Also known as: public agents · government agent
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A person who acts on behalf of a governmental entity in an official capacity. The designation covers law enforcement officers and other officials whose conduct is attributable to the state for constitutional and procedural purposes. Statements made to such an agent in response to interrogation are subject to mandatory disclosure when the government intends to use them at trial.
Philip Powell was questioned in a conference room by a federal fraud investigator who identified himself at the outset. Powell gave a detailed oral explanation of his deposit practices. The prosecutor later plans to have the investigator testify about that explanation at trial. Because the defendant knew the questioner was a government agent and the government intends to use the statement, the rule requires disclosure of its substance upon request.
Paige Porter, a state university official, was sued for alleged tortious acts committed while carrying out campus housing policies. The court held that the Eleventh Amendment protects the state itself but does not automatically shield the individual officer when the claim seeks relief against the officer personally for exceeding lawful authority.
In 1974 Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst State School and Hospital, filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case became a class action on behalf of all present and future residents of the institution. The Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens and the United States joined as plaintiffs. Defendants included Pennhurst and its officials, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare and its officials, and county officials from five surrounding counties. The amended complaint alleged that conditions at Pennhurst violated rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, and the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966. Both damages and injunctive relief were sought. After a lengthy trial the District Court found in 1977 that conditions were dangerous, with residents often physically abused or drugged by staff, and inadequate for habilitation. Some residents suffered deterioration in physical, intellectual, and emotional skills. The court ordered immediate steps to remove residents from Pennhurst, directed the provision of community living arrangements, and appointed a Special Master with broad supervisory powers. The Court of Appeals affirmed most of the judgment in 1979 but remanded for individual determinations regarding institutionalization. On further remand the District Court established procedures for individual habilitation plans and appointed a Hearing Master. This Court in 1981 reversed the Court of Appeals' reliance on federal statutory grounds and remanded for consideration of state-law, constitutional, and section 504 claims. On remand the Court of Appeals in 1982 reinstated its prior judgment solely on the state Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in In re Schmidt. It rejected Eleventh Amendment and abstention challenges. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1982. The District Court had found that the individual defendants acted in good faith within the sphere of their official responsibilities despite staff shortages and limited resources.
Pearl Porter, a state prosecutor, directed an investigation that resulted in charges against a defendant. The defendant argued that the prosecutor's actions violated due process because they exceeded constitutional bounds on governmental authority. The court examined whether the conduct of the public agent remained within the limits imposed by the Constitution on state action.
Joseph Hurtado was charged by an information filed in the Superior Court of Sacramento County with the murder of Jose Antonio Estuardo. The information was in the usual form and charged the crime with technical precision and in due legal language. It was filed after the defendant had been examined and committed by a magistrate, as required by the statute. The Constitution of California, adopted in 1879, provides that offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment shall be prosecuted by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, or by indictment. The Penal Code of the State, adopted in 1872 and in force at the time, contained provisions authorizing every person to be proceeded against criminally by indictment or by information, and specifying that an information is an accusation in writing presented by the district attorney after preliminary examination or waiver. Hurtado moved to set aside the information on the ground that it was not found or presented by a grand jury. The motion was overruled. He was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and was put upon his trial. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, and judgment was pronounced sentencing him to be hanged. From this judgment Hurtado appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of California, which affirmed it. He then sued out a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Pierre Poulin was indicted and placed in a holding cell with another detainee. Investigators had recruited the detainee and directed him to ask specific questions about the charged arson. Because the detainee was acting as a government agent deliberately eliciting statements after adversary proceedings had begun, the Sixth Amendment barred use of the resulting statements without counsel present.
In January 1981, police officers in Belfast, Maine responded to a fire call at the Belfast Dodge automobile dealership and discovered a burning stolen Chevrolet dump truck along with evidence of several automobile thefts inside a building leased to Brian Moulton and his codefendant Gary Colson. On April 7, 1981, a Waldo County grand jury indicted Moulton and Colson on four counts of theft by receiving stolen goods. Moulton and Colson, represented by retained counsel, pleaded not guilty on April 9 and were released on bail. On November 4, 1982, Colson telephoned Police Chief Robert Keating to report anonymous threatening calls and expressed a desire to discuss the pending charges. After consulting his lawyer, Colson met with police on November 9 and 10, provided full confessions of his and Moulton's participation in the thefts and additional crimes including burglary and arson, and agreed to testify against Moulton and cooperate in the prosecution in exchange for no further charges. The police placed a recording device on Colson's telephone with instructions to record calls from Moulton or threats. Colson recorded three telephone conversations with Moulton on November 22, December 2, and December 14, 1982, in which the men discussed the pending charges and arranged to meet on December 26 to plan their defense. On December 26, Colson wore a body wire transmitter to the meeting as arranged with the police, and the two discussed defense strategy including false alibis, during which Moulton made numerous incriminating statements about the thefts that were later admitted at trial. Moulton moved to suppress the recorded statements before trial. The trial court denied the motion after finding the recordings were made to investigate threats and protect Colson. Moulton was convicted of burglary and theft following a bench trial. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reversed the convictions on the ground that the statements were obtained in violation of Moulton's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The United States Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari.
Pablo Perez operated a business subject to OSHA inspections. A federal agent arrived without a warrant and demanded entry to search for violations. The court held that the Fourth Amendment protects against warrantless searches by government agents even in a regulatory context unless an exception applies.
Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 to assure safe and healthful working conditions. Section 8(a) of the Act empowered agents of the Secretary of Labor to enter without delay any workplace within the Act's jurisdiction to inspect for safety hazards and regulatory violations, with no search warrant expressly required under the Act. On the morning of September 11, 1975, an OSHA inspector entered the customer service area of Barlow's, Inc., an electrical and plumbing installation business located in Pocatello, Idaho. Ferrol G. "Bill" Barlow, the president and general manager, was present. After presenting credentials the inspector stated that he wished to search the working areas of the business, explaining that Barlow's had been selected through the agency's routine process even though no employee complaint had been filed. Barlow refused entry to the nonpublic employee areas without a warrant, invoking rights under the Fourth Amendment. Three months later the Secretary petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Idaho for an order compelling Barlow to admit the inspector. The district court issued the requested order on December 30, 1975; it was presented to Barlow on January 5, 1976. Barlow again refused admission and filed his own action seeking injunctive relief against warrantless OSHA searches. A three-judge district court was convened. On December 30, 1976, the three-judge court ruled in Barlow's favor, entering an injunction against searches or inspections conducted pursuant to Section 8(a). The Secretary appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.
Phuong Pham gave statements to federal agents during an interview that was later ruled to violate Miranda. At trial the government sought to use those statements only to impeach inconsistent testimony. The court permitted the use for impeachment because the statements were not obtained through coercion that would render them unreliable for that limited purpose.
Respondent James Havens, an attorney from Fort Wayne, Indiana, and John McLeroth boarded a flight from Lima, Peru, to Miami, Florida. Upon arrival in Miami, customs officers searched McLeroth and discovered cocaine sewn into makeshift pockets in a T-shirt he wore under his outer clothing. McLeroth implicated Havens, who had already cleared customs and was arrested. Officers seized and searched Havens' luggage without a warrant, finding a T-shirt with pieces cut out that matched those sewn onto McLeroth's T-shirt. The T-shirt and other items from the search were suppressed before trial on Havens' motion. Both men were charged in a three-count indictment. McLeroth pleaded guilty to one count and testified against Havens at trial, stating that Havens had supplied the altered T-shirt and sewed the pockets shut. Havens took the stand in his defense and denied any involvement in smuggling cocaine. On direct examination, Havens testified that he did not engage in wrapping or taping activities with McLeroth. During cross-examination, the government asked Havens whether he had a size 38-40 medium T-shirt with swatches missing in his luggage when passing through customs, and Havens denied it. On rebuttal, a government agent testified that the T-shirt had been found in Havens' suitcase and that Havens had claimed the T-shirts belonged to McLeroth. The T-shirt was admitted into evidence over objection, with the jury instructed to consider it only for impeaching Havens' credibility. Havens was convicted of importing, conspiring to import, and intentionally possessing cocaine. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The government must disclose the substance of any relevant oral statement made by the defendant before or after arrest in response to interrogation by a person the defendant knew was a government agent if the government intends to use the statement at trial. This obligation arises upon the defendant's request under the applicable discovery rule.
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…unless Fulminante confessed. Our cases have made clear that a finding of coercion need not depend upon actual violence by a government agent; a credible threat is sufficient. As we have said, "coercion can be mental as well as physical, and . . . the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional…
…to protect the rights of individuals and minorities, as well against the power of numbers, as against the violence of public agents transcending the limits of lawful authority, even when acting in the name and wielding the force of the
…in his bedroom by four police officers); Mathis v. United States , 391 U. S. 1, 2-3 (1968) (defendant questioned by a Government agent while in jail). : No more is implied by this analogy than that most traffic stops resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry . We of…
…from suit is a high attribute of sovereignty — a prerogative of the State itself — which cannot be availed of by public agents
…without authorization of a judge. Id. , Government Exhibit 1. It further asked petitioner to affirm that he was not a Government agent
The Sixth Amendment prohibits deliberate elicitation of incriminating statements by a government agent after adversary proceedings have begun without counsel or waiver. Passive listening by a cooperating inmate who was instructed only to keep his ears open does not violate the right to counsel.
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Once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, authorities may not initiate further custodial interrogation about any offense through a government agent unless the suspect initiates contact or counsel is present. Continuous custody requires suppression of statements obtained in violation of that rule.
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The discovery obligation for oral statements made to a known government agent turns on the defendant's request, the responsive nature of the statement, and the government's intent to use it at trial. The presence of counsel does not remove the duty to disclose the substance of the statement.
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