residuary estate

In 1930 a New York resident created a revocable trust that was amended in 1931. The trust directed income from the corpus to his wife for life. It also granted her a general power of appointment. In default of appointment half the corpus passed to the decedent's heirs and half to the wife's heirs. In 1951 the wife executed an instrument that purported to release the general power and convert it into a special power. The decedent died in 1957. His estate claimed a marital deduction for the widow's trust on the federal estate tax return. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction under section 2056(b)(5) of the 1954 Code and assessed a deficiency. The estate petitioned the Tax Court for redetermination. While that proceeding was pending the estate obtained a New York Supreme Court decree declaring the 1951 release a nullity. The Tax Court accepted the decree as controlling and allowed the deduction. A divided Second Circuit affirmed. The companion case involved the estate of a Connecticut decedent who died in 1958. His will directed payment of estate taxes without proration and created a residuary trust granting his wife a general testamentary power of appointment. The Commissioner disallowed part of the marital deduction. The executor then obtained a probate court order applying the state proration statute. The District Court refused to treat the probate decree as binding on federal tax questions. The Second Circuit agreed the decree was not conclusive. The two cases reached the Supreme Court after the Second Circuit panels reached differing conclusions on the effect of the state decrees. Certiorari was granted to resolve the conflict among the circuits.

In 1902, a trust indenture established Kingsbury Place as a private subdivision in St. Louis, with covenants requiring maintenance as desirable residence property of the highest class. The indenture empowers trustees and property owners to enforce its provisions against encroachment or injury. Except for one vacant lot, the subdivision features spacious two and three-story homes used exclusively as private residences. Louise Woodruff Johnston, owner of the house at #4 Kingsbury Place, died on January 14, 1973. Her will directed the executor, Mercantile Trust Co., to cause the home to be razed and the land sold, with proceeds transferred to the residue of the estate. Following Johnston's death, neighboring property owners and trustees for the Kingsbury Place Subdivision filed suit against the executor seeking an injunction to prevent demolition of the house. The plaintiffs contended that razing the home would adversely affect their property rights and the community. During trial, uncontradicted testimony established that the current value of the house and land totaled $40,000, while the empty lot would fetch no more than $5,000 after $4,350 in demolition costs. The St. Louis Commission on Landmarks and Urban Design had designated Kingsbury Place as a city landmark due to its architectural significance. Witnesses testified that demolition would depreciate adjoining property values by an estimated $10,000 and create a break in the urban design continuity. The trial court dissolved the temporary restraining order and ruled against the plaintiffs on all issues. The plaintiffs then appealed the denial of their petition to the Missouri Court of Appeals.

Howard Mahoney died intestate on May 6, 1961, of gunshot wounds. His wife, Charlotte Mahoney, was tried for the murder of Howard Mahoney in the Addison County Court and was convicted by jury of the crime of manslaughter in March, 1962. She is presently serving a sentence of not less than 12 nor more than 15 years at the Women’s Reformatory in Rutland. Howard Mahoney left no issue, and was survived by his wife and his father and mother. His father, Mark Mahoney, was appointed administrator of his estate which at the present time amounts to $3,885.89. After due notice and hearing, the Probate Court for the District of Franklin entered a judgment order decreeing the residue of the Estate of Howard Mahoney, in equal shares, to the father and mother of the decedent. An appeal from the judgment order and decree has been taken here by the appellant widow. The cause now before us is here on a direct appeal from the Probate Court. Findings of fact were made below from which it appears that the judgment of the probate court decreeing the estate of Howard Mahoney to his parents, rather than to his widow, was based upon a finding of the felonious killing of her husband by Mrs. Mahoney. The Probate Court used the record of the conviction of the appellant for manslaughter for its determination that the appellant had feloniously killed her husband. In Vermont, an indictment for murder can result in a jury conviction on either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. The legislature has provided the sentences that may be passed upon a person convicted of manslaughter, but provides no definition of that offense, nor any statutory distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.

The will on its face contained a residuary bequest to the defendant that expressly required him to distribute all the property bequeathed to him. It granted him no discretion on whether to distribute it and allowed discretion only as to the manner of distribution pursuant to the testatrix's intentions. No other written instrument was signed by the testatrix and made part of the will by reference. Before, at the time of, and after the execution of the will, the testatrix orally made known to the defendant her wish and intention that the residue should be disposed of and distributed by him as executor for charitable uses and purposes according to his discretion and judgment. She directed him to do so while especially expressing her desires as to the objects to be preferred. The defendant stated these oral communications in his answer, and the plaintiffs admitted the facts to be true. The matter was presented to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts on the facts agreed by the parties, with the court entering a decree for the plaintiffs.