Also known as: sanciri · sancitus · sanction
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A Latin verb meaning to enact, confirm, or prescribe. In modern legal usage the term supplies the root of sanction, denoting a penalty or coercive measure imposed by a court or authority to enforce compliance or punish misconduct.
Vivienne formed Apex Advisory LLC with one thousand dollars and commingled Ralph's investment funds with her personal mortgage payments. When the fund collapsed she transferred the remaining assets to her brokerage account. The court disregarded the LLC form because adherence to the fiction would sanction fraud and allow her to evade personal liability on the guarantees she had given clients.
A shareholder created an undercapitalized entity that ignored corporate formalities and existed only to shield personal assets from creditors. The court applied the two-prong test and pierced the veil because treating the entity as separate would sanction injustice and permit the shareholder to escape liability for the debts he had personally guaranteed.
Federal narcotics agents conducted a warrantless search of a private residence and arrested the occupant without probable cause. The Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of action allowing the victim to recover damages directly under the Fourth Amendment, thereby sanctioning a remedy against individual officers for constitutional violations.
On the morning of November 26, 1965, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Webster Bivens's apartment in the Bronx. The agents broke open the door, handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and young children, and thoroughly searched the apartment. They then transported Bivens to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search. Several days later Bivens was released on his own recognizance, and he was never indicted or prosecuted for any offense. Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the six agents in their individual capacities. His complaint sought fifteen thousand dollars in damages from each agent and alleged that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, that unreasonable force was employed, and that the arrest was made without probable cause. Bivens claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' conduct. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the judgment.
View caseA state board of education required public school students to salute the flag and recite the pledge under threat of expulsion. The Supreme Court held that the compulsion violated the First Amendment and sanctioned the students' right to refrain from compelled speech without facing official penalty.
Following the Supreme Court's 1940 decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the West Virginia legislature amended its statutes to require all schools in the state to conduct courses of instruction in history, civics, and the Constitutions of the United States and West Virginia for the purpose of teaching, fostering, and perpetuating the ideals, principles, and spirit of Americanism. The State Board of Education was directed to prescribe the courses of study covering these subjects for public schools. Private, parochial, and denominational schools were required to prescribe similar courses. On January 9, 1942, the West Virginia State Board of Education adopted a resolution ordering that the salute to the flag become a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools, with all teachers and pupils required to participate. The resolution specified the stiff-arm salute with the right hand raised and palm turned up while repeating the pledge: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Refusal to salute was defined as an act of insubordination to be dealt with by expulsion. Readmission was denied by statute until compliance. The expelled child was treated as unlawfully absent. Parents or guardians faced prosecution with fines not exceeding $50 and jail terms not exceeding thirty days. The appellees are citizens of the United States and West Virginia who are Jehovah's Witnesses, an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by temporal government. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which prohibits making or bowing down to any graven image or likeness. They consider the flag an image within this command, leading them to refuse to salute it on religious grounds. Children of the appellees who were pupils in the public schools were expelled for their refusal to salute the flag and take the pledge of allegiance. Their parents were prosecuted for causing delinquency. Officials threatened to send the children to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined juveniles. The appellees brought suit in the United States District Court for themselves and others similarly situated to enjoin enforcement of the laws and regulations against them. The Board of Education moved to dismiss the complaint setting forth these facts. The complaint alleged that the law and regulations denied religious freedom and freedom of speech and were invalid under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cause was submitted on the pleadings to a District Court of three judges, which restrained enforcement as to the plaintiffs and those of that class. The Board of Education brought the case to the Supreme Court by direct appeal.
View caseA New York statute limited bakers to ten hours of work per day and sixty hours per week. The Supreme Court sanctioned the statute's invalidation under the Due Process Clause, holding that the hours restriction interfered with the liberty of contract between employers and employees.
The New York legislature passed a labor law in 1897 that regulated bakeries and confectionery establishments. Section 110 of article 8 of that law stated that no employee shall be required or permitted to work more than sixty hours in any one week or more than ten hours in any one day. This applied unless for the purpose of making a shorter work day on the last day of the week. The plaintiff in error violated the one hundred and tenth section of article 8, chapter 415, of the Laws of 1897, known as the labor law of the State of New York, in that he wrongfully and unlawfully required and permitted an employe working for him to work more than sixty hours in one week. The charge arose from a voluntary contract rather than any use of physical force. The judgments of the County Court of Oneida County, the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals of New York upheld the conviction under the statute, although several judges dissented. The record indicated that the state courts had viewed the law as a measure relating to public health. The case came before the Supreme Court of the United States after argument on February 23 and 24, 1905. The Court rendered its decision on April 17, 1905.
View caseA city ordinance authorized the taking of private land for a public street without payment. The Supreme Court sanctioned the requirement that just compensation be paid, holding that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and obligates payment for the property taken.
The City of Chicago, acting under an 1872 Illinois statute that became part of its charter in 1875, passed an ordinance on October 9, 1880, to open and widen Rockwell Street from West 18th Street to West 19th Street by condemning parcels of land owned by individuals and parts of the right of way of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company within the city limits. On November 12, 1890, the city filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking condemnation of the property and asking that just compensation be ascertained by a jury, with the railroad company admitted as a defendant along with other interested parties. The jury awarded one dollar as just compensation to the railroad company for the parts of its right of way to be used for the street, while awarding compensation to individual owners for their parcels. The railroad moved for a new trial, which was overruled, and final judgment was entered in execution of the award. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 149 Illinois 457. After affirmance the railroad company sued out a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court. The railroad had raised claims under the Fourteenth Amendment in its motion for new trial and in its assignment of errors filed in the state supreme court. The Illinois statute provided no provision for an answer by defendants in condemnation proceedings, but the railroad asserted its federal claims in the written motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.
View caseA plaintiff must show unity of interest and ownership so that the corporation and shareholder have no separate personalities, and that respecting the corporate form would sanction fraud or promote injustice. Factors such as commingling of funds, failure to observe formalities, and undercapitalization help establish the first element.
A court may impose monetary sanctions only when necessary for effective deterrence and only after the sanctioned party has received notice and an opportunity to respond. The sanction must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct.
Yes. Professional misconduct includes accomplishing a violation through the acts of another. A lawyer barred from appearing in a tribunal who drafts pleadings and directs a junior associate to file them while concealing the bar engages in prohibited conduct that subjects the barred lawyer to discipline.
Yes. A lawyer admitted in multiple jurisdictions remains subject to the disciplinary authority of each licensing state for the same course of conduct. The rules expressly recognize that a lawyer may be answerable to more than one jurisdiction.