Also known as: res immobilis · immovables · immovable property
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Immovable property consisting of land and things so attached to land as to be regarded as part of it under applicable law. The classification distinguishes such property from movable items whose location can be changed.
Dana, a director at GreenEarth Conservancy, secretly executed a deed conveying a preserved wetland parcel owned by Rivershed Mitigation Trust to a development company in which she held a hidden interest. The transfer occurred without authority and for her personal benefit. Under the governing theft statute the act constituted an unlawful disposition of immovable property.
River Ocean purchased coastal property in State B under a contract designating State A law. Jeremy later claimed a prescriptive easement based on decades of use entirely within State B. The court evaluated contacts to determine which state's rules governed interests in the immovable.
After a land sale closed, the buyer and seller disputed whether a prior use created an easement. Both parties had consulted counsel and formed expectations in State A, yet the land lay in State B. The court weighed the need to protect justified expectations against the situs state's interest in its own property rules.
A State A court faced a dispute over title to land located in State B. The court applied the totality of State B law, including its choice-of-law rules, to reach the same result a State B court would reach on the actual facts.
After a Louisiana decedent's death, heirs litigated rights to land situated in the state. The court applied Louisiana rules classifying the property as an immovable and determining succession accordingly.
Lou Bertha Patterson gave birth to Rita Vincent on March 15, 1962, in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana. On May 10, 1962, Patterson and Ezra Vincent jointly executed a Louisiana State Board of Health form before a notary public acknowledging that Vincent was the natural father of the child. This acknowledgment occurred under Louisiana procedures but did not alter the child's status for purposes of intestate succession. Ezra Vincent died intestate on September 16, 1968, in Rapides Parish, Louisiana, leaving substantial property within the state but no will to direct its distribution. Lou Bertha Labine, as guardian and tutrix of Rita Vincent, petitioned the state court for the appointment of an administrator for Vincent's estate, a declaration that Rita Vincent was the sole heir, and an order directing support and maintenance payments for the child. In the alternative, the petition sought a declaration of entitlement to $150 per month in support under Louisiana law. The administrator of the succession answered the petition by claiming that Vincent's relatives were entitled to the entire estate. The trial court ruled that the father's collateral relations took the property and dismissed the petition with costs. It also denied the support claim in light of Social Security payments of $60 per month and Veterans Administration payments of $40 per month available to the child. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, affirmed the judgment, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana denied a petition for writ of certiorari. The child's guardian appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseA husband unilaterally mortgaged jointly owned Louisiana land. The wife challenged the transaction, and the court examined state rules governing interests in immovables within the community property regime.
In 1974, Joan Feenstra filed a criminal complaint against her husband Harold Feenstra charging him with molesting their minor daughter. While incarcerated on that charge, Harold retained attorney Karl Kirchberg to represent him and signed a $3,000 promissory note for legal services. To secure the note, Harold executed a mortgage on the couple's jointly owned home without informing his wife or obtaining her consent, relying on former Article 2404 of the Louisiana Civil Code. After Joan dropped the charge, Harold obtained a legal separation and moved out of state. Joan first learned of the mortgage in 1976 when Kirchberg threatened foreclosure unless she paid the outstanding amount on the note. Upon her refusal to pay, Kirchberg obtained an order of executory process directing the local sheriff to seize and sell the home. Kirchberg filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana seeking a declaratory judgment that he was not liable under the Truth in Lending Act for nondisclosures regarding the mortgage. In her answer, Joan asserted counterclaims including one challenging the constitutionality of the statutory scheme allowing her husband to execute the mortgage unilaterally. The State of Louisiana and its Governor were joined as third-party defendants on the constitutional counterclaim. The District Court granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the constitutional counterclaim. While Joan's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was pending, the Louisiana Legislature revised its community property laws to grant spouses equal control over the disposition of such property, with the changes effective January 1, 1980. The Court of Appeals held that Article 2404 violated the Equal Protection Clause but limited its decision to prospective application. Only Kirchberg appealed to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseYes. Statutes modeled on Model Penal Code section 223.2(2) make it theft to unlawfully transfer immovable property of another or any interest therein with purpose to benefit oneself or another not entitled to the benefit. Leasehold interests qualify as interests in immovable property.
For immovables the reference is to the law of the state where the land is located, including that state's choice-of-law rules, so that a forum court reaches the same result a court of the situs would reach.
When two or more states have identical local law rules on the issue, contacts located in those states are treated as if grouped in a single state for choice-of-law purposes.
…religious and charitable purposes; "(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; "(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and "(d) to administer such property in accordance with law." See 1 Chaudhri, Constitutional Rights and Limitations (1955), 875. This Article does not, however, appear to have completely…