Also known as: Religion Clause · Establishment Clause · Free Exercise Clause
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
The two provisions in the First Amendment that together bar the government from establishing religion or prohibiting its free exercise. These clauses protect religious voluntarism and equality by committing the preservation of religious beliefs to the private sphere rather than allowing the state to prescribe or proscribe them. The clauses interact to require neutrality toward religion while permitting some play in the joints between their competing demands.
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Renee Rogers belongs to a religious group that performs animal sacrifice as part of its ceremonies. City officials enact an ordinance that singles out the precise method of slaughter used in those ceremonies while leaving other forms of animal killing untouched. The ordinance prevents Renee from conducting the required rituals and she challenges the law as a violation of her religious rights.
Rebecca Ross loses her job after using a controlled substance during a religious ceremony. State officials apply a neutral criminal prohibition and deny her unemployment benefits under a generally applicable rule. Rebecca claims the denial burdens her religious practice and seeks an exemption from the law.
Ryan Roberts, a foreign national from a majority-Muslim country, seeks entry to the United States to practice law. An executive order bars entry from several such countries on stated national security grounds. Ryan challenges the order as an improper religious preference despite the order's facial neutrality.
Regina Robinson withdraws her children from public school after eighth grade to provide religiously required vocational training and study at home. State officials enforce compulsory attendance laws and seek to return the children to formal schooling. Regina asserts that the enforcement substantially burdens her family's religious practices.
Riverfront Developments receives public funds for campaign-related activities under a statutory scheme. Taxpayers object that the funding forces them to support speech they oppose, drawing an analogy to compelled support for religion. The developers defend the program as a permissible government appropriation.
Rosa Ruiz seeks to build a religious facility but local zoning rules block the project. Congress enacts a statute purporting to require strict scrutiny for such burdens on religious exercise. City officials argue that the statute cannot alter the substantive constitutional standard governing neutral land-use regulations.
A law triggers strict scrutiny when it is not neutral or generally applicable and was enacted to suppress religious practice. Courts then require the government to show the law is necessary to achieve a compelling interest. Neutral laws that incidentally burden religion do not receive this heightened review.
The Free Exercise Clause requires the state to treat religious schools the same as nonreligious schools in neutral programs. The Establishment Clause does not bar equal inclusion of religious options when the benefit reaches schools through private choice. Exclusion based solely on religious character violates neutrality.
…says, between allowing a patchwork of exemptions that would hinder its law enforcement efforts, and risking a violation of the Establishment Clause by arbitrarily limiting its religious exemptions. This argument, however, could be made in almost any free exercise case. See Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free…
…made by Congress uses public money in a manner to which some taxpayers object. Appellants next argue that "by analogy" to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment public financing of election campaigns, however meritorious, violates the First Amendment. We have, of course, held that the
…publicschool students to leave school grounds during school hours to receive religious instruction does not violate the Establishment Clause
…States. I agree, and I also believe that RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to the Federal Government because it violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Dissenting opinions Dissenting opinion by Justice O’Connor I dissent from the Court’s opinion. The Court today strikes down RFRA as applied to the States.…
…must not ignore the danger that an exception from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no matter how vital it may be to the protection of values promoted by the right of
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Courts apply at most rational basis review and give substantial deference to the political branches. An order survives if it states a legitimate national security purpose rationally related to the restrictions. Extrinsic statements suggesting improper motive do not override the facial rationale under this deferential standard.
Exemptions are required when the law substantially burdens sincere religious practices of parents who demonstrate a self-sufficient community whose alternative education satisfies state interests. The clause protects the right to direct religious upbringing in such circumstances.
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