Also known as: effective assistance of counsel · ineffective assistance of counsel · Strickland right · 6th Amendment counsel right
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A Sixth Amendment guarantee that a criminal defendant receives representation by counsel whose performance satisfies an objective standard of reasonableness and whose errors do not undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.
Roland Rhodes was convicted after his appointed lawyer failed to call an available alibi witness. On postconviction review the court applied the presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and found that the omission did not so undermine the adversarial process that the verdict lost reliability.
Ruby Rivera told her lawyer she intended to testify falsely about her whereabouts. Counsel refused to elicit the testimony and warned that disclosure to the court would follow if she persisted. The court held that the lawyer's actions preserved rather than violated the right to effective assistance.
Ryan Roberts faced the death penalty. His lawyer presented no evidence of his troubled childhood or mental-health history despite leads that such mitigation existed. The reviewing court found the failure to investigate rendered the sentencing proceeding unreliable.
Rachel Ramirez insisted on proceeding pro se after the court conducted a thorough colloquy confirming her understanding of the charges and penalties. The conviction stood because the waiver was knowing and intelligent and no ineffective-assistance claim arose from the absence of counsel.
Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft in an information filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California. At the arraignment, the Superior Court Judge assigned to preside over the case appointed the public defender to represent him. Two and a half months later, Faretta requested that the judge allow him to represent himself. The judge questioned him about his ability to conduct his own defense. Faretta replied that he had some experience with the law. He had once represented himself in a criminal prosecution. He had a high school education. The judge initially accepted Faretta's waiver of the assistance of counsel in a preliminary ruling. The judge indicated that he might reverse this ruling if it later appeared that Faretta was unable adequately to represent himself. Several weeks thereafter, the judge sua sponte held a hearing to inquire into Faretta's ability to conduct his own defense. The judge questioned him specifically about both the hearsay rule and the state law governing the challenge of potential jurors. After consideration of Faretta's answers, the judge observed his demeanor. The judge ruled that Faretta had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel. The judge also ruled that Faretta had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense. The judge reversed his earlier ruling and appointed the public defender to represent Faretta. Faretta's subsequent request for leave to act as cocounsel was rejected. His efforts to make motions on his own behalf were rejected. Throughout the subsequent trial, the judge required that Faretta's defense be conducted only through the appointed lawyer from the public defender's office. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Faretta guilty as charged. The judge sentenced him to prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's ruling that Faretta had no federal or state constitutional right to represent himself. A petition for rehearing was denied without opinion. The California Supreme Court denied review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseRicardo Rojas was tried for a felony without any lawyer present. The court reversed the conviction because the complete absence of counsel at a critical stage violated the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance.
Petitioner Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in a Florida state court with having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under Florida law. Appearing in court without funds and without a lawyer, Gideon asked the court to appoint counsel for him. The court denied the request, stating that under the laws of the State of Florida the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. Put to trial before a jury, Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be expected from a layman. He made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the State’s witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself, and made a short argument emphasizing his innocence to the charge contained in the Information filed in this case. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and petitioner was sentenced to serve five years in the state prison. Later, petitioner filed in the Florida Supreme Court this habeas corpus petition. The petition attacked his conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial court’s refusal to appoint counsel for him denied him rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights by the United States Government. Treating the petition for habeas corpus as properly before it, the State Supreme Court, upon consideration thereof but without an opinion, denied all relief. Since 1942, when Betts v. Brady was decided by a divided Court, the problem of a defendant’s federal constitutional right to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts. To give this problem another review here, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Since Gideon was proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court appointed counsel to represent him and requested both sides to discuss in their briefs and oral arguments whether this Court’s holding in Betts v. Brady should be reconsidered.
View caseRiley Rivera pleaded guilty after counsel advised that the plea would avoid a harsher sentence. Later evidence showed the advice rested on a miscalculation of sentencing exposure. The court examined whether the deficient advice created a reasonable probability that Rivera would have insisted on trial.
The defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance created a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
Yes. Counsel must provide competent advice about plea offers and the consequences of accepting or rejecting them. Failure to communicate a favorable offer or to give accurate sentencing information can constitute deficient performance.
Prejudice is presumed in cases of actual or constructive denial of counsel at a critical stage or when counsel labors under an actual conflict that adversely affects performance.
Strategic decisions made after reasonable investigation are entitled to deference. A court will not find deficient performance when counsel's choice reflects a reasonable professional judgment even if the strategy ultimately fails.
…8, 87 S.Ct., at 827, n. 8; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). In my view, the right to effective assistance of counsel is entailed by the right to counsel, and abridgment of the former is equivalent to abridgment of the latter. I would thus hold that a showing that the performance of a defendant's…