Also known as: rules of nonappealability · nonappealability rule · nonappealability doctrine · final judgment rule
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An appellate rule that bars immediate review of most district-court orders until a final judgment is entered. The rule rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) for remand orders and on the final-judgment requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 for other interlocutory rulings that fail the collateral-order test.
Ridgeway Partners removed a state-law class action to federal court under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act. The district court found the claims outside the Act's preclusion provision and remanded the case to state court. Ridgeway Partners filed a notice of appeal. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal because the remand order fell squarely within the rule of nonappealability and no exception permitted immediate review.
Roberto Reyes sued Coopers & Lybrand on behalf of a putative class of investors. The district court denied class certification on the ground that individual issues predominated. Reyes appealed immediately, arguing the denial effectively ended the litigation. The court of appeals held the order nonappealable because it did not satisfy the collateral order doctrine's requirement of effective unreviewability after final judgment.
Coopers & Lybrand is an accounting firm that certified the financial statements in a prospectus issued in connection with a 1972 public offering of securities in Punta Gorda Isles for an aggregate price of over $18 million. Respondents purchased securities in reliance on that prospectus. In its next annual report to shareholders, Punta Gorda restated the earnings that had been reported in the prospectus for 1970 and 1971 by writing down its net income for each year by over $1 million. Thereafter, respondents sold their Punta Gorda securities and sustained a loss of $2,650 on their investment. Respondents filed this action on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated purchasers. They alleged that petitioner and other defendants had violated sections 11, 12(2), and 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The District Court first certified, and then, after further proceedings, decertified the class. Respondents did not request the District Court to certify its order for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Rather, they filed a notice of appeal pursuant to § 1291. The Court of Appeals regarded its appellate jurisdiction as depending on whether the decertification order had sounded the “death knell” of the action. After examining the amount of respondents’ claims in relation to their financial resources and the probable cost of the litigation, the court concluded that they would not pursue their claims individually. The Court of Appeals therefore held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and, on the merits, reversed the order decertifying the class. Because there is a conflict in the Circuits over this issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseRenee Rogers sued Mohawk Industries and sought production of documents she claimed were protected by attorney-client privilege. The district court ordered disclosure. Mohawk appealed at once, asserting the order would cause irreparable harm. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that ordinary privilege rulings remain subject to the rule of nonappealability and can be reviewed adequately after final judgment.
In 2007 Norman Carpenter, a former shift supervisor at a Mohawk manufacturing facility, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia alleging that Mohawk had terminated him in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1985(2) and Georgia laws. According to Carpenter’s complaint, his termination followed an e-mail he sent to a member of Mohawk’s human resources department stating that the company was employing undocumented immigrants. At the time Carpenter sent the e-mail, he was unaware that Mohawk stood accused in a pending class-action lawsuit, Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., No. 4:04-cv-00003-HLM (ND Ga., Jan. 6, 2004), of conspiring to drive down the wages of its legal employees by knowingly hiring undocumented workers in violation of federal and state racketeering laws. Company officials directed Carpenter to meet with Mohawk’s retained counsel in the Williams case. Counsel allegedly pressured Carpenter to recant his statements about the company’s hiring practices. When Carpenter refused, Mohawk fired him under what he maintains were false pretenses. After learning of Carpenter’s complaint, the Williams plaintiffs sought an evidentiary hearing to explore his allegations. In its response, Mohawk described Carpenter’s accusations as pure fantasy and recounted the true facts of his dismissal, stating that Carpenter had attempted to have Mohawk hire an undocumented worker, that retained counsel had interviewed him during an immediate investigation, and that the company had terminated him for blatantly violating company policy. While those events unfolded in the Williams case, discovery proceeded in Carpenter’s separate action. Carpenter moved to compel Mohawk to produce information concerning his meeting with retained counsel and the company’s termination decision. Mohawk maintained that the requested information was protected by the attorney-client privilege. The District Court agreed that the privilege applied but granted the motion to compel after concluding that Mohawk had implicitly waived the privilege through its representations in the Williams case. The court declined to certify its order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). The court stayed the ruling to allow Mohawk to pursue other appellate avenues, including a petition for mandamus or an appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Mohawk filed a notice of appeal and a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291, holding that the District Court’s ruling did not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541. The Eleventh Circuit also denied the mandamus petition. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits concerning the availability of collateral appeals in the attorney-client privilege context.
View caseThe rule originates in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which provides that an order remanding a case to state court is generally not reviewable on appeal. Courts have applied the same principle to other interlocutory orders that do not meet the collateral order exception.
Yes. An order is immediately appealable only if it conclusively determines a disputed question, resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits, and is effectively unreviewable after final judgment. Orders that fail any of these three conditions remain subject to the rule of nonappealability.
No. A sanctions order against an attorney is not a final decision and is not effectively unreviewable after final judgment in the underlying action. Such orders therefore fall within the rule of nonappealability.
No. The Supreme Court has held that the Act does not create an exception to the general rule of nonappealability for remand orders under § 1447(d). The court of appeals therefore lacks jurisdiction to review the remand.
…fining attorneys for discovery violations would result in “the very sorts of piecemeal appeals and concomitant delays that the final judgment rule was designed to prevent”). Attempting to downplay such concerns, Mohawk asserts that the three Circuits in which the collateral order doctrine currently applies to adverse privilege rulings…