Also known as: privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States · privileges or immunities clause · privileges and immunities clause · Privileges or Immunities Clause · 14th Amendment Privileges or Immunities
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional guarantee that prohibits any state from making or enforcing a law abridging rights belonging to citizens of the United States by virtue of their national citizenship.
Paula Pierce, recently naturalized as a United States citizen, settled in a state that refused her access to a public employment preference extended only to persons born in the United States. She sued, arguing the restriction abridged a right attached to her national citizenship. The court considered whether the denial violated the clause because it treated her differently solely on the basis of how she acquired citizenship status.
Philip Powell moved from State A to State B for work and applied for welfare benefits. State B limited new arrivals to the benefit level they would have received in their prior state and imposed a one-year residency requirement for full benefits. Powell challenged the rule as infringing his right to travel and receive equal treatment as a newly arrived citizen. The court struck down the limitation because it penalized the exercise of a right protected for citizens of the United States.
Pierre Poulin, licensed in State A, sought admission to the State B bar without establishing residency. State B rejected the application on the ground that nonresidents would not remain current on local rules or perform pro bono work. Poulin sued, claiming the residency rule abridged his right to pursue the common calling of law. The court considered whether the requirement discriminated against nonresidents without substantial justification tied to a protected privilege of national citizenship.
Penelope Price held a license in State A and sought reciprocal admission in State B under a statute that required applicants to maintain their principal office in the admitting state. State B denied her application solely because she resided elsewhere. Price sued, asserting the rule infringed her right to practice law across state lines. The court considered whether the restriction violated the clause because it imposed a discriminatory barrier without adequate justification.
Peter Park faced a criminal prosecution in state court for a serious offense carrying a potential two-year sentence. The state provided only a bench trial. Park claimed the denial abridged a right of national citizenship. The court considered whether the privilege to a jury trial in serious cases is protected against state action by the clause.
In October 1966, nineteen-year-old Gary Duncan stopped his car on Highway 23 in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, after seeing his two younger Negro cousins talking with four white boys near a formerly all-white high school that had recently experienced racial incidents. Duncan approached the group, spoke with the white boys, encouraged his cousins to leave, and was about to drive away when a dispute arose over whether he had slapped or merely touched one of the white boys on the elbow. At his trial in the Twenty-fifth Judicial District Court of Louisiana, the white boys and a white onlooker testified that Duncan had slapped Herman Landry, while Duncan and his cousins testified that he had only touched the boy. The trial judge found Duncan guilty of simple battery beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Louisiana law, simple battery is a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of two years' imprisonment and a three-hundred-dollar fine. Duncan requested a jury trial, but the trial judge denied the request because the Louisiana Constitution provides for jury trials only in cases where capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed. Duncan was convicted by the judge alone and sentenced to sixty days in the parish prison and a fine of one hundred fifty dollars. Duncan sought review in the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which denied his application for a writ of certiorari. He then petitioned the United States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), alleging that the denial of a jury trial violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument along with a related case.
View casePerry Pratt purchased property subject to a private covenant barring sale to nonwhite buyers. A neighboring owner sued to enforce the covenant in state court. Pratt argued that judicial enforcement would abridge rights secured to him as a citizen of the United States. The court considered whether state judicial action giving effect to the restriction would violate the clause.
In February 1911, thirty out of thirty-nine owners of property fronting both sides of Labadie Avenue between Taylor Avenue and Cora Avenue in St. Louis signed a recorded agreement. The agreement restricted the use and occupancy of the properties for fifty years to persons of the Caucasian race. It excluded occupancy by people of the Negro or Mongolian race. The district included fifty-seven parcels of land. The signers held title to forty-seven parcels. At the time, five parcels were owned by Negroes, with one occupied by Negro families since 1882. On August 11, 1945, the Shelley petitioners, who are Negroes, purchased one parcel from Fitzgerald by warranty deed for valuable consideration without knowledge of the restriction. On October 9, 1945, respondents sued in the Circuit Court of St. Louis to restrain the Shelleys and divest title. The trial court denied relief, but the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and directed enforcement. In June 1934, Ferguson and his wife executed a contract restricting their Detroit property to Caucasian occupancy. The restriction was effective only if at least eighty percent of the lots in the block were subjected to similar restrictions. The restrictions were to remain in effect until January 1, 1960. Similar agreements covered eighty percent of the lots. By deed dated November 30, 1944, the McGhee petitioners, who were Negroes, acquired and occupied the Detroit property. On January 30, 1945, respondents sued in Wayne County Circuit Court. The court ordered them to move within ninety days and enjoined future occupancy. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed. Petitioners claimed that judicial enforcement violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
View caseThe clause safeguards rights that belong to individuals by virtue of their status as citizens of the United States, such as the right to travel and the right to pursue a common calling on equal terms with longer-term residents.
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The clause in the Fourteenth Amendment protects rights incident to national citizenship from state interference, whereas the Article IV clause prevents one state from discriminating against citizens of other states in fundamental rights such as the pursuit of a livelihood.
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One reading of the clause treats it as a vehicle for applying the Bill of Rights to the states by protecting the privileges of national citizenship, including safeguards enumerated in the first eight amendments.
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Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of the clause, so they receive no direct protection and must rely on other constitutional provisions such as the Commerce Clause or Due Process Clause.
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