Also known as: rights to contribution · right of contribution · contribution right
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A right held by one joint tortfeasor who has paid more than an equitable share of a common liability to recover the excess from other joint tortfeasors who are also liable for the same harm to the same plaintiff. The right arises from common liability in tort for an indivisible injury and is limited to the amount paid beyond the paying tortfeasor's own equitable share.
Rhapsody Entertainment and Royal Crest Hotels were both found negligent for toxic runoff that contaminated a town's groundwater. Rhapsody paid the entire judgment after the jury held both companies jointly liable. Rhapsody then sued Royal Crest to recover a portion of the payment based on their shared responsibility for the single harm.
Raphael Rivera and Rita Russell were both found negligent for scaffolding that collapsed and injured a pedestrian. After a jury held both jointly liable for the same harm, Raphael paid the full judgment. Raphael then sued Rita to recover the amount he paid beyond his equitable share of the common liability.
Riley Rivera and Renee Rogers both participated in an event that injured Rosalind Reed. Riley acted with intent while Renee was merely negligent. After Riley paid the full judgment, he sought contribution from Renee. The court denied the claim because Riley intentionally caused the harm.
Radiance Media and Regal Apparel were held jointly liable for a product defect that harmed a consumer. Regal Apparel held a contractual right of indemnity against Radiance Media. After Regal Apparel paid the judgment, it attempted to obtain contribution from Radiance Media. The court held that the indemnity right eliminated any contribution claim between them.
Rhapsody Entertainment and Royal Crest Hotels co-sponsored an event where a spectator was injured due to combined negligence. Rhapsody paid the entire judgment. Rhapsody then brought an action against Royal Crest to reallocate the loss according to each party's equitable share of responsibility for the single injury.
On April 22, 1974, Glen Gregos, a teenage boy, was injured while participating in a cross-country motorcycle race for novices sponsored by the American Motorcycle Association and the Viking Motorcycle Club. Glen's second amended complaint alleged that the American Motorcycle Association and Viking negligently designed, managed, supervised, and administered the race and negligently solicited entrants. Such negligence was a direct and proximate cause of his injuries, including a crushed spine resulting in permanent loss of the use of his legs. Glen's parents, acting as guardians ad litem, filed the underlying action against the American Motorcycle Association, the Viking Motorcycle Club, and the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission. The American Motorcycle Association answered the complaint, denying the charging allegations and asserting affirmative defenses that included a claim that Glen's own negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries. Thereafter the American Motorcycle Association sought leave of court to file a cross-complaint against Glen's parents. The first cause of action alleged that the parents knew motorcycle racing is dangerous, were knowledgeable about Glen's training, directly participated in his decision to enter the race by signing a parental consent form, and negligently failed to exercise their power of supervision over their minor child. The second cause of action sought declaratory relief. It asked for a declaration of the allocable negligence of Glen's parents so that any damages awarded against the American Motorcycle Association could be reduced by the percentage allocable to the parents' negligence. The trial court denied the American Motorcycle Association's motion for leave to file the cross-complaint. The American Motorcycle Association petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to grant the motion. The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ. Ultimately the court granted a peremptory writ of mandate. Because of the statewide importance of the questions presented, the Supreme Court ordered a hearing in the case on its own motion.
View caseTwo banks were held secondarily liable under federal securities law for the same investor losses. One bank paid the full judgment and then sought contribution from the other bank. The court addressed whether contribution was available among parties jointly responsible for the identical harm.
In 1986 and 1988, the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority issued a total of $26 million in bonds to finance public improvements at Stetson Hills, a planned residential and commercial development in Colorado Springs. Petitioner Central Bank of Denver served as indenture trustee for the bond issues. The bonds were secured by landowner assessment liens covering about 250 acres for the 1986 issue and 272 acres for the 1988 issue. The bond covenants required that the land subject to the liens be worth at least 160% of the bonds' outstanding principal and interest, and AmWest Development, the developer, was to provide Central Bank with annual reports containing evidence that this test was met. In January 1988, AmWest provided Central Bank with an updated appraisal of the land securing the 1986 bonds and proposed for the 1988 bonds, showing values almost unchanged from 1986. A senior underwriter for the 1986 bonds soon expressed concern that declining property values in Colorado Springs meant the 160% test might not be met, given the appraisal was over 16 months old. Central Bank asked its in-house appraiser to review the 1988 appraisal, who found the values optimistic and suggested retaining an outside appraiser for an independent review. After an exchange of letters with AmWest in early 1988, Central Bank agreed to delay the independent review until the end of the year, six months after the June 1988 closing on the bond issue. Before the review was complete, the Authority defaulted on the 1988 bonds. Respondents First Interstate Bank of Denver and Jack K. Naber, who had purchased $2.1 million of the 1988 bonds, sued the Authority, underwriters, an AmWest director, and Central Bank for violations of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, alleging Central Bank was secondarily liable for aiding and abetting the fraud. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment to Central Bank. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact on recklessness and substantial assistance. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b).
View caseThe right arises when two or more persons become liable in tort to the same person for the same harm. It exists even without a judgment against all tortfeasors. One tortfeasor who pays more than an equitable share may recover the excess from the others.
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Yes. The paying tortfeasor may recover the amount paid in excess of its equitable share. The right is limited to that excess and cannot require any tortfeasor to pay more than its own equitable share.
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No. The right of contribution does not exist in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally caused the harm. This bar prevents intentional wrongdoers from shifting loss to others even when multiple parties share liability.
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When one tortfeasor holds a right of indemnity against another, neither may obtain contribution from the other. The indemnity relationship displaces the contribution doctrine entirely.
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Yes. A settling tortfeasor who discharges the entire claim by paying more than its equitable share may still pursue contribution. The absence of a judgment against other tortfeasors does not defeat the right.
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…of § 10(b), we have decided questions about the elements of the 10b-5 private liability scheme: for example, whether there is a right to contribution, what the statute of limitations is, whether there is a reliance requirement, and whether there is an in pari delicto defense. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau ,…