A doctrine under which inchoate offenses such as solicitation, attempt, and conspiracy merge into a completed felony when the principal crime occurs. The completed offense absorbs the preliminary conduct so that only the felony supports conviction and punishment.
2
in property law
Sense 1
1
in criminal law
A doctrine under which inchoate offenses such as solicitation, attempt, and conspiracy merge into a completed felony when the principal crime occurs. The completed offense absorbs the preliminary conduct so that only the felony supports conviction and punishment.
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Common Law
Examples
Sense 2
2
in property law
A doctrine providing that a contract for the sale of land merges into the deed upon delivery and extinguishes contractual promises relating to title. The doctrine also extinguishes an easement when the same party acquires both the dominant and servient estates to the extent the fee permits the same uses.
A doctrine providing that a contract for the sale of land merges into the deed upon delivery and extinguishes contractual promises relating to title. The doctrine also extinguishes an easement when the same party acquires both the dominant and servient estates to the extent the fee permits the same uses.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
3
Solicitation Merges into Completed Burglary
Roland Rhodes asks a friend to break into a warehouse and steal electronics. The friend completes the burglary. Prosecutors charge Rhodes only with the completed felony. The inchoate solicitation merges into the burglary so that the preliminary conduct supports no separate conviction.
Conspiracy Merges into Completed Extortion
Roger Ramirez and Riley Rivera agree to extort money from a local business owner. They later carry out the extortion. Federal prosecutors obtain a conviction only on the completed offense. The conspiracy merges into the substantive crime and supplies no independent felony liability.
Callanan v. United States364 U.S. 587, 81 S.Ct. 321, 5 L.Ed.2d 312 (1961)
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri a jury convicted petitioner on two counts under the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act. Count I charged conspiracy to obstruct commerce by extorting money and Count II charged the substantive offense of obstructing commerce by extortion. The district court imposed consecutive twelve-year terms on each count but suspended the sentence on Count II and replaced it with a five-year probation term to commence upon expiration of the Count I sentence.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Petitioner then filed a motion in the district court under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking correction of the sentence. He asserted that the Act established a maximum penalty of twenty years for obstructing interstate commerce by any means and that Congress had not intended to authorize two separate penalties.
The district court denied relief. It held that the Hobbs Act gave no indication of any departure from the usual rule allowing cumulative punishment for conspiracy and the substantive crime that was its object. Petitioner appealed the denial to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because it deemed the question raised by petitioner of sufficient importance.
Rosa Ruiz and a co-conspirator agree to distribute controlled substances and then complete several sales. The government indicts only for the completed distribution offenses. The conspiracy merges into those felonies and cannot support a separate conviction under the merger doctrine.
Iannelli v. United States420 U.S. 770, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 43 L.Ed.2d 616
The case began when eight petitioners, together with seven unindicted coconspirators and six codefendants, were tried in the Western District of Pennsylvania under a six-count indictment that alleged federal gambling offenses. Each petitioner faced charges of conspiring to violate and of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1955, a statute that makes it a federal crime for five or more persons to conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own a gambling business prohibited by state law.
At trial the evidence showed that the petitioners owned and operated a large-scale illegal numbers game violating state law. The jury convicted each petitioner of both the substantive offense under § 1955 and the conspiracy offense under 18 U.S.C. § 371. The trial judge then imposed sentences on both counts for every petitioner.
On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conspiracy convictions. It reversed the substantive convictions, however, because the evidence failed to prove that each petitioner had conducted a gambling business involving five or more participants. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether Wharton's Rule barred the conspiracy convictions.
Does the merger doctrine prevent conviction for both an inchoate offense and the completed crime?
Yes. When the principal offense is completed the inchoate conduct merges into the felony so that only the completed crime supports conviction.
Supporting sources
Examples1
Contract Promise Merges into Deed
Raphael Rivera sells a commercial building to Renee Rogers under a contract that requires Rivera to repair the roof before closing. At closing Rivera delivers a warranty deed silent on the roof. Rogers later discovers the unrepaired roof. The contractual repair obligation merges into the deed and cannot be enforced after delivery.
3 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
When does a purchase contract merge into the deed under the merger doctrine?
Merger occurs upon delivery of the deed at closing. Contractual promises relating to title are extinguished while promises concerning physical condition may survive absent clear intent to merge.
Supporting sources
Does acquisition of both dominant and servient estates extinguish an easement by merger?
Yes. When one owner holds both estates the easement merges into the fee to the extent the fee permits the same uses that the easement authorized.
Supporting sources
Can a later sale revive an easement extinguished by prior unity of title?
No. Once merger occurs the easement is permanently extinguished. A subsequent conveyance that separates title does not revive the old servitude without a new grant or reservation.
Supporting sources
364 U.S. 587, 81 S. Ct. 321, 5 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1961)
…offense in one provision, § 1951, manifested an intent not to punish commission of two offenses cumulatively. Unlike the merger doctrine, petitioner’s position does not question that the Government could charge a conspiracy even when the substantive crime that was its object had been completed. His concern is with the…