Also known as:probationer · probations · probationers · probated sentence · supervised release · conditional sentence
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A court-imposed criminal sentence that releases a convicted person into the community under supervision and stated conditions instead of incarceration. Compliance with the conditions for the full term ends supervision and lifts the restrictions. Violation of conditions can lead to increased supervision, added restrictions, or revocation and imprisonment.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Witness Probation Status Impeachment
Pearl Porter stands trial for robbery. The prosecution calls a key eyewitness who is on juvenile probation. The defense seeks to cross-examine the witness about that probation status to show possible bias in favor of the state. The trial court allows the questions after finding they are necessary to test credibility.
Juvenile Probation Violation Sentence
Pilar Pena, age sixteen, receives probation after pleading guilty to armed burglary. She later commits new offenses that violate the probation terms. The court revokes probation, adjudicates her guilty, and imposes life without parole for the original burglary.
Graham v. Florida560 U.S. 48, 59, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2021, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010)
Terrance Graham was sixteen years old when he committed armed burglary and attempted armed robbery in Florida. In return for his guilty plea to these charges, the Florida trial court withheld adjudication of guilt and sentenced him to probation rather than entering a formal conviction.
Graham subsequently violated the terms of his probation by committing additional crimes. The trial court then adjudicated him guilty of the original charges, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the armed burglary.
Because Florida has abolished its parole system, the sentence ensures that Graham will die in prison without any meaningful opportunity to obtain release, no matter what he might do to demonstrate that he has matured or been rehabilitated. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the sentence on appeal.
The case reached the United States Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari to determine whether the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.
Priya Prasad is on probation when federal agents recruit her to wear a wire during conversations with a suspected associate. The recordings capture incriminating statements. At trial the associate objects that the probationer-informant arrangement violated his privacy rights.
United States v. White401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971)
In 2008 defendant William White, leader of the American National Socialist Workers Party, operated the website Overthrow.com. On September 11, 2008, White posted an article titled "Hale Seeks To Have Sentence Overturned" with the sub-headline "Gay Jewish Anti-Racist Led Jury."
The post included a photograph of Mark Hoffman, who had served as foreperson on the jury that convicted Matthew Hale in 2004, along with Hoffman's date of birth, address at 6915 Hamilton #A Chicago IL 60645, cell phone number, home phone number, and office number, and described Hoffman as living with his "gay black lover" and cat "homeboy." The posts appeared the same day a Chicago Sun-Times article discussed Hale's post-conviction motion challenging Hoffman's jury service on grounds including Hoffman's sexual orientation and race of his partner. White posted a virtually identical version on the blog section of the site and, after Northwestern University removed Hoffman's photo, posted an update the next day noting the block and repeating the same personal information. The site at the time also displayed links to other articles including one titled "Kill Richard Warman" and a magazine cover image showing crosshairs over Barack Obama's head titled "Kill This Nigger?"
Hoffman received a harassing phone call from a Virginia number on September 11, 2008, asking about his jury service, followed by text messages containing offensive content. Hoffman contacted Northwestern security and FBI Agent Sara Lopez. FBI agents later executed search warrants at properties associated with White in Roanoke, Virginia, seizing the server used to run Overthrow.com and confirming through forensic analysis that White created the Hoffman posts.
The government charged White with one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 373 by soliciting or endeavoring to persuade another person to injure Hoffman based on his jury service in the Hale case. A prior district judge dismissed the superseding indictment, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for trial, and an anonymous jury returned a guilty verdict. White moved for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.
At trial the evidence revealed that all of the information in the posts was in the public domain. Former ANSWP members Philip Anderson and Michael Burks testified about the organization's structure, conference calls, and their interactions with White, including White's post-arrest instructions to Anderson to contact other white supremacists to determine whether anyone planned to harm Hoffman. The government introduced dozens of prior Overthrow.com posts in which White had published addresses and expressed violent wishes toward other individuals.
Peter Park is arrested for domestic battery and for violating probation. The victim signs an affidavit describing the assault. The trial court admits the affidavit at the probation-revocation hearing over the defense objection that the declarant was unavailable for cross-examination.
Davis v. Washington547 U.S. 813 (2006)
On February 1, 2001, Michelle McCottry placed a 911 call reporting that her former boyfriend Adrian Davis was beating her with his fists inside her house. The 911 operator asked a series of questions about the location, whether weapons were involved, whether Davis had been drinking, his full name and middle initial, and his current actions. McCottry answered that Davis had just run out the door and was leaving in a car.
Police arrived within four minutes, observed fresh injuries on McCottry's face and forearm along with her shaken state, and noted her efforts to gather her belongings and children. Davis was charged with felony violation of a domestic no-contact order. At trial McCottry did not appear, and the court admitted the 911 recording over Davis's Confrontation Clause objection, leading to his conviction, which the Washington Court of Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed.
On February 26, 2003, police responded late at night to a reported domestic disturbance at the home of Hershel and Amy Hammon. Upon arrival Amy Hammon appeared somewhat frightened on the front porch but initially stated nothing was the matter. After officers entered and separated the couple, one officer questioned Amy in the living room while the other stayed with Hershel in the kitchen. Amy described a verbal argument that became physical, including Hershel breaking the furnace, lamps, and phone, shoving her into broken glass, and punching her in the chest. Amy then completed and signed a battery affidavit stating those events.
Hershel was charged with domestic battery and probation violation. At his bench trial Amy did not appear, and the court admitted the officer's recounting of her statements as excited utterances along with the affidavit over objection. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed Hershel's convictions, and the Indiana Supreme Court held Amy's oral statements nontestimonial while finding the affidavit testimonial but its admission harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Davis v. Washington and the consolidated Hammon v. Indiana cases to address the testimonial character of the statements. The evidence introduced at each trial consisted solely of the out-of-court statements, as neither victim appeared to testify and no other witnesses could identify the assailant or describe the cause of the injuries.
Pavel Petrov receives probation after a guilty plea. The judge later finds additional facts that increase the probation term beyond the statutory maximum for the offense. The defense argues the extra term rests on judicial fact-finding that a jury must perform.
Blakely v. Washington542 U.S. 296 (2004)
In 1998, Ralph Howard Blakely abducted his estranged wife Yolanda from their orchard home in Grant County, Washington. He bound her with duct tape and forced her at knifepoint into a wooden box in the bed of his pickup truck while imploring her to dismiss divorce and trust proceedings. When their 13-year-old son Ralphy returned from school, Blakely ordered him to follow in another car under threat of harming Yolanda with a shotgun. Ralphy escaped at a gas station and sought help, but Blakely continued with Yolanda to a friend's house in Montana before his arrest.
The State initially charged Blakely with first-degree kidnapping but reached a plea agreement that reduced the charge to second-degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm. Blakely entered a guilty plea admitting the elements of the reduced charge along with the domestic-violence and firearm allegations, but no other relevant facts. Washington law classified the offense as a class B felony carrying a statutory maximum of ten years, yet specified a standard sentencing range of 49 to 53 months for this offender score and offense level.
At sentencing the State recommended a term within the standard range. After hearing Yolanda's account of the incident, the judge rejected the recommendation and conducted a three-day bench hearing that included testimony from Blakely, Yolanda, Ralphy, a police officer, and medical experts. The judge issued 32 findings of fact detailing the defendant's motivation, methods, and violation of a restraining order, then concluded that Blakely had acted with deliberate cruelty, a statutorily enumerated aggravating factor.
The judge imposed an exceptional sentence of 90 months, 37 months above the standard maximum. Blakely appealed, contending that the sentencing procedure deprived him of the right to jury determination of facts essential to his sentence. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the state supreme court's earlier rejection of a similar challenge, and the Washington Supreme Court denied discretionary review.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the sentencing procedure under the Sixth Amendment.
Perry Pratt is on probation when charged with a new offense. He raises an insanity defense based on a long-standing mental condition. The court considers whether the probation history and prior compliance affect the determination of criminal responsibility.
Durham v. United States214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C.Cir.1954)
Monte Durham was convicted of housebreaking by the District Court of the District of Columbia sitting without a jury. The prosecution proceeded on a charge arising from an incident on July 13, 1951, in which Durham was found in a house.
Durham's history included discharge from the Navy in 1945 at age seventeen following a psychiatric examination revealing a profound personality disorder rendering him unfit for service. In 1947 he pleaded guilty to violating the National Motor Theft Act and was placed on probation for one to three years. In January 1948, as a result of a conviction in the District of Columbia Municipal Court for passing bad checks, the District Court revoked his probation and he commenced service of his Motor Theft sentence. His conduct within the first few days in jail led to a lunacy inquiry in the Municipal Court where a jury found him to be of unsound mind. Upon commitment to St. Elizabeths he was diagnosed as suffering from 'psychosis with psychopathic personality.' He experienced multiple discharges and readmissions to St. Elizabeths between 1949 and 1951, including a conditional release in June 1950 that he violated, and a further lunacy finding in 1951.
Following the July 1951 housebreaking, Durham was indicted in October 1951 and adjudged of unsound mind based on psychiatrists' affidavits diagnosing psychosis with psychopathic personality. He underwent subshock insulin therapy during a six-month commitment ending in February 1953, after which Dr. Silk certified him mentally competent to stand trial and able to assist counsel.
At the ensuing trial, the prosecutor expressed a plan to allow Durham to raise an insanity defense on this charge. The court accepted waivers of jury trial and additional competency proceedings despite Durham's expressed desire for further hospitalization. Testimony included that of Durham's mother regarding his post-May 1951 behavior and a psychiatrist who examined him in September 1951 and opined on his mental condition around the time of the offense. The trial court found the defense of insanity not established under the prevailing standards.
The appeal reached the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Does a defendant have a right to counsel at a probation revocation hearing?
A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at combined probation revocation and sentencing proceedings. The right is not automatic in every revocation hearing but turns on case-specific factors including the complexity of the issues and the risk of incarceration.
When may a court revoke probation for failure to pay a fine or restitution?
A court may not revoke probation and imprison a defendant for failure to pay a fine or restitution without first determining that the defendant willfully refused to pay despite having the ability to do so or that adequate alternatives to imprisonment are unavailable. Automatic revocation for nonpayment violates equal protection and due process.
Are statements made by a probationer to a probation officer protected by the Fifth Amendment?
A probationer’s incriminating statements to a probation officer made under a general obligation to be truthful are not deemed compelled or involuntary. The probationer must affirmatively invoke the privilege to obtain Fifth Amendment protection.
What procedural protections apply before a court modifies probation conditions?
Before modifying the conditions of probation the court must hold a hearing at which the person has the right to counsel and an opportunity to make a statement and present information in mitigation.
514 U.S. 549 (1995)
…conducted a bench trial, found him guilty of violating § 922(q), and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release. On appeal, respondent challenged his conviction based on his claim that § 922(q) exceeded Congress' power to legislate under the Commerce Clause. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth…