Also known as: runs with the land · running with the land · ran with the land · covenant running with the land
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A covenant or promise respecting the use of land that passes automatically to successors in interest. The benefit or burden travels with the estate when the original parties intended it to do so and the successor acquires an interest in the land to which the promise relates.
Rowan Russell conveyed land to Renata Russo by general warranty deed containing covenants of title. Renata later conveyed the same parcel to Ruby Rivera. When a title defect surfaced, Ruby sued Rowan directly on the warranty. The covenant supported the claim because it had passed with each successive transfer of the estate.
Roberto Reyes promised Raphael Rivera that he would keep a shared driveway clear for access to the adjoining parcel. The deed recited that the promise was made for the benefit of the dominant land. When Raphael sold the dominant parcel to Ralph Richardson, Ralph enforced the promise against Roberto. The parties' recorded intent allowed the benefit to travel with the estate.
Reliance Insurance obtained a promise from a neighboring owner to maintain a boundary fence. Reliance later sold its parcel to Riverside Healthcare. Riverside sought to enforce the fence obligation. Because Riverside had succeeded to Reliance's interest in the land that the promise concerned, the benefit reached the new owner.
A surface owner acquired land subject to an old waiver allowing underground mining without liability for subsidence. The waiver had been given decades earlier by a prior surface owner. When the current owner sued to block mining that would damage the surface, the court considered whether the waiver bound successors. The analysis turned on whether the original covenant had passed with the surface estate.
In 1966 the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act to address land subsidence caused by underground coal mining. The Act authorizes the Department of Environmental Resources to implement and enforce a comprehensive program preventing or minimizing subsidence and consequent damage to surface structures. Section 4 prohibits mining that causes subsidence damage to public buildings, dwellings used for human habitation, and cemeteries, and generally requires that 50 percent of the coal beneath such structures remain in place to provide surface support. Petitioners are an association of coal producers and several of its member corporations engaged in underground bituminous coal mining in western Pennsylvania. They own, lease, or control substantial coal reserves and associated support estates beneath surface properties affected by the Subsidence Act. Many of these interests were severed from the surface estate between 1890 and 1920, and petitioners or their predecessors typically acquired waivers of liability for subsidence damage along with rights to deposit wastes, provide drainage and ventilation, and erect surface facilities. In 1982 petitioners filed a civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Resources and other officials. They sought to enjoin enforcement of the Subsidence Act and its implementing regulations, alleging that Section 4 and Section 6 effected a taking of their property without compensation and that Section 6 impaired their contractual obligations. The parties entered a stipulation of facts concerning the facial challenge and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department officials. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional challenges to the Subsidence Act. Petitioners have never claimed that the Subsidence Act makes it commercially impracticable for them to continue mining their bituminous coal interests in western Pennsylvania, nor have they identified any specific mine rendered unprofitable by the statute. The evidence in the record shows that enforcement of the 50 percent rule has required petitioners to leave less than 27 million tons of coal in place. This applies across 13 mines containing over 1.46 billion tons. It amounts to less than 2 percent of the total coal in those operations.
View caseA purchaser bought a garden square with actual knowledge that the prior owner had covenanted to keep it open for the benefit of surrounding houses. The buyer planned to build on the square. Adjoining owners sued in equity to stop the construction. The court enforced the restriction against the buyer because the covenant had passed with the land and the buyer took with notice.
In 1808, the plaintiff, then owner in fee of a vacant piece of ground in Leicester Square and of several houses forming the square, sold the piece of ground by the description of "Leicester Square garden or pleasure ground, with the equestrian statue then standing in the centre thereof, and the iron railing and stone work round the same," to one Elms in fee. The deed of conveyance contained a covenant by Elms, for himself, his heirs, and assigns, with the plaintiff, his heirs, executors, and administrators, that Elms, his heirs, and assigns should, and would from time to time and at all times thereafter at his and their own costs and charges, keep and maintain the said piece of ground and square garden and the iron railing round the same in its then form and in sufficient and proper repair as a square garden and pleasure ground, in an open state, uncovered with any buildings, and that it should be lawful for the inhabitants of Leicester Square, tenants of the plaintiff, on payment of a reasonable rent for the same, to have keys at their own expense and the privilege of admission therewith at any time or times into the said square garden and pleasure ground. The piece of land so conveyed passed by divers mesne conveyances into the hands of the defendant. His purchase deed contained no similar covenant with his vendor, but he admitted that he had purchased with notice of the covenant in the deed of 1808. The defendant manifested an intention to alter the character of the square garden and asserted a right, if he thought fit, to build upon it. The plaintiff, who still remained owner of several houses in the square, filed a bill for an injunction, and an injunction was granted by the Master of the Rolls restraining the defendant from converting or using the piece of ground and square garden, and the iron railing round the same, to or for any other purpose than as a square garden and pleasure ground in an open state and uncovered with buildings. On a motion to discharge that order, Mr. R. Palmer for the defendant contended that the covenant did not run with the land so as to be binding at law upon a purchaser from the covenantor, and he relied on the dictum of Lord Brougham C. in Keppell v. Bayley to the effect that notice of such a covenant did not give a court of equity jurisdiction to enforce it by injunction against such purchaser.
View caseA testator's will directed that her residence be razed after her death and the lot left vacant. The executor sought to sell the lot to a buyer who intended to build. Neighbors holding lots in the same subdivision claimed the direction created a running restriction. The court examined whether the restriction could bind successors to the estate and whether it violated public policy.
In 1902, a trust indenture established Kingsbury Place as a private subdivision in St. Louis, with covenants requiring maintenance as desirable residence property of the highest class. The indenture empowers trustees and property owners to enforce its provisions against encroachment or injury. Except for one vacant lot, the subdivision features spacious two and three-story homes used exclusively as private residences. Louise Woodruff Johnston, owner of the house at #4 Kingsbury Place, died on January 14, 1973. Her will directed the executor, Mercantile Trust Co., to cause the home to be razed and the land sold, with proceeds transferred to the residue of the estate. Following Johnston's death, neighboring property owners and trustees for the Kingsbury Place Subdivision filed suit against the executor seeking an injunction to prevent demolition of the house. The plaintiffs contended that razing the home would adversely affect their property rights and the community. During trial, uncontradicted testimony established that the current value of the house and land totaled $40,000, while the empty lot would fetch no more than $5,000 after $4,350 in demolition costs. The St. Louis Commission on Landmarks and Urban Design had designated Kingsbury Place as a city landmark due to its architectural significance. Witnesses testified that demolition would depreciate adjoining property values by an estimated $10,000 and create a break in the urban design continuity. The trial court dissolved the temporary restraining order and ruled against the plaintiffs on all issues. The plaintiffs then appealed the denial of their petition to the Missouri Court of Appeals.
View caseThe original parties must have intended the benefit to pass to successors. The promise must also relate to the use of the land, and the successor must acquire an interest in that land.
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Future covenants in a warranty deed run with the land and may be enforced by remote grantees against prior warrantors. Present covenants generally do not run in the same way and are enforceable only by the immediate grantee.
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A nonassuming transferee is not personally liable on the note or mortgage. Mortgage covenants that affect use or maintenance may still run with the land and bind the transferee to the extent they fall within the law of waste.
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The benefit still passes with the land if the original parties intended it to run. No separate assignment is required when the covenant touches and concerns the estate and the successor acquires the relevant interest.
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…as an action would depend not merely on the issue of fact, which was alone in dispute, but also upon whether the covenant ran with the land. It is clear, however, from the form of the order, that the injunction was not considered to depend upon the action; for if that had been the case, the plaintiff would have been ordered,…