij-iz and im-YOON-ih-teez of SIT-uh-zenz of the yoo-NY-ted STATES/·constitutional clause
Also known as:privileges and immunities clause · privileges or immunities · 14th Amendment privileges and immunities · P&I clause
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional guarantee that no state shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. The clause protects a limited set of rights of national citizenship, including the right to travel and the right to pursue a common calling on equal terms with residents of the host state.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
New Resident Denied Welfare Benefits
Pilar Pena moved from State A to State B for work. State B capped her welfare payments at the lower amount she would have received in State A and imposed a one-year waiting period for full benefits. Pilar challenged the cap. The restriction treated her differently from longer-term residents solely because of her recent arrival and violated her right to equal treatment upon exercising the right to travel.
New Arrival Barred from Full Welfare
Parker Phillips relocated from State C to State D and applied for welfare. State D limited new residents to the benefit level of their prior state for one year. Parker sued. The waiting period penalized the exercise of the right to travel and denied equal treatment to newly arrived citizens.
Pablo Perez, licensed in State E, applied for admission in State F. State F required one year of prior residency. Pablo sued after denial. The residency rule blocked nonresidents from the common calling of law practice without substantial justification.
Reciprocal Admission Blocked by Residency
Priscilla Parks, admitted in State G, sought reciprocal admission in State H. State H imposed a residency requirement for reciprocity. Priscilla challenged the rule. The barrier prevented nonresidents from practicing law on equal terms absent a substantial state interest.
Court Enforcement of Restrictive Covenant
Pamela Phillips purchased property subject to a racially restrictive covenant. State courts enforced the covenant against her. Pamela claimed the enforcement abridged her privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States.
Shelley v. Kraemer334 U.S. 1 (1948)
In February 1911, thirty out of thirty-nine owners of property fronting both sides of Labadie Avenue between Taylor Avenue and Cora Avenue in St. Louis signed a recorded agreement. The agreement restricted the use and occupancy of the properties for fifty years to persons of the Caucasian race. It excluded occupancy by people of the Negro or Mongolian race.
The district included fifty-seven parcels of land. The signers held title to forty-seven parcels. At the time, five parcels were owned by Negroes, with one occupied by Negro families since 1882.
On August 11, 1945, the Shelley petitioners, who are Negroes, purchased one parcel from Fitzgerald by warranty deed for valuable consideration without knowledge of the restriction. On October 9, 1945, respondents sued in the Circuit Court of St. Louis to restrain the Shelleys and divest title. The trial court denied relief, but the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and directed enforcement.
In June 1934, Ferguson and his wife executed a contract restricting their Detroit property to Caucasian occupancy. The restriction was effective only if at least eighty percent of the lots in the block were subjected to similar restrictions. The restrictions were to remain in effect until January 1, 1960. Similar agreements covered eighty percent of the lots.
By deed dated November 30, 1944, the McGhee petitioners, who were Negroes, acquired and occupied the Detroit property. On January 30, 1945, respondents sued in Wayne County Circuit Court. The court ordered them to move within ninety days and enjoined future occupancy. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed.
Petitioners claimed that judicial enforcement violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Perry Pratt challenged a state law enacted under Congress's enforcement authority. The law exceeded the scope of the privileges or immunities guarantee. Perry argued the measure could not validly abridge rights protected by the clause.
City of Boerne v. Flores521 U.S. 507 (1997)
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses.
To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building.
A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district.
Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application.
The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses.
Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.
Does the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protect corporations?
No. The clause protects natural persons who are citizens of the United States. Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of the clause and therefore receive no protection from it.
Supporting sources
What rights does the clause protect for newly arrived state residents?
It protects the right to travel and to receive equal treatment with longer-term residents in matters such as welfare benefits. A state may not impose a waiting period or reduce benefits based solely on the length of residency.
Supporting sources
May a state require residency for bar admission under the clause?
No. Residency requirements that discriminate against nonresidents in the practice of law violate the clause unless the state shows a substantial justification closely related to the discrimination.
Supporting sources
334 U.S. 1 (1948)
…of the UnitedStates and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the UnitedStates; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal…