Also known as: retreats to the wall · duty to retreat
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A common law rule in self-defense requiring a person to retreat as far as reasonably possible before using deadly force if the retreat can be accomplished in complete safety. The rule applies unless a recognized exception eliminates the obligation to withdraw. The principal exception is an attack occurring in the defender's own home.
Roland Rhodes stood inside his living room when an intruder climbed through a broken window and advanced with a knife. Rhodes drew a firearm and fired once, killing the intruder. Because the confrontation occurred inside his dwelling, Rhodes had no obligation to withdraw before using deadly force.
Roger Ramirez worked at a repair shop when a coworker shoved him against a vehicle and raised a wrench. Ramirez picked up a tire iron and struck the coworker's arm. The shared workspace meant Ramirez was required to attempt safe withdrawal before resorting to force.
Riley Rivera encountered an armed assailant on a city sidewalk. Rivera could have stepped into a nearby doorway without increasing his danger. Because a safe avenue existed, Rivera was obligated to withdraw before employing deadly force.
This was a writ of error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas sentencing the plaintiff in error to death for the murder of Philip Henson, a white man, in the Cherokee Nation of the Indian Territory. The defendant was tried and convicted in 1893, and upon such conviction being set aside by this court, 150 U. S. 551, was again tried and convicted in 1894. The case was again reversed, 157 U. S. 675, when Allen was tried for the third time and convicted, and this writ of error was sued out. The facts are so fully set forth in the previous reports of the case that it is unnecessary to repeat them here. We are somewhat embarrassed in the consideration of this case by the voluminousness of the charge, and of the exceptions taken thereto, as well as by the absence of a brief on the part of the plaintiff in error.
View caseRenee Rogers stood trial for murder after shooting an attacker in a public park. The state required her to prove she could not retreat safely. The jury evaluated whether a reasonable path of withdrawal existed before deadly force became necessary.
This was a writ of error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas sentencing the plaintiff in error to death for the murder of Philip Henson, a white man, in the Cherokee Nation of the Indian Territory. The defendant was tried and convicted in 1893, and upon such conviction being set aside by this court, 150 U. S. 551, was again tried and convicted in 1894. The case was again reversed, 157 U. S. 675, when Allen was tried for the third time and convicted, and this writ of error was sued out. The facts are so fully set forth in the previous reports of the case that it is unnecessary to repeat them here. We are somewhat embarrassed in the consideration of this case by the voluminousness of the charge, and of the exceptions taken thereto, as well as by the absence of a brief on the part of the plaintiff in error.
View caseRosa Ruiz participated in a planned confrontation that escalated into violence. She claimed self-defense but had not attempted withdrawal. The court examined whether her prior intent affected the availability of the retreat obligation.
The duty does not apply when the attack occurs inside the defender's own home. The defender need not retreat if doing so cannot be accomplished in complete safety.
Supporting sources
The exception applies when the attack occurs inside the defender's own home.
Supporting sources
The retreat obligation reinforces the necessity element by requiring the defender to avoid deadly force when a safe exit exists. If retreat is possible in complete safety, the use of deadly force is not necessary and therefore unjustified.
Supporting sources
…bodily harm, and that her only means of escape from such danger was in the use of . . . force,” and (3) she “did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid danger.” Ibid. Martin argued that due process did not permit the State to impose the burden of proving self-defense on her, because proving self-defense would necessarily negate…