quiet enjoyment

The landlords leased apartments to the defendants for residential use in a building they owned. They also leased nearby premises to third parties for operation as a bar or cocktail lounge. The lease for the lounge required that entertainment be conducted so that it could not be heard outside the building and would not disturb the apartment residents. The landlords introduced this commercial activity into an area leased for residential purposes. The lounge presented amplified music from electric musical instruments and singing starting at 9:30 P.M. and continuing until 1:30 A.M. or 2 A.M. on Tuesdays through Sundays. The music penetrated the granite walls of the residential building and was described as unbelievably loud, incessant, raucous, and penetrating. Noise from patrons yelling and fighting also occurred, interfering with conversation and preventing sleep for the tenants. The residential tenants made numerous objections to the landlords about the disturbances. The landlords promised each tenant to correct the situation and complained to the lounge tenants from time to time. Although the noise would abate in response to the landlords' complaints, their attempts to remedy the problem were unsuccessful. Each tenant vacated his apartment within a reasonable time. The landlords brought consolidated actions for rent against the tenants. The trial judge found that the tenants were very substantially deprived of quiet enjoyment of their leased premises for a substantial time. The trial judge further found that the landlords had it within their control to correct the conditions which amounted to a constructive eviction of each tenant. Following entry of judgment for the tenants, the landlords appealed and the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the appeals for its review.

In May 1958, Joy M. Cooper leased a portion of the ground floor of a commercial building at 207 Union Street, Hackensack, New Jersey, from the predecessor in title to Reste Realty Corp. After about a year of occupancy, the parties executed a new five-year lease in April 1959 covering the entire ground floor except the furnace room for use as commercial offices in connection with a jewelry firm's sales training and meetings. A driveway ran along the north side of the building. During the first year of occupancy, rainwater ran off the driveway into the leased offices whenever it rained. Arthur A. Donigian, an officer and resident manager of the corporate owner who also maintained an office in the building, was notified of the flooding and took steps to remove the water. Before signing the second lease, Donigian promised to remedy the problem by resurfacing the driveway, and the work was performed. Donigian died on March 30, 1961. Thereafter, when flooding occurred, the lessor ignored Cooper's complaints, and she and her employees removed the water themselves. On multiple occasions, including after heavy rainstorms that left up to two inches of water, sales meetings with as many as fifty attendees had to be relocated or adjourned, sometimes requiring rental of other quarters. On December 20, 1961, five inches of water flooded the premises during a meeting of sales representatives from four states, forcing the meeting to be moved to a nearby inn. Cooper consulted an attorney that evening and, after notifying the lessor, vacated the premises on December 30, 1961. Reste Realty Corp. acquired the building and the lease assignment on January 19, 1962. On November 9, 1964, it sued Cooper to recover rent for the unexpired term through March 31, 1964. The trial court entered judgment for Cooper on her constructive eviction defense. The Appellate Division reversed, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification.

Lakeside Village is a 530-unit condominium development in Culver City consisting of 12 separate three-story buildings whose residents share common lobbies, hallways, laundry, and trash facilities. In April 1978 the developer recorded a declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions that included the provision that no animals, defined to mean dogs and cats, livestock, reptiles, or poultry, shall be kept in any unit. Plaintiff Natore Nahrstedt purchased a unit in January 1988 and moved in with her three cats, which she kept entirely inside the unit. When the Lakeside Village Condominium Association learned of the cats it demanded their removal and levied successive monthly fines against Nahrstedt. Nahrstedt then filed suit against the Association, its officers, and two employees seeking declaratory relief that the pet restriction was unreasonable as applied to her indoor cats, invalidation of the assessments, damages for invasion of privacy and emotional distress, and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the cats were noiseless, created no nuisance, and had not damaged any portion of her unit or the common areas, and it incorporated by reference the grant deed, the declaration, and the condominium plan. The Association demurred to the complaint on the ground that the restriction was reasonable as a matter of law. The trial court sustained the demurrer as to every cause of action and dismissed the complaint. A divided Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of dismissal, concluding that Nahrstedt had stated a claim for declaratory relief because the reasonableness of enforcing the restriction against her particular cats presented a factual question. The dissenting justice in the Court of Appeal maintained that the recorded restriction should be treated as presumptively valid under the law of equitable servitudes. On the Association's petition the Supreme Court granted review.

Brookfield, Wisconsin, is a residential suburb of Milwaukee with a population of approximately 4,300. Appellees Sandra C. Schultz and Robert C. Braun, who opposed abortion, picketed on a public street outside the residence of a doctor who performed abortions at clinics in neighboring towns. Between April 20, 1985, and May 20, 1985, they and others assembled outside the doctor's home on at least six occasions for periods ranging from one to one and a half hours, with groups varying in size from 11 to more than 40 people, and the picketing remained generally orderly and peaceful. The picketing generated substantial controversy and numerous complaints, prompting the Town Board to enact an ordinance on May 7, 1985, that prohibited all picketing in residential neighborhoods except for labor picketing. After the town attorney advised that the labor exception likely rendered the ordinance unconstitutional under Carey v. Brown, the town repealed it on May 15, 1985, and replaced it with a flat ban stating that it is unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brookfield. The new ordinance recited its purpose as the protection and preservation of the home through assurance that members of the community enjoy in their homes and dwellings a feeling of well-being, tranquility, and privacy, and noted concerns about emotional disturbance, distress, harassment, and obstruction of public sidewalks. On May 18, 1985, appellees were informed that enforcement would begin on May 21, leading them to cease picketing and file suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the town and its officials. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction, which the Seventh Circuit affirmed by an equally divided en banc vote after initial panel proceedings. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case after postponing consideration of its appellate jurisdiction.