Solo cedit quod solo implantatur.

Frederick Walz, owner of real estate in Richmond County, New York, filed suit in New York state courts seeking an injunction to prevent the New York City Tax Commission from granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for properties used solely for religious worship. The exemptions were authorized by Article 16, Section 1 of the New York Constitution, which permits exemptions for real or personal property used exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes and owned by nonprofit corporations or associations organized exclusively for such purposes. Walz contended that the exemptions indirectly required him to contribute to religious bodies by increasing the tax burden on non-exempt property. The New York City Tax Commission moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard oral argument on November 19, 1969. All fifty states provide tax exemptions for places of worship, most through constitutional provisions. New York has granted such exemptions since before the adoption of the First Amendment, and Congress has provided similar exemptions for church property in the District of Columbia since the early nineteenth century. The exemptions apply to a broad class of nonprofit organizations, including hospitals, libraries, scientific groups, and patriotic societies, not solely to religious organizations.

Nancy Christian was the tenant of an apartment whose lessors had been notified by her on November 1, 1963, that the knob of the cold water faucet on the bathroom basin was cracked and should be replaced. On November 30, 1963, plaintiff Rowland entered the apartment at Christian's invitation as a social guest and was injured while using the bathroom fixtures when the porcelain handle of one of the water faucets broke in his hand. The injury severed the tendons and medial nerve in Rowland's right hand. He incurred medical and hospital expenses, suffered loss of wages, and sustained damage to his clothing. Rowland later filed a complaint alleging that the bathroom fixtures were dangerous, that Christian was aware of the dangerous condition, and that his injuries were proximately caused by her negligence. Christian filed an answer containing a general denial except that she admitted telling the lessors the faucet was defective and should be replaced. She also alleged contributory negligence and assumption of the risk on the ground that Rowland had failed to use his eyesight and knew of the condition of the premises. Christian supported her motion for summary judgment with an affidavit stating that Rowland was a social guest who had used the bathroom on a prior occasion and that the handle broke while he was using the faucet. In opposition, Rowland filed an affidavit stating that immediately prior to the accident he told Christian he was going to use the bathroom facilities, that she had known for two weeks that the faucet handle was cracked, that she had warned the manager of the building of the condition but nothing was done to repair it, that she did not warn him of the condition, and that the handle broke when he turned off the faucet. The trial court granted summary judgment for Christian, and Rowland appealed.

Stiffel Company secured design and mechanical patents on a pole lamp. The lamp was a vertical tube having lamp fixtures along the outside and constructed to stand upright between floor and ceiling. Pole lamps achieved commercial success after Stiffel brought them to market. Sears, Roebuck & Company subsequently placed on the market a substantially identical lamp that it sold at a lower price. Its retail price matched Stiffel's wholesale price. Stiffel brought an action against Sears in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Its first count claimed that Sears had infringed the patents by copying the design. The second count alleged that Sears had engaged in unfair competition under Illinois law by causing confusion in the trade as to the source of the lamps. Evidence introduced included the absence of identifying tags on Sears lamps, although labels appeared on the cartons delivered to customers. Additional evidence showed customer inquiries to Stiffel about differences from Sears lamps and complaints from two customers who had purchased Stiffel lamps upon learning of the cheaper Sears versions. After determining that the patents were invalid for want of invention, the District Court found as a fact that Sears' lamp was a substantially exact copy of Stiffel's. The lamps were so alike in appearance and functional details that confusion between them was likely and had already occurred in some cases. The court then entered judgment against Sears on the unfair competition claim. It enjoined Sears from selling or attempting to sell pole lamps identical to or confusingly similar to Stiffel's lamp. The court also ordered an accounting to determine profits and damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question presented by the case.