Also known as: self-criminate · self-criminated · self-criminating · self-incrimination
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An act of providing testimony or other evidence that tends to establish one's own guilt in a criminal matter. The Fifth Amendment protects natural persons from being compelled to furnish such evidence when it is testimonial in nature.
Sydney Santos took the stand to describe her reputation for honesty in business dealings. On cross-examination the opposing party asked whether she had previously filed false tax returns that exposed her to criminal liability. Sydney invoked the privilege and the court sustained the objection because the inquiry touched only her character for truthfulness.
Sofia Stern was taken to the station in a locked cruiser and questioned for hours about missing funds. Officers never advised her of her rights to remain silent or to counsel. Her later statements were excluded because the questioning occurred in custody without the required warnings.
Stella Shapiro refused to answer questions in a state proceeding that could have led to criminal charges. The state court attempted to compel her testimony. The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege binds the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Sebastian Santos received a subpoena to testify before a grand jury about his own role in a conspiracy. After the government granted use and derivative-use immunity he answered the questions. His testimony could not later be used against him in a criminal prosecution.
In February 1971 petitioners were subpoenaed to appear before a United States grand jury in the Central District of California investigating violations of federal gambling and related laws. The government believed that petitioners were likely to assert their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Prior to the scheduled appearances, the government applied to the District Court for an order directing petitioners to answer questions and produce evidence before the grand jury under a grant of immunity conferred pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003. Petitioners opposed issuance of the order, contending that the scope of the immunity provided by the statute was not coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination and therefore was not sufficient to supplant the privilege and compel their testimony. The District Court rejected this contention and ordered petitioners to appear before the grand jury and answer its questions under the grant of immunity. Petitioners appeared but refused to answer questions, asserting their privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. They were brought before the District Court, and each persisted in his refusal to answer the grand jury's questions notwithstanding the grant of immunity. The court found both in contempt and committed them to the custody of the Attorney General until either they answered the grand jury's questions or the term of the grand jury expired. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the contempt findings. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether testimony may be compelled by granting immunity from the use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom or whether transactional immunity is necessary.
View caseSteven Silva was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Officers obtained a blood sample over his objection without any verbal questioning. The results were admissible because the physical evidence did not constitute compelled testimonial self-incrimination.
Petitioner Schmerber and a companion had been drinking at a tavern and bowling alley on November 12, 1964. Petitioner was driving from the bowling alley about midnight when the car skidded, crossed the road, and struck a tree. Both petitioner and his companion were injured and taken to a hospital for treatment. A police officer who arrived at the scene shortly after the accident smelled liquor on petitioner's breath and testified that petitioner's eyes were bloodshot, watery, and sort of a glassy appearance. The officer saw petitioner again at the hospital within two hours of the accident and noticed similar symptoms of drunkenness. He thereupon informed petitioner that he was under arrest and that he was entitled to the services of an attorney, that he could remain silent, and that anything he told the officer would be used against him in evidence. At the direction of a police officer, a blood sample was then withdrawn from petitioner's body by a physician at the hospital. The chemical analysis of this sample revealed a percent by weight of alcohol in his blood at the time of the offense which indicated intoxication. The report of this analysis was admitted in evidence at the trial. Petitioner objected to receipt of this evidence of the analysis on the ground that the blood had been withdrawn despite his refusal, on the advice of his counsel, to consent to the test. Petitioner was convicted in Los Angeles Municipal Court of the criminal offense of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The Appellate Department of the California Superior Court rejected petitioner's contentions and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseSylvia Santos and a co-defendant were tried together. The co-defendant's confession implicating Sylvia was introduced through a police officer. The court reversed the conviction because the statement was admitted without an opportunity for cross-examination and violated Sylvia's privilege against self-incrimination.
In June 1966, petitioner George William Bruton and codefendant Evans were jointly tried before a jury in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. They faced a federal charge of armed postal robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2114. A postal inspector testified that during two interrogations at the St. Louis city jail on April 11 and May 4, 1966, Evans orally confessed that he and Bruton had committed the robbery and that Evans had an accomplice whom he would not name. The interrogations followed an April 8 confession Evans gave to local police officers without warnings while held on state charges. Both defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court set aside Evans’ conviction on the ground that his oral confessions should not have been received in evidence against him. However, the court affirmed Bruton’s conviction because the trial judge had instructed the jury that Evans’ confession was competent evidence only against Evans and inadmissible hearsay against Bruton. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The trial had begun one week after Miranda v. Arizona, and the Court of Appeals applied that decision to hold the confessions tainted. On retrial Evans was acquitted. The Solicitor General later submitted a memorandum stating that in light of the record the judgment as to Bruton should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
View caseNo. A witness who testifies on another subject does not waive the privilege for questions that relate only to character for truthfulness. The protection remains intact for inquiries that would expose the witness to criminal liability.
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Yes. Any statement obtained during custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the person first receives warnings about the right to remain silent, the use of statements in court, the right to counsel, and the right to appointed counsel if indigent.
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Yes. The Fifth Amendment privilege is incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment and binds the states.
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…interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any…