Also known as: replegiare · repleviable · replevisable · replevisor · replevy · replevied · replevying · replevin action · writ of replevin
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An action to recover possession of specific personal property wrongfully taken or detained together with damages for its detention.
Ravi Reddy prepaid Radiance Media for custom-engraved commemorative coins that the seller had already minted and tagged for his account. When gold prices rose the seller repudiated and refused delivery. Ravi filed an action to obtain the specific coins themselves rather than money damages.
A bankruptcy trustee discovered that the debtor had transferred a valuable machine to Granfinanciera shortly before filing. The trustee brought an action styled as replevin to recover the chattel itself rather than seeking only a money judgment.
The Chase & Sanborn Corporation filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1983. A plan approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida then vested in respondent Nordberg, the trustee in bankruptcy, causes of action for fraudulent conveyances. In 1985 respondent filed suit against petitioners Granfinanciera, S. A., and Medex, Ltda., in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging that petitioners had received $1.7 million from Chase & Sanborn's corporate predecessor within one year of the bankruptcy petition without receiving consideration or reasonably equivalent value. The complaint sought to avoid the transfers and recover damages under 11 U. S. C. §§ 548(a)(1) and (a)(2), 550(a)(1) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). The District Court referred the proceedings to the Bankruptcy Court. Over five months later respondent served a summons on petitioners in Bogota, Colombia shortly before the Colombian Government nationalized Granfinanciera. In their answer both petitioners requested a trial by jury on all issues so triable. The Bankruptcy Judge denied petitioners' request for a jury trial, deeming a suit to recover a fraudulent transfer a core action that originally, under the English common law, as I understand it, was a non-jury issue. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed with prejudice respondent's actual fraud claim but entered judgment for respondent on the constructive fraud claim in the amount of $1,500,000 against Granfinanciera and $180,000 against Medex. The District Court affirmed without discussing petitioners' claim that they were entitled to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also affirmed, 835 F. 2d 1341 (1988), ruling that petitioners lacked a statutory right to a jury trial because the constructive fraud provision contains no mention of such a right and 28 U. S. C. § 1411 affords jury trials only in personal injury or wrongful death suits, and that the Seventh Amendment supplied no right because fraudulent conveyance actions are equitable in nature and bankruptcy proceedings are inherently equitable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether petitioners were entitled to a jury trial, 486 U. S. 1054 (1988), and now reverses.
View caseRachel Ramirez discovered that two paintings stolen from her gallery decades earlier were now in the possession of Ralph Richardson. She filed a replevin action to obtain return of the specific canvases rather than damages.
Georgia O'Keeffe, a renowned artist, had three paintings stolen from An American Place gallery in New York in March 1946. The gallery was operated by her husband Alfred Stieglitz. The paintings subject to this action are "Seaweed" and "Cliffs," with a third painting "Fragments" also missing. O'Keeffe did not report the theft to the police or advertise the loss, though she discussed it with associates. Stieglitz died in the summer of 1946. In 1947 O'Keeffe retained Doris Bry to help settle the estate. Bry urged reporting the loss, but O'Keeffe declined. In 1972, O'Keeffe authorized Bry to report the theft to the Art Dealers Association of America, Inc., which maintains a registry of stolen paintings. In September 1975, O'Keeffe learned that the paintings were in the Andrew Crispo Gallery in New York on consignment from Bernard Danenberg Galleries. On February 11, 1976, O'Keeffe discovered that Ulrich A. Frank had sold the paintings to Barry Snyder for $35,000. She demanded their return, but Snyder refused. O'Keeffe filed her complaint for replevin in March 1976 against Snyder, who impleaded Frank as a third-party defendant. The trial court granted summary judgment to Snyder on the ground that the action was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed and entered judgment for O'Keeffe. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification to consider the issues. Frank traces his possession of the paintings to his father, Dr. Frank, who died in 1968, claiming to have seen them in his father's apartment as early as 1941-1943. Snyder purchased the paintings from Frank in 1975. There are factual disputes regarding the circumstances of the paintings' disappearance and acquisition.
View caseA state statute permitted ex parte issuance of a replevin writ upon a creditor’s affidavit alone. The debtor challenged the procedure under the Due Process Clause and argued that a prior hearing was required before the property could be taken.
George Eldridge was first awarded Social Security disability benefits in June 1968. In March 1972 he received a questionnaire from the state agency charged with monitoring his medical condition. He completed and returned the questionnaire, indicating that his condition had not improved and identifying recent medical sources. The state agency obtained reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant. After reviewing those reports and other information in his file, the agency sent Eldridge a letter stating that it had made a tentative determination that his disability had ceased in May 1972. The letter included a statement of reasons for the proposed termination and advised Eldridge that he could request time to submit additional information. Eldridge responded in writing, disputing one characterization of his medical condition and asserting that the agency already possessed sufficient evidence of his disability. The state agency then made a final determination that Eldridge had ceased to be disabled in May 1972; the Social Security Administration accepted that determination. In July 1972 Eldridge received written notice that his benefits would terminate after that month and that he could seek reconsideration by the state agency within six months. Instead of requesting reconsideration, Eldridge filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. He challenged the constitutionality of the Secretary's termination procedures and sought an injunction barring termination of benefits until a pretermination evidentiary hearing was provided, together with immediate reinstatement of benefits. The District Court held that the existing procedures violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, ordered the Secretary to provide Eldridge a pretermination hearing, and directed reinstatement of benefits pending that hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard the case.
View caseRaymond Ramos purchased multiple appliances under a single installment contract containing a cross-collateral clause. After default the seller initiated replevin to recover every item still in his possession even though some payments had been completed on individual pieces.
Appellee Walker-Thomas Furniture Company operates a retail furniture store in the District of Columbia. During the period from 1957 to 1962, each appellant purchased several household items from the company, with payment to be made in installments. The terms of each purchase appeared in a printed form contract that set forth the value of the item and purported to lease it to the purchaser for a stipulated monthly rent payment. Title remained in the company until the total of all monthly payments equaled the stated value, after which the purchaser could take title. In the event of default on any monthly installment, the company could repossess the item. The contract further provided that the amount of each periodical installment payment would be inclusive of and not in addition to payments under prior leases, and that all payments made would be credited pro rata on all outstanding leases, bills, and accounts due the company. This provision kept a balance due on every item purchased until the balance due on all items was liquidated. As a result, the debt from each purchase was secured by the right to repossess all items previously purchased by the same buyer, and each new item became subject to a security interest from previous dealings. On May 12, 1962, appellant Thorne purchased a Daveno, three tables, and two lamps with a total stated value of $391.10. Shortly after this purchase, Thorne defaulted on the monthly payments, leading the company to seek replevin of all items purchased since the first transaction in 1958. On April 17, 1962, appellant Williams bought a stereo set of stated value $514.95. At that time her account showed a balance of $164 from prior purchases. The total of all purchases over the years came to $1,800 with total payments of $1,400. Williams also defaulted shortly thereafter, prompting the company to seek replevin of all items purchased since December 1957. The Court of General Sessions granted judgment for the company in these cases. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments. This court granted the appellants' motion for leave to appeal. Prior to the last purchase by Williams, she had reduced her account balance to $164. The reverse side of the stereo contract listed the name of her social worker and her $218 monthly stipend from the government. At the time of the purchases, the company was aware of Williams's financial position and her need to support herself and seven children on that amount.
View caseRicardo Rojas agreed to buy a cow from Rita Russell believing it to be barren. When the seller later discovered the animal was pregnant she refused delivery and Rojas brought replevin to obtain possession of that specific cow.
In May 1886, T. C. Sherwood, a banker living in Plymouth in Wayne County, Michigan, sought to purchase cattle from Hiram Walker & Sons. The defendants resided in Detroit, conducted business at Walkerville, Ontario, and maintained a farm at Greenfield in Wayne County where they kept blooded polled Angus cattle that they believed were barren. On May 5, 1886, Sherwood visited the Greenfield farm after the defendants informed him they had a few head there that were probably barren and would not breed. A few days later Sherwood negotiated with one of the defendants for the purchase of the cow known as Rose 2d of Aberlone. On May 15, 1886, the parties reached final agreement by telephone that Sherwood would pay five and one-half cents per pound live weight less fifty pounds shrinkage. That same day the defendants sent Sherwood a letter confirming the sale and enclosing an order directing George Graham to deliver the cow at King’s cattle-yard, send a halter, and have her weighed. On May 19, 1886, Sherwood wrote Graham that he would collect the cow the following morning and instructed that she not be watered. On May 20 the defendants learned from Graham that the cow appeared to be with calf, telegraphed Sherwood that they could not sell her, and instructed Graham not to deliver. On May 21 Sherwood presented the order and letter to Graham, who refused delivery; Sherwood then tendered eighty dollars to Hiram Walker, who refused both the money and the cow. Sherwood commenced a replevin action in justice’s court and obtained judgment. The defendants appealed to the circuit court of Wayne County, where a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. After securing possession under the writ, Sherwood caused the cow to be weighed at 1,420 pounds at a location other than King’s cattle-yard. The cow gave birth to a calf in October 1886. At the time of the transaction both parties believed the cow was barren; she had cost the defendants $850 and, if capable of breeding, would have been worth between $750 and $1,000.
View caseThe plaintiff must establish a right to immediate possession of the specific personal property and that the defendant is wrongfully detaining it. The action restores the chattel itself rather than awarding its value as damages.
A buyer may replevy goods identified to the contract when the seller fails to deliver or repudiates and the buyer cannot reasonably cover or the goods are unique. Identification alone is sufficient for consumer goods once a special property interest vests.
Supporting sources
When state procedure authorizes ex parte seizure the creditor must still demonstrate a probable right to the property and a risk that the property will be unavailable after judgment. An opportunity to be heard must be provided promptly after seizure.
Supporting sources
Replevin restores possession of the specific chattel to the plaintiff. Conversion awards damages measured by the property’s value and transfers title to the defendant upon satisfaction of the judgment.
…of wages, was entirely silent on the matter. In Fuentes v. Shevin , 407 U. S., at 96-97, the Court said only that in a replevin suit between two private parties the initial determination required something more than an ex parte proceeding before a court clerk. Similarly, Bell v. Burson, supra , at 540, held, in…