Also known as: religious exemption · religion exemptions
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Exceptions from generally applicable laws granted to accommodate religious practices. The Free Exercise Clause does not require such exemptions when a neutral law incidentally burdens religious conduct, but the presence of discretionary secular exemptions renders the law not generally applicable and triggers strict scrutiny.
Roberto Reyes, a member of a Native American church, was fired after using peyote during a religious ceremony. The state denied his unemployment claim under a criminal prohibition on the drug that applied to all workers. The court upheld the denial because the prohibition was neutral and generally applicable.
Rachel Ramirez's religious organization sought a property tax exemption for its meeting hall. The city granted the exemption along with similar relief for secular nonprofits. The court upheld the exemption as a permissible accommodation that did not single out religion for special benefit.
Roger Ramirez owned a closely held corporation whose religious beliefs opposed providing certain contraceptive coverage. Federal law required the coverage, but less restrictive alternatives existed. The court granted an exemption under RFRA because the mandate failed strict scrutiny as applied.
Renata Russo operated a family business whose owners held religious objections to contraceptive coverage. Federal regulations required the coverage without a less restrictive alternative. The court held that RFRA entitled the business to an exemption from the mandate.
In 2012 and 2013, three closely held for-profit corporations—Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Mardel, Inc., and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp.—along with their owners, the Green and Hahn families, filed suits against the Secretary of Health and Human Services and other federal officials. Hobby Lobby operates over 500 stores with more than 13,000 employees. Mardel runs 35 Christian bookstores with nearly 400 employees. Conestoga employs about 950 people in its woodworking business. The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby and Mardel. The Hahn family owns and operates Conestoga. Both families hold sincere Christian religious beliefs that life begins at conception. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, employers with 50 or more full-time employees must provide group health insurance covering certain preventive services for women, including 20 FDA-approved contraceptive methods, without cost sharing. The Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations requiring coverage of all 20 methods. The Greens and Hahns object specifically to four methods because they believe these may prevent implantation of a fertilized egg, which they view as destroying an embryo in violation of their faith. If the companies fail to provide the required coverage, they face penalties of $100 per day per affected employee, potentially reaching $475 million annually for Hobby Lobby, $33 million for Conestoga, and $15 million for Mardel. Alternatively, dropping coverage entirely could trigger penalties of $2,000 per employee per year. The companies and owners sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, seeking to enjoin the mandate as applied to the four objected-to methods. The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied a preliminary injunction to the Greens and their companies. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the corporations could assert RFRA claims. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the District Court denied a preliminary injunction to the Hahns and Conestoga. The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion under RFRA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases.
Rowan Russell, a baker, declined to create a custom cake for a same-sex wedding on religious grounds. State officials applied an antidiscrimination law that permitted other secular exceptions. The court required consideration of a religious exemption under strict scrutiny.
Raymond Ramos and other Amish parents withdrew their children from school after eighth grade for religious vocational training. State law required attendance until age sixteen. The court granted an exemption because the community's self-sufficient alternative education satisfied state interests.
A policy is not generally applicable when officials may grant case-by-case exemptions for secular reasons such as operational hardship. Once that occurs, the government must satisfy strict scrutiny before denying a comparable religious exemption. The presence of individualized discretion creates the risk of discriminatory application against religious exercise.
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…not protect an interest of the highest order. The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind — ranging from compulsory military service, see, e. g., Gillette v. United States , 401 U. S. 437 (1971), to the payment of taxes,…
…what it says . . . , many laws will not meet the test. . . . [The test] would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind." Id. , at 888. Laws valid under Smith would fall under RFRA without regard to whether they had the object of stifling or…
…but also because no analysis of religious-liberty claims can take place in a vacuum. If the parents in this case are allowed a religious exemption, the inevitable effect is to impose the parents' notions of
…be unenforceable as a result of the secret nature of the Santeria religion. Id. , at 1486-1487, and nn. 57-59. A
…to flourish or wither, without being burdened by real property taxes. III Although governmental purposes for granting religious exemptions may be wholly secular,
The Clause requires an exemption when parents demonstrate sincere religious beliefs against formal secondary education, the community is law-abiding and self-sufficient, and the alternative training meets the state's core educational objectives. Strict enforcement would impose a substantial burden that is not justified when the alternative already satisfies state interests.
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A state may deny benefits when the rotation policy is neutral and generally applicable and does not target religion. The Free Exercise Clause does not mandate a religious exemption from such rules even when they incidentally burden sincere religious practice.
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The policy loses general applicability and must satisfy strict scrutiny. The government cannot justify denying a religious exemption when it has already created flexibility for comparable secular reasons without showing a compelling interest pursued through the least restrictive means.
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