relates back

In 1973, Raymond Dirks served as an officer of a New York broker-dealer firm that specialized in investment analysis of insurance company securities for institutional investors. On March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America, alleging that the company's assets were vastly overstated due to fraudulent corporate practices and that regulatory agencies had failed to act on employee charges of fraud. Secrist urged Dirks to verify the allegations and disclose them publicly. Dirks decided to investigate the claims. He traveled to Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles, where he interviewed several officers and employees. While senior management denied any wrongdoing, Equity Funding employees corroborated the fraud allegations. Throughout his investigation, Dirks openly discussed the information with clients and investors, none of whom included Dirks or his firm in ownership or trading of Equity Funding stock. Some of these investors sold holdings totaling more than $16 million. Dirks also contacted William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles bureau chief, and urged him to publish a story on the fraud. Blundell declined to write the story because he feared that publishing such damaging hearsay might be libelous. Over the two-week period of Dirks' activities, Equity Funding's stock price fell from $26 to less than $15 per share, prompting the New York Stock Exchange to halt trading on March 27. California insurance authorities then impounded the company's records and uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did the SEC file a complaint against Equity Funding. On April 2, the Wall Street Journal published a front-page story based largely on information assembled by Dirks. Equity Funding subsequently entered receivership. The SEC investigated Dirks' role and, following a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, found that he had aided and abetted violations of federal securities laws by repeating the fraud allegations to investment community members who sold their Equity Funding stock. The SEC censured Dirks, recognizing his role in exposing the fraud. Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which affirmed the SEC's decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question presented.

In March 1988, John F. DiGiovanni submitted an application to the Connecticut Superior Court for a prejudgment attachment in the amount of $75,000 on Brian K. Doehr's home in Meriden, Connecticut, in conjunction with a civil action for assault and battery that he was seeking to institute against Doehr. DiGiovanni had no pre-existing interest in Doehr's real estate, and the suit did not involve the property. Connecticut law authorized prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice or hearing upon verification by oath that there was probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiff's claim. DiGiovanni accompanied the application with an affidavit stating that the facts set forth in his complaint were true, that he had been willfully, wantonly and maliciously assaulted by Doehr resulting in a broken left wrist, an ecchymosis to his right eye, and other injuries, and that he had expended sums for medical care and treatment. The affidavit concluded that these facts were sufficient to show probable cause that judgment would be rendered for the plaintiff. On March 17, 1988, the Superior Court judge found probable cause to sustain the validity of the claim and ordered the attachment on Doehr's home to the value of $75,000. The sheriff attached the property on March 21, 1988. Doehr first learned of the attachment after it had been recorded on the land records. He had not yet been served with the complaint. The attachment notice informed Doehr of his right to a hearing to claim that no probable cause existed, to request that the attachment be vacated or modified or a bond substituted, or to claim that some portion of the property was exempt. Doehr filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut claiming that the Connecticut statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment upholding the statute. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict of authority regarding the statute's constitutionality.

Robert Lalli claims to be the illegitimate son of Mario Lalli, who died intestate on January 7, 1973, in New York. Robert’s mother, who died in 1968, was never married to Mario. After Mario’s widow, Rosamond Lalli, was appointed administratrix of the estate, Robert and his sister Maureen petitioned the Surrogate’s Court for Westchester County for a compulsory accounting, asserting their entitlement to inherit as Mario’s children. Rosamond Lalli opposed the petition. She argued that Robert and Maureen had not obtained an order of filiation during Mario’s lifetime as required by New York Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law § 4-1.2. Robert conceded the absence of such an order. He presented evidence. This included a notarized document in which Mario referred to him as “my son” when consenting to his marriage. There were also affidavits from individuals stating that Mario had openly acknowledged Robert and Maureen as his children. The Surrogate’s Court ruled that Robert and Maureen were excluded as distributees. On direct appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. While the case was pending before the United States Supreme Court, the Court decided Trimble v. Gordon and vacated and remanded for further consideration. On remand, the New York Court of Appeals adhered to its prior disposition. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard the case.

Carol Sosna married Michael Sosna on September 5, 1964, in Michigan. They lived together in New York between October 1967 and August 1971, after which they separated but continued to reside there. In August 1972 Sosna moved to Iowa with her three children. The following month she petitioned the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, for dissolution of her marriage. Michael Sosna was personally served when he visited Iowa and made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction. The Iowa court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 598.6 because Sosna had not resided in the state for one year preceding the filing. Instead of appealing, Sosna filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on constitutional grounds. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. While the federal action was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Williams, 217 N.W.2d 202 (1974), and upheld the statute's constitutionality. The three-judge court upheld the residency requirement. This Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the appeal Sosna obtained a divorce in New York, though custody and support issues remained unresolved from the Iowa proceeding. She returned to Iowa to prosecute the appeal. Sosna sought class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to represent Iowa residents who had lived in the state less than one year and wished to initiate divorce actions but were barred by the residency requirement. The parties stipulated that numerous people were similarly situated, joinder was impracticable, her claims were representative, and she would adequately protect class interests. The district court approved the stipulation in a pretrial order.