Also known as: procedural default · default judgment · procedural default rules
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A doctrine under which a court may enter judgment against a party that fails to appear, plead, or otherwise defend, subject to limits on the relief granted and to rules permitting the default to be set aside for good cause.
Paula Pierce sued Precision Tools for breach of contract and demanded $75,000 in damages. After the company failed to answer, the clerk entered a default judgment for $120,000 plus interest. The court later vacated the excess amount because the judgment could not exceed the relief demanded in the pleadings.
Pablo Perez missed the deadline to respond to a complaint and the clerk entered default against him. He promptly moved to set the entry aside, showing excusable neglect and a meritorious defense. The court granted the motion for good cause under the governing rule.
Patricia Patel's trial lawyer failed to object to an unconstitutional jury instruction at her state murder trial. On federal habeas, the court held that the omission constituted a procedural default that could not be excused without a showing of cause and prejudice.
In September 1976, respondent David Washington committed a series of crimes over a ten-day period in the Miami area that included three brutal stabbing murders along with torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, Washington surrendered to police and gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third criminal episode. The State of Florida indicted him for kidnapping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him. Washington waived his right to a jury trial against counsel's advice and pleaded guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder counts. In the plea colloquy he stated that he had committed a string of burglaries but had no significant prior criminal record and that he had been under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family. Counsel spoke with Washington about his background, contacted his wife and mother by telephone, but did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination. At the sentencing hearing before the trial judge, counsel's strategy relied primarily on the plea colloquy to convey remorse and emotional stress and argued that these factors justified sparing Washington the death penalty. Counsel successfully moved to exclude Washington's rap sheet and decided not to request a presentence report because it would have included his criminal history. The trial judge found multiple aggravating circumstances for each murder and no mitigating circumstances, sentencing Washington to death on each of the three murder counts. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Washington sought collateral relief in state court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on six grounds including failure to request a psychiatric report, investigate and present character witnesses, and seek a presentence investigation report. He submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives willing to testify and two reports from a psychiatrist and psychologist. The state trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Washington then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. After an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel testified, the District Court denied relief, concluding that although counsel made errors in judgment by failing to investigate mitigating evidence further, no prejudice resulted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for application of a new framework it developed for analyzing ineffectiveness claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding.
View casePierce Patterson challenged the admission of evidence in his state conviction but raised the federal constitutional argument only after trial. The state appellate court rejected the claim as untimely under its contemporaneous-objection rule. Federal habeas review was therefore unavailable.
In March 1973, three adult male respondents and a sixteen-year-old girl were traveling in a Chevrolet on the New York State Thruway when the car was stopped for speeding. Police observed two loaded handguns weighing approximately six pounds in an open handbag on the front floor or seat beside the girl, who admitted the bag belonged to her. A machinegun and heroin were discovered in the trunk after it was pried open. The four were tried together in Ulster County Court for possession of the handguns and trunk items. The trial judge instructed the jury regarding the statutory presumption that the presence of firearms in the automobile constituted evidence of possession by all occupants. The jury found the three adult males guilty of handgun possession but acquitted everyone of the trunk charges. The convictions were affirmed by the Appellate Division without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. The respondents sought federal habeas corpus relief in the Southern District of New York. The district court granted the writ on the ground that the presumption could not support the convictions on these facts. The Second Circuit affirmed the grant of the writ, though on the basis that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the procedural and substantive issues raised by the lower federal courts' decisions.
View casePamela Phillips sued her broker in federal court despite an arbitration clause in the customer agreement. The court enforced the clause and dismissed the action, holding that her decision to litigate constituted a procedural default of the contractual right to arbitrate.
Petitioners are individuals who invested about $400,000 in securities. They signed a standard customer agreement with the broker, which included a clause stating that the parties agreed to settle any controversies relating to the accounts through binding arbitration that complies with specified procedures. The agreement to arbitrate these controversies is unqualified, unless it is found to be unenforceable under federal or state law. After the investments turned sour, petitioners eventually sued respondent and its broker-agent in charge of the accounts, alleging that their money was lost in unauthorized and fraudulent transactions. In their complaint they pleaded several violations of federal and state law, including claims under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and claims under three sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The District Court ordered all the claims to be submitted to arbitration except for those raised under section 12(2) of the Securities Act. It reaffirmed its ruling upon reconsideration and also entered a default judgment against the broker, who is no longer in the case. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's order, concluding that the arbitration agreement is enforceable because this Court's subsequent decisions have reduced Wilko to obsolescence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the enforceability of the arbitration agreement for claims under the Securities Act of 1933.
View casePreston Pratt sought habeas relief based on a Supreme Court decision announced after his state conviction became final. The court refused to apply the new rule because it would constitute a retroactive change barred by the doctrine of procedural defaults in collateral review.
Petitioner Teague, a black man, was convicted in an Illinois state court of three counts of attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of aggravated battery by an all-white jury. During jury selection for petitioner's trial, the prosecutor used all 10 of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks. Petitioner's counsel used one of his 10 peremptory challenges to exclude a black woman who was married to a police officer. After the prosecutor had struck six blacks, petitioner's counsel moved for a mistrial. When the prosecutor struck four more blacks, petitioner's counsel again moved for a mistrial, arguing that petitioner was entitled to a jury of his peers. The prosecutor defended the challenges by stating that he was trying to achieve a balance of men and women on the jury. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the jury appeared to be a fair one. On appeal, petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges denied him the right to be tried by a jury that was representative of the community. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected petitioner's fair cross section claim. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1983. Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Petitioner repeated his fair cross section claim, and argued that the opinions of several Justices concurring in, or dissenting from, the denial of certiorari in McCray v. New York had invited a reexamination of Swain v. Alabama. The District Court, though sympathetic to petitioner's arguments, held that it was bound by Swain and Circuit precedent. On appeal, petitioner repeated his fair cross section claim and his McCray argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner that the Sixth Amendment's fair cross section requirement applied to the petit jury and held that petitioner had made out a prima facie case of discrimination. A majority of the judges on the Court of Appeals voted to rehear the case en banc, and the panel opinion was vacated. Rehearing was postponed until after Batson v. Kentucky was decided. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner could not benefit from the rule in that case because Allen v. Hardy had held that Batson would not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner's Swain claim was procedurally barred and in any event meritless. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's fair cross section claim, holding that the fair cross section requirement was limited to the jury venire. Petitioner's conviction became final two and a half years prior to Batson.
View caseThe petitioner must demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation, or that failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
No. A state court's error in Fourth Amendment analysis does not by itself amount to a denial of a full and fair opportunity to litigate, so the claim remains subject to the independent and adequate state ground doctrine.
AEDPA codified a modified res judicata rule that limits federal habeas relief when the state court adjudicated the claim on procedural grounds that were adequate and independent.