Also known as: public record · public records · public report · public reports · public records exception · FRE 803(8)
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A category of official documents admissible under the hearsay exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) that includes records of public office activities, matters observed pursuant to legal duty, and factual findings from authorized investigations.
Pearl Porter paid off her mortgage loan in full to Prosperity Investments. The lender filed a satisfaction document with the county recorder. When Pearl later sold the property to Pavel Petrov, the buyer offered the recorded satisfaction as a public record at trial. The court admitted it under the hearsay exception because it documented an official office activity.
Paula Pierce represented a client in a high-profile contract dispute. She told reporters that court filings already on file contained the key contract terms. The statement stayed within the Model Rule exception because it merely repeated information already contained in a public record that would itself be admissible under the hearsay exception.
Pedro Pacheco sued a federal contractor after an agency investigation concluded that safety violations caused his injury. The plaintiff offered the investigator’s report containing both observations and conclusions. The court admitted the entire document under the public records exception because it resulted from an authorized investigation.
Prime Logistics paid off a senior mortgage on property owned by Precision Tools. By operation of law the senior mortgage passed to Prime. Prime offered the recorded assignment at trial as a public record. The court admitted it under the hearsay exception because it documented an official office activity affecting title.
Penelope Price sought internal agency documents in a challenge to a government policy. The government resisted production by claiming some materials were already available in public records. The court ordered targeted production after confirming that the requested items were not duplicates of existing public records admissible under the hearsay exception.
In January 2001, shortly after assuming office, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum establishing the National Energy Policy Development Group. The Group was directed to develop a national energy policy designed to help promote dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound production and distribution of energy. The President assigned agency heads and assistants, all federal employees, to serve as members of the committee. He authorized the Vice President, as chairman, to invite other officers of the Federal Government to participate as appropriate. Five months later the NEPDG issued a final report and, according to the Government, terminated all operations. Following publication of the report, Judicial Watch, Inc., and the Sierra Club filed separate actions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that were later consolidated. The plaintiffs alleged that the NEPDG had failed to comply with the procedural and disclosure requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Non-federal employees including private lobbyists regularly attended and fully participated in non-public meetings. Respondents contend that the regular participation of the non-Government individuals made them de facto members of the committee. The suits named Vice President Cheney, the NEPDG, government officials who served on the committee, and the alleged de facto members as defendants. The suit seeks declaratory relief and an injunction requiring them to produce all materials allegedly subject to FACA's requirements. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. It dismissed respondents' claims against the non-Government defendants. Because the NEPDG had been dissolved, it could not be sued as a defendant, and the claims against it were dismissed as well. The District Court held that FACA's substantive requirements could be enforced against the Vice President and other Government participants on the NEPDG under the Mandamus Act and against the agency defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court allowed respondents to conduct a tightly reined discovery to ascertain the NEPDG's structure and membership. The District Court denied in part the motion to dismiss and ordered respondents to submit a discovery plan. Petitioners including the Vice President sought a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to vacate the discovery orders, direct the District Court to rule on the basis of the administrative record, and dismiss the Vice President from the suit. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus and the Vice President's attempted interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePeter Park’s prosecutor disclosed during plea negotiations that the defendant’s prior convictions appeared in the public court records. The statement did not violate confidentiality rules because it rested solely on information already part of the public record admissible under the hearsay exception.
Paul Lewis Hayes was indicted by a Fayette County, Ky., grand jury on a charge of uttering a forged instrument in the amount of $88.30. This offense was then punishable by a term of 2 to 10 years in prison. After arraignment, Hayes, his retained counsel, and the Commonwealth’s Attorney met in the presence of the Clerk of the Court to discuss a possible plea agreement. During these conferences the prosecutor offered to recommend a sentence of five years in prison if Hayes would plead guilty to the indictment. He also said that if Hayes did not plead guilty, he would return to the grand jury to seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act. This would subject Hayes to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment by reason of his two prior felony convictions. Hayes chose not to plead guilty. The prosecutor obtained an indictment charging him under the Habitual Criminal Act. The recidivist charge was fully justified by the evidence. The prosecutor possessed this evidence at the time of the original indictment. Hayes’ refusal to plead guilty led to the habitual criminal indictment. A jury found Hayes guilty on the principal charge. In a separate proceeding the jury found that he had twice before been convicted of felonies. He was sentenced to a life term in the penitentiary. The Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected Hayes’ constitutional objections to the enhanced sentence in an unpublished opinion. On Hayes’ petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied the writ. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider a constitutional question of importance in the administration of criminal justice.
View caseFederal Rule of Evidence 803(8) covers records of the activities of a public office, matters observed pursuant to a legal duty, and factual findings from an authorized investigation in civil cases and against the government in criminal cases.
No. The exception applies whether or not the declarant is available to testify.
Yes. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), factual findings resulting from an authorized investigation include opinions and conclusions when the report is otherwise trustworthy.
…(1972) (cross-examined prior-trial testimony); Comment, 30 La. L. Rev. 651, 668 (1970) ("Properly administered the business and public records exceptions would seem to be among the safest of the hearsay exceptions"). : The complexity of reconciling the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules has triggered an outpouring…