pro forma

In 2001 Boston police officers received a tip that a Kmart employee was engaging in suspicious activity involving repeated short trips in a blue sedan. Officers set up surveillance in the parking lot, observed the described sequence of events, detained the employee upon his return, and discovered four clear plastic bags containing a substance resembling cocaine. The officers then arrested the two men in the car, one of whom was petitioner Luis Melendez-Diaz. The officers placed all three suspects in a police cruiser. During the short drive to the police station the officers observed their passengers fidgeting and making furtive movements in the back of the car. After depositing the men at the station they searched the police cruiser and found a plastic bag containing nineteen smaller bags hidden in the partition between the front and back seats. The officers submitted the seized substances to the State Laboratory Institute of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, which was required by law to conduct chemical analysis upon police request. Analysts at the laboratory performed the tests on November 28, 2001, and prepared three certificates of analysis that reported the weight of the bags and stated that the substance was found to contain cocaine. Each certificate was sworn before a notary public by the analysts, as required under Massachusetts law, and reprinted the statutory provision making the certificates prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and net weight of the narcotic analyzed. Melendez-Diaz was charged with distributing cocaine and trafficking in cocaine in an amount between 14 and 28 grams. At trial the prosecution introduced the bags seized from the codefendant and from the cruiser along with the three certificates. Petitioner objected to admission of the certificates, asserting that Crawford v. Washington required the analysts to testify in person. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the certificates pursuant to the state statute. The jury found Melendez-Diaz guilty. He appealed, contending that admission of the certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed the convictions, relying on a prior decision of the Supreme Judicial Court that had held forensic analysts are not subject to confrontation. The Supreme Judicial Court denied review, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In the summer of 1977, New York was terrorized by a serial killer popularly known as the Son of Sam. By the time David Berkowitz was identified as the killer and apprehended, the rights to his story were worth a substantial amount. The State quickly enacted the statute at issue, N. Y. Exec. Law § 632-a. The Son of Sam law requires any entity contracting with an accused or convicted person for a depiction of the crime to submit a copy of the contract to the New York State Crime Victims Board. It must turn over any income under that contract to the Board for deposit in an escrow account. The requirement applies to contracts in any medium of communication, including books. The Board holds the funds for the benefit of victims who bring civil actions within five years. After five years, it pays any remaining funds to the person or representatives. The statute broadly defines a person convicted of a crime to include anyone who has voluntarily and intelligently admitted the commission of a crime for which the person is not prosecuted. Since its enactment, the law has been invoked against Jean Harris, Mark David Chapman, and R. Foster Winans. In August 1981, Henry Hill entered into a contract with author Nicholas Pileggi for a book about his life. The following month, Hill and Pileggi signed a publishing agreement with Simon & Schuster. Wiseguy was published in January 1986. In January 1986, the Board notified Simon & Schuster of the contract and ordered it to furnish copies and suspend payments to Hill. By that time, Simon & Schuster had paid $96,250. It was holding $27,958 for Hill. Simon & Schuster brought suit in August 1987 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaration that the Son of Sam law violates the First Amendment. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court upheld the statute. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Phillips Petroleum Company, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Oklahoma, produced or purchased natural gas from leased land in 11 states during the 1970s. It sold most of the gas in interstate commerce at prices regulated by the Federal Power Commission, later the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Beginning in the mid-1970s Phillips proposed price increases. It collected higher amounts subject to refund with interest if disapproved. Phillips suspended royalty payments to lessors until final Commission approval. It paid the suspended royalties of $3.7 million in 1976, $4.7 million in 1977, and $2.9 million in 1978 without interest after the increases were approved. In 1979 the Commission began investigating overcharges. In 1983 it issued an opinion ordering refunds. Royalty owners Irl Shutts, a Kansas resident, and Robert and Betty Anderson, Oklahoma residents owning leases in Oklahoma and Texas, filed suit in Kansas state court seeking interest on the suspended royalties. They sought to represent a class of 33,000 royalty owners later reduced to 28,100 members after 3,400 opted out and 1,500 could not be notified. Fewer than 1,000 class members resided in Kansas and only about one-quarter of one percent of the leases were located there. The Kansas trial court certified the class under a state statute modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on an opt-out basis. It sent first-class mail notice describing the action and the right to opt out. The court applied Kansas law to award interest at Commission rates followed by the Kansas post-judgment rate of 15 percent. After the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1984.

Blasius Industries, Inc. began accumulating shares of Atlas Corporation in July 1987 and by October 29, 1987, with affiliates owned 9.1% of Atlas common stock as disclosed in its Schedule 13D filing with the SEC. In that filing, Blasius stated its intent to encourage a restructuring or other transaction to enhance shareholder value and disclosed it was exploring obtaining control, including through a tender offer or board representation. Blasius had come under the control of Michael Lubin and Warren Delano, who raised $60 million through junk bonds underwritten by Drexel Burnham to fund the acquisition, creating debt service obligations that could not be met from operations. On December 2, 1987, following a regular Atlas board meeting, Lubin and Delano met with Atlas management including CEO Weaver, CFO Devaney, counsel Masinter, and a Goldman Sachs representative to propose a leveraged recapitalization involving a $35 million cash dividend and $125 million in 7% secured subordinated gold-indexed debentures, funded partly by a gold loan and asset sales. Atlas directed Goldman Sachs to analyze the proposal, which management viewed skeptically, leading to a December 9 press release questioning the timing and debt burden amid market uncertainty after the October crash. Further meetings were delayed pending Goldman's analysis. On December 30, 1987, Blasius delivered a written consent to Atlas proposing a precatory resolution for restructuring, amending bylaws to expand the board from seven to fifteen members, and electing eight new directors nominated by Blasius; it also filed suit challenging certain bylaws. The next day, December 31, Atlas held an emergency telephone board meeting that expanded the board to nine members and appointed John Devaney and Harry Winters to the new positions, with terms expiring in 1988 and 1990 respectively under the staggered board structure. Subsequently, on January 6, 1988, after Goldman Sachs presented its analysis concluding the proposal would lead to bankruptcy and low stock value, the Atlas board rejected the recapitalization. A consent contest followed with competing mailings, culminating in Blasius presenting consents on March 6, 1988; an independent fiduciary as judge of elections reported on March 17 that none of the proposals achieved the required 1,486,293 consents, falling short by about 45,000 shares. The second action was filed on March 9, 1988. The cases were consolidated for trial in the Delaware Court of Chancery before Chancellor Allen.