Also known as: retreat rule · retreat rules · no-retreat rule · no-retreat rules · duty to retreat · stand your ground · stand-your-ground rule
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A set of common-law rules determining whether a person threatened with deadly force must attempt to withdraw before resorting to deadly force in self-defense. In the minority of jurisdictions following the traditional approach a defender must retreat as far as reasonably possible if the retreat can be accomplished in complete safety. Recognized exceptions eliminate the duty when the attack occurs in the defender's own home, while the defender is making a lawful arrest, or while the assailant is committing a robbery.
Riley Rivera returns to the townhouse she has rented for five years and finds an intruder rifling through drawers. The intruder turns and advances while holding a metal object. Rivera steps back into the hallway but grabs a lamp and strikes the intruder fatally rather than exiting through the rear door. Because the confrontation occurred inside her dwelling the no-retreat exception applies and her self-defense claim is preserved.
Renee Rogers stands in a dressing room when Victor demands control of a locked trunk and advances aggressively. An open hallway leads to a secure empty corridor. Rogers could step into the hallway or surrender the trunk but instead strikes Victor with a heavy microphone stand causing serious injury. The availability of complete safety by retreating or complying removes justification for the use of deadly force.
Raymond Ramos and a coworker argue in the service bay where both regularly work. The coworker leaves then returns holding a raised wrench and advances toward Ramos. An open side door offers an unobstructed exit. Ramos strikes the coworker with a tire iron without attempting to leave. Because the location is a shared workplace and Ramos could have retreated safely the duty to retreat applies.
This was a writ of error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas sentencing the plaintiff in error to death for the murder of Philip Henson, a white man, in the Cherokee Nation of the Indian Territory. The defendant was tried and convicted in 1893, and upon such conviction being set aside by this court, 150 U. S. 551, was again tried and convicted in 1894. The case was again reversed, 157 U. S. 675, when Allen was tried for the third time and convicted, and this writ of error was sued out. The facts are so fully set forth in the previous reports of the case that it is unnecessary to repeat them here. We are somewhat embarrassed in the consideration of this case by the voluminousness of the charge, and of the exceptions taken thereto, as well as by the absence of a brief on the part of the plaintiff in error.
View caseRobert Rivera is charged with murder after shooting an intruder inside his apartment. The state places the burden on Rivera to prove he had no safe avenue of retreat. Rivera shows the confrontation occurred entirely within his dwelling. The home exception eliminates any duty to retreat and the burden allocation does not alter the outcome.
On July 21, 1983, petitioner Earline Martin and her husband, Walter Martin, argued over grocery money. Petitioner claimed that her husband struck her in the head during the argument. Petitioner's version of what then transpired was that she went upstairs, put on a robe, and later came back down with her husband's gun which she intended to dispose of. Her husband saw something in her hand and questioned her about it. He came at her, and she lost her head and fired the gun at him. Five or six shots were fired, three of them striking and killing Mr. Martin. She was charged with and tried for aggravated murder. She pleaded self-defense and testified in her own defense. The judge charged the jury with respect to the elements of the crime and of self-defense and rejected petitioner's Due Process Clause challenge to the charge placing on her the burden of proving self-defense. The jury found her guilty. Both the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the conviction. Both rejected the constitutional challenge to the instruction requiring petitioner to prove self-defense. The latter court, relying upon Patterson v. New York, concluded that the State was required to prove the three elements of aggravated murder but that Patterson did not require it to disprove self-defense. The court said, "the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant purposely, and with prior calculation and design, caused the death of her husband. Appellant did not dispute the existence of these elements, but rather sought to justify her actions on grounds she acted in self defense." The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 475 U.S. 1119 (1986).
Roger Ramirez participates in an armed robbery but claims he later acted in self-defense when the victim resisted. Ramirez knew he could have withdrawn from the scene before the fatal shot. The prosecution shows Ramirez's continued presence and failure to retreat negate any self-defense justification. The evidence of intent and the retreat rule together defeat the claim.
Justus Rosemond participated in a drug transaction arranged by Vashti Perez to sell a pound of marijuana to Ricardo Gonzales and Coby Painter. Perez drove to a local park accompanied by Ronald Joseph and Rosemond to complete the exchange. Upon arrival, Gonzales entered the backseat of the vehicle to inspect the marijuana while Painter remained outside. Instead of paying, Gonzales punched the backseat passenger and fled with the drugs. As Gonzales and Painter ran away, one of the male passengers exited the car and fired several shots from a semiautomatic handgun before the three individuals pursued the buyers in their vehicle. A police officer responding to a dispatcher's alert pulled over the car before the pursuers could catch Gonzales and Painter. The Government subsequently charged Rosemond with violating 18 U.S.C. §924(c) by using a gun in connection with a drug trafficking crime or, alternatively, aiding and abetting that offense under 18 U.S.C. §2. Because the identity of the shooter remained disputed, the prosecution pursued both theories at trial: that Rosemond himself fired the weapon or that he aided and abetted Joseph's use of the firearm. At trial, the District Judge instructed the jury on aiding and abetting principles. A person aids or abets if he willfully and knowingly associates himself with the crime and seeks by some act to help make it succeed. The judge further instructed that Rosemond could be convicted of aiding and abetting the §924(c) offense if he knew his cohort used a firearm in the drug trafficking crime and knowingly and actively participated in the drug trafficking crime. Rosemond had proposed an alternative instruction requiring that he intentionally took action to facilitate or encourage the use of the firearm specifically. The jury convicted Rosemond of the §924(c) violation along with other offenses, resulting in a consecutive 120-month sentence for that count. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction, upholding the District Court's aiding and abetting instructions against Rosemond's challenge. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the requirements for aiding and abetting liability under these circumstances.
The castle doctrine removes any duty to retreat when the attack occurs inside the defender's own home. Long-term exclusive residential use, payment of rent, and maintenance of the premises establish the dwelling status even if legal title belongs to another party. The exception applies once the location predicate is satisfied regardless of available exits.
Supporting sources
…bodily harm, and that her only means of escape from such danger was in the use of . . . force,” and (3) she “did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid danger.” Ibid. Martin argued that due process did not permit the State to impose the burden of proving self-defense on her, because proving self-defense would necessarily negate…
…turned and confronted her attacker instead of escaping. While we do not overrule our earlier holdings that a party has no duty to retreat from a confrontation, we believe the possibility of escape should be a recognized factor in determining whether deadly force was necessary to avoid death or great bodily harm. See State v.…
…might repel the attempt by force, and was under no obligation to retreat if the deceased attacked him with a knife. The general duty to retreat
…is for sanctuary and shelter, and shelter, if not sanctuary, is in the home. That there is, in such a situation, no duty to retreat is, we think, the settled law in the United States as in England. It was so held by the United States Supreme Court in Beard v. United States (158 U. S. 550). In that case there was a…
…No. 95-01121, on rehearing from 701 So.2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). We rephrase the question as follows: SHOULD THE LAW IMPOSE A DUTY TO RETREAT FROM THE RESIDENCE BEFORE A DEFENDANT MAY JUSTIFIABLY RESORT TO DEADLY FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST A CO-OCCUPANT, IF THAT FORCE IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT DEATH OR GREAT BODILY HARM? As…
A defendant must show that retreat was possible as far as reasonably necessary and could be accomplished in complete safety. Knowledge of a safe exit or the ability to surrender property to a person asserting a claim of right defeats justification for deadly force. The rule applies unless a recognized exception such as the home or arrest exception is established.
Supporting sources
The duty to retreat generally applies in a shared workplace when the defender knows the assailant also works there and the defender was the initial aggressor. An open exit that permits withdrawal in complete safety triggers the obligation. The rule distinguishes dwellings from shared work spaces to avoid unnecessary violence among co-workers.
Supporting sources
Once the home exception attaches the safety limitation on retreat does not independently require withdrawal. The rule focuses on the physical location of the attack rather than the availability of possible avenues of escape. Policy considerations favor protecting occupants who cannot realistically flee their own dwelling.
Supporting sources