Also known as: rational basis review · rational basis scrutiny
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A deferential standard of judicial review under which a law is upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The standard permits classifications that are underinclusive or overinclusive and requires only minimal justification from the government.
Rita Russell, a physically fit 51-year-old officer, challenges a city rule forcing retirement at age 50. The court applies relaxed scrutiny and upholds the rule because the age limit is rationally related to the legitimate goal of maintaining a capable force, even though some older officers remain fit.
Rina Rahman, a national from a majority-Muslim country, sues after an executive order blocks her entry on national-security grounds. The court applies relaxed scrutiny, defers to the political branches in immigration matters, and upholds the order because it states a rational connection to security despite earlier statements suggesting bias.
Ruby Rivera, a parent in a district using race-based student assignments, challenges the policy. The court declines to apply relaxed scrutiny and instead demands strict scrutiny because the classification rests on race rather than a category receiving only deferential review.
In the late 1990s the Seattle School District No. 1 adopted a student assignment plan for its ten regular public high schools. Incoming ninth graders ranked preferences among schools. The district applied a series of tiebreakers when schools were oversubscribed. The second tiebreaker classified students as white or nonwhite. It selected students whose race would bring an integration-positive school within ten percentage points of the district-wide balance of 41 percent white and 59 percent nonwhite. The plan affected assignments at five oversubscribed schools in the 2000-2001 school year. Petitioner Parents Involved in Community Schools filed suit in the Western District of Washington in July 2000 alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause. Jefferson County Public Schools had been under a 1975 federal desegregation decree. The decree was dissolved in 2000 after a finding of unitary status. The district adopted a voluntary assignment plan in 2001. The plan required all nonmagnet schools to maintain black enrollment between 15 and 50 percent. The plan grouped elementary schools into clusters. It assigned kindergartners and new students within clusters according to space and racial guidelines. It denied transfer requests that would push a school outside the guidelines. Approximately 34 percent of the district's 97,000 students were black. When Crystal Meredith moved into the district in August 2002 she sought to enroll her son Joshua in kindergarten at Bloom Elementary one mile from their home. The district denied the intercluster transfer from Young Elementary because it would adversely affect desegregation compliance at Young which was then 46.8 percent black. Meredith filed suit in the Western District of Kentucky alleging an Equal Protection violation. The Seattle District Court granted summary judgment to the district in 2001. The Ninth Circuit en banc affirmed the federal constitutional ruling in 2005. The District Court found that Jefferson County had asserted a compelling interest in maintaining racially diverse schools, and that the assignment plan was in all relevant respects narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion relying upon the reasoning of the District Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases in 2006.
View caseRoland Rhodes is prosecuted under a federal statute banning guns near schools. The court refuses relaxed scrutiny and strikes the law because Congress lacked a rational basis under the Commerce Clause for regulating purely local, non-economic activity.
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseRising Sun Electronics challenges a city rule removing commercial newsracks from public sidewalks while allowing noncommercial ones. The court declines relaxed scrutiny, applies intermediate scrutiny to the commercial-speech distinction, and invalidates the regulation because it fails the required tailoring analysis.
In 1989 the city of Cincinnati authorized Discovery Network, Inc., to place 38 newsracks on public property to distribute its free magazine published nine times a year that advertises adult educational, recreational, and social programs while also containing some information about current events. That same year Harmon Publishing Company, Inc., received permission to install 24 newsracks for its free magazine that advertises residential properties for sale throughout the United States and includes listings, photographs, interest rates, market trends, and other real estate matters for the greater Cincinnati area. Approximately one-third of Discovery's magazines and about 15 percent of Harmon's Cincinnati-area distribution occurred through these authorized devices. In March 1990, the city's Director of Public Works notified each respondent that its permit was revoked. The city ordered the newsracks removed within 30 days. This action was taken on the ground that the publications constituted commercial handbills under Municipal Code § 714-1—C. Distribution on public property was barred by § 714-23. Respondents received administrative hearings and review by the Sidewalk Appeals Committee, which maintained the city's position but permitted the devices to remain pending judicial determination. Respondents commenced litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. After an evidentiary hearing the District Court addressed the regulatory scheme. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1992. The city's prohibition on commercial handbills predated any concern about newsracks and had been enacted to address litter rather than permanent dispensing devices. Between 1,500 and 2,000 newsracks stood on Cincinnati's public rights of way at the time of the litigation, of which the 62 operated by respondents formed a small portion.
View caseRidgeway Partners, a utility company, challenges a commission order banning promotional advertising. The court declines relaxed scrutiny, applies intermediate scrutiny under the commercial-speech doctrine, and invalidates the order because it fails the required justification and tailoring analysis.
In December 1973, the Public Service Commission ordered electric utilities in New York State to cease all advertising that promoted the use of electricity because the interconnected utility system lacked sufficient fuel stocks for the 1973-1974 winter. The order rested on the Commission's finding that the system did not have sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to meet customer demands. Three years later, when the fuel shortage had eased, the Commission requested comments from the public on its proposal to continue the ban on promotional advertising. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. opposed the ban on First Amendment grounds. After reviewing the public comments, the Commission extended the prohibition in a Policy Statement issued on February 25, 1977. The Policy Statement divided advertising expenses into promotional and institutional categories. It permitted informational advertising designed to encourage shifts of consumption from peak demand times to periods of low electricity demand. The Commission banned promotional advertising because additional electricity would be more expensive to produce and promotional advertising would give misleading signals to the public. Central Hudson challenged the order in state court. The order was upheld through the New York Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and reversed.
View caseA court applies relaxed scrutiny to classifications that are not suspect, such as those based on age or certain immigration distinctions. The government need only show a rational relationship to a legitimate interest, and the classification may be underinclusive or overinclusive.
Yes. Courts generally apply at most relaxed scrutiny to federal immigration and foreign-affairs measures because of deference to the political branches. A facially neutral order with a rational security purpose survives even if earlier statements suggest improper motive.
Relaxed scrutiny requires only a rational basis, while gender classifications receive intermediate scrutiny that demands an exceedingly persuasive justification and a substantial relationship to an important interest. Age or immigration rules that receive relaxed scrutiny need not meet this higher bar.
Yes. Under relaxed scrutiny a law may be overinclusive or underinclusive so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate purpose. Courts defer to legislative judgments and do not require a perfect fit between means and ends.
…the ground that "[t]he crafting and safeguarding of public morality . . . indisputably is a legitimate government interest under rational basis scrutiny"); Milner v. Apfel , 148 F. 3d 812, 814 (CA7 1998) (citing Bowers for the proposition that "[l]egislatures are permitted to legislate with regard to morality . . . rather than confined…