Also known as: SC · S. C. · Supreme Court · South Carolina
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
An abbreviation used in legal citations to denote the Supreme Court.
An abbreviation placed between parallel citations to indicate the later report covers the identical case.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
An abbreviation used in legal citations to denote the Supreme Court.
Sapphire Holdings challenges a federal excise tax that applies only to imports entering through East Coast ports. The company argues the tax violates uniformity requirements when collected unevenly across states. The S.C. reviews whether Congress exercised its taxing power consistently nationwide.
Spencer Silver offers documents showing prior similar transactions to prove intent in a contract suit. The opposing party objects that the documents lack any tendency to prove a consequential fact. The S.C. determines whether the evidence meets the threshold for admission under relevance standards.
An abbreviation placed between parallel citations to indicate the later report covers the identical case.
1 common questions
It indicates that the same case is reported in both places.
Sasha Stone and Sean Steele reach an oral agreement for the sale of commercial property. Months later Steele sends a signed letter confirming the essential terms. The S.C. considers whether the later writing satisfies the statute even though it postdates formation.
Southland Foods, a state-run cafeteria operator, contests application of federal wage standards to its employees. The state claims the law interferes with traditional governmental functions. The S.C. holds that political safeguards rather than judicial limits protect state autonomy under the commerce power.
Sierra Santos purchases beachfront lots intending to build homes. A new state statute bars all construction to protect dunes. The S.C. examines whether the total deprivation of economic use constitutes a taking requiring compensation.
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation. Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures. Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.
View caseSolomon Silver seeks a writ to compel delivery of his judicial commission after the new administration withholds it. The S.C. declares that it possesses authority to review the constitutionality of acts of Congress and to refuse enforcement of conflicting statutes.
In December 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper petitioned the Supreme Court for a rule requiring Secretary of State James Madison to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue commanding delivery of their commissions as justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. The applicants had been nominated by outgoing President John Adams. The Senate had advised and consented to the appointments. Commissions in due form were signed by the President with the seal of the United States affixed by the Secretary of State. During the proceedings the Court heard testimony from Department of State clerks Jacob Wagner and Daniel Brent, who described the preparation and handling of the commissions. Wagner recalled that two commissions had been signed but could not confirm whether those of the applicants were recorded. Brent believed Marbury's and Hooe's commissions were made out. Ramsay's was omitted by mistake. None of the Adams-signed commissions for District justices were recorded. Attorney General Levi Lincoln, who had acted as Secretary of State, testified that he had seen signed and sealed commissions but did not know whether any for the applicants were ever sent out. James Marshall's affidavit stated that on March 4, 1801, he received and later returned several commissions from the Secretary of State's office, including those for Hooe and Harper. The applicants also submitted the affidavit of Hazen Kimball confirming that commissions for Marbury and Hooe were in the office on March 3, 1801. Madison did not appear or show cause after the rule was served. The motion for the writ itself was heard in the February 1803 term.
View caseSyllabus The Supreme Court of the United States has not power to issue a mandamus to a Secretary of State of the United States, it being an exercise of original jurisdiction not warranted by the Constitution.…